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The boundaries of my language signify the borders of my world.
-- Ludwig Wittgenstein 1
Introduction: The Limits of Language
Legal phrases, maxims and rules often enhance efficient dispute resolution by
providing intellectual hooks on which to hang analysis, as well as mental handles with
which to arrange otherwise complex arguments. Like the questions we ask, the language
of the law can shape the choices ultimately made by arbitrators and judges.
Words can beget misunderstanding as well as insight, however. Expressions
which bear multiple meanings often find themselves employed with promiscuous
disregard to context and function.
The disorienting effect of language finds illustration in the principle that
arbitrators may rule on their own authority. Often expressed as Kompetenz-Kompetenz 2

1

Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt. LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (1921), at § 5.6. In the original, the
juxtaposition of boundaries (Grenzen) and the verb to signify (bedeuten) is particularly
striking, since linguistic meaning usually grounds itself in distinctions and demarcation.
An Austrian philosopher who taught at Cambridge in the early 20th century, Wittgenstein
continues to influence legal theory in certain quarters. See EDUARDO SILVA ROMERO,
WITTGENSTEIN ET LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (2002), § 271 at 353-355; PROTRACTATUS,
AN EARLY VERSION OF TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (B.F. McGuinness, T.
Nyberg & G. H. von Wright, eds., D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuiness, trans., 1971);
TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (Pierre Klossowski, trans., 1961), providing a
slightly nuanced rendering of the cited phrase, “Les limites de mon langage signifient les
limites de mon propre monde.” Id. at 86.
2
Normally interchangeable, compétence-compétence and Kompetenz-Kompetenz often
take their usage by the speaker’s preference for a German or a French formulation.
Given a slight scholarly preference for the German phrase, that formulation will be used
in this paper. See generally Pierre Mayer, L'Autonomie de l'arbitre dans l'appréciation de
sa propre compétence, 217 RECUEIL DES COURS 320 (Académie de droit international de
La Haye 1989); Emmanuel Gaillard, L’effet negative de la competence-compétence, in
ÉTUDES DE PROCÉDURES ET D’ARBITRAGE EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET
385 (J. Haldy, J-M. Rapp & P. Ferrari, eds., 1999); ADAM SAMUEL, JURISDICTIONAL
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Chs. 4 & 5, 177-274 (1989).

3

(literally “jurisdiction on jurisdiction”), the precept has been applied to questions such as
who must arbitrate, what must be arbitrated, and which powers arbitrators may exercise. 3
As we shall see, this much-vexed principle possesses a chameleon-like quality that
changes color according to the national and institutional background of its application.
The basic rule that arbitrators may decide on their own jurisdiction says nothing
about who ultimately decides a particular case. Rather, the rule states only that the
question of “who decides what” may itself be addressed by an arbitrator. At least until a
competent court directs otherwise, arbitral proceedings need not stop just because one
side challenges the arbitrator’s authority.
To say that arbitrators may make jurisdictional decisions tells only part of the
story. 4 Every jurisdictional ruling by an arbitrator begs two further questions, one
relating to timing and the other to finality.
The timing question asks when judges should intervene in the arbitral process to
monitor possible jurisdictional excess. If an unhappy respondent denies having agreed to
arbitrate, a court might be requested to declare the arbitration clause invalid. Should a
judge entertain a “mid-arbitration” request to stop the proceedings? Or should the
respondent be required to wait until an award has been rendered, and only then seek
vacatur for alleged jurisdictional excess?
Each alternative carries its own risks and opportunities for mischief. Delay in
3

When the very existence of the arbitration agreement is challenged, the term
“arbitrator” may turn out to be a misnomer. However, to avoid an unduly heavy style,
discussions of arbitral jurisdiction often speak of “arbitrator” (rather than “alleged
arbitrator”) even when that status remains an open question. In that context, the term is
used for convenience, with no intent to presume ultimate conclusions on the matter.
4

While thoughts may be simultaneous, words remain sequential, creating a chronically
inadequate container for legal truth, reminiscent of the “treasure in earthen vessels”
mentioned in Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians (II Cor. 4:7).

4

judicial scrutiny can subject respondents to the expense of unauthorized proceedings
before overreaching arbitrators. 5 However, early access to courts increases opportunities
for dilatory tactics. In the business world, determining the scope of arbitration clauses
may implicate time-consuming investigations into complex questions of fact and law
related to matters such as agency relationships and the corporate veil. 6
The second question relates to the effect that judges should give to arbitrators’
jurisdictional rulings. In what circumstances (if any) should an arbitrator’s decision on
his or her authority be final?
Legal systems differ on whether and when an arbitrator’s decision on his or her
authority should foreclose judicial determination on the matter. Some countries (notably
the United States) implement the litigants’ agreement to have arbitral authority
determined by the arbitrators themselves. Judges, of course, must still ask what (if
anything) the parties actually expected the arbitrator to decide. 7 Assuming such an
agreement exists, however, it will be respected.

5

Under some circumstances (depending on the applicable institutional rules and arbitral
situs) the arbitrators may award costs against the losing party, including attorneys’ fees.
Not always, however, as proven by recent American case law. See CIT Project Finance v.
Credit Suisse First Boston, 799 NYS2d 159, 2004 WL 2941331 (2004), holding an award
of attorneys’ fees to be permissible only if explicitly provided in the parties’ agreement.
6

See e.g., Intergen v. Grina, 344 F. 3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (litigation between two parent
entities, neither of which had signed arbitration clause, with one side seeking a “plaintiff
friendly” court); Bridas v. Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2006) (government
manipulation of oil company made it the state’s alter ego); Sarhank v. Oracle Corp., 404
F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005) (parent should not answer pursuant to arbitration clause signed by
subsidiary); Kazakhstan v. Istil Group, [2006] EWHC 448 (Comm.) Queen’s Bench
(vacating award against Kazakhstan for lack of substantive jurisdiction.); Fluor Daniel
Intercontinental v. General Electric Co., 1999 WL 637236 (SDNY, 20 August 1999)
(estoppel required signatories of arbitration clauses to arbitrate with non-signatory).
7

In many instances the question will be more along the lines of what the parties
expectations would have been had they given the matter any thought.

5

Other countries (notably Germany) seem to preclude such agreements to arbitrate
arbitrability. This approach sacrifices liberty of contract in order to provide an extra
measure of protection against inadvertent loss of the proverbial day in court.
This dual line of inquiry, looking at timing of judicial intervention and effect of
arbitral determinations, can remove much of the mystification afflicting jurisdictional
discourse in arbitration law. From a policy perspective, the correct answers will not
always be self-evident. However, asking the right questions, rather than simply reciting a
catch-phrase, permits attention to costs and benefits of each alternative, enhancing the
transactional security and economic cooperation that can be facilitated by arbitration. 8
I.

The Basics
A.

An Anti-sabotage Mechanism
1. The Principle in Primitive Form

In its most primitive form, the principle that arbitrators may rule on their

8

While the rationale for arbitration varies according to context, its core value lies in the
same principles that justify freedom of contract. Business managers can negotiate a “fix
to fit the fuss” as people in the American South say. For international contracts,
arbitration enhances neutrality (and thus predictability) and secures a significant treaty
enforcement mechanism. In business-to-business transactions, arbitration can facilitate
access to expertise, particularly in construction and reinsurance. By contrast, the
motivator for American consumer arbitration often lies in avoiding jury trial. This does
not mean that arbitration commends itself for all agreements. See Theodore Eisenberg
and Geoff Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante
Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts (30 August 2006), Cornell
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, which studies more than two thousand contracts
contained as exhibits in 2002 for Form 8-K SEC filings, required under American
securities laws for material events. The study finds that only 11 % of the contracts
included arbitration clauses. The highest rates were to be found at 37% and 33% for
employment and licensing contracts respectively.

6

jurisdiction serves as a measure to protect against having an arbitration derailed before it
begins. The arbitral tribunal (and/or the relevant arbitral institution) need not halt the
proceedings just because one side questions its authority. The principle reduces the
prospect that proceedings will be derailed through a simple allegation that an arbitration
clause is unenforceable, due to any number of contract law defenses. In most legal
systems, 9 arbitrators can get on with their work until ordered to stop by a judge with
authority to do so. 10
The rule is not foolproof, of course, given the eternal ingenuity with which fools
often acquit themselves. Recalcitrant parties can still mount troublesome court
9

Exceptions do exist, however. In China, for example, the power to rule on the validity
of an arbitration agreement is given to “the arbitration commission” (which is to say, the
supervisory arbitral institution) rather than the arbitrators. The assumption seems to be
that ad hoc arbitration does not take place in China. Article 20 of the Arbitration Law of
the People’s Republic of China (effective 1 September 1995) provides, “If a party
challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement, he may request the arbitration
commission to make a decision or apply to the People’s Court for a ruling. If one party
requests the arbitration commission to make a decision and the other party applies to the
People’s Court for a ruling, the People’s Court shall give a ruling.” See translation in
CHENG DEJUN, MICHAEL J. MOSER, & WANG SHENGCHANG, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2nd edn, 2000), at 727. Article 26 of the same
statute provides that an arbitration agreement must designate an “arbitration
commission”. While this term clearly includes Chinese arbitration institutions, it is not
entirely certainly to what extent foreign associations fall within its purview. See
discussion in Jingzhou Tao, Articles 16 and 18 of the PRC Arbitration Law,
23 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL (2007), forthcoming.
10

Anti-arbitration injunctions issued by courts with questionable authority over the
arbitration raise issues beyond the scope of this paper. See Emmanuel Gaillard,
Reflections on the Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration, in Pervasive
Problems in International Arbitration 203 (L. Mistelis & J. Lew, eds. 2006). See also
Hakeem Seriki, Anti-Suit Injunctions and Arbitration: A Final Nail in the Coffin?, 23(1)
J. INT’L ARB. 2 (2006). For the time being, let us assume that a Massachusetts court
monitors an arbitration taking place in Boston, that a Paris judge is asked to recognize an
award rendered against a French company, or that a Swiss judge is called to enforce an
award by attaching assets in a Geneva bank. We can leave for another day the
circumstances under which a court in Mumbai or Karachi might attempt to enjoin an
arbitration in London.

7

challenges (even if not ultimately successful) designed to slow the train. 11 However, the
principle does avoid conceptual barriers to arbitration that would exist if legal systems
considered jurisdictional powers of judges and of arbitrators to be mutually exclusive. 12
On occasion, analogies have been made between arbitral jurisdiction and the
power of courts to construe constitutional provisions related to their authority. Such
comparisons should be resisted. Few non-circular options exist for interpreting judicial
authority, at least in western legal systems. By contrast, in commercial arbitration the
enforcement of arbitral authority (initially a matter of the litigants’ consent 13) normally
rests with national courts, which must undertake some investigation into the legitimacy of
that authority as part of the enforcement process.
2. Diversity: The Timing and Impact of Court Intervention
Although most countries accept that a jurisdictional objection does not
automatically stop an arbitration, little consensus exists on other aspects of an arbitrator’s

11

See generally PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD, & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN,
TRAITÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1996), Sections 660-682; W.
LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK, & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION (3rd ed, 2000), at 48-49 & 512-515; W. MICHAEL REISMAN, W.
LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (1997), at 524-540 & 645-664; Antonias Dimolitsa, Autonomie et
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 1998 Rev. arb. 305.
12

While few modern legal systems follow such an approach, vestiges can still be found in
some court decisions. See MBNA America Bank v. Loretta Credit, 281 Kansas 655
(2006), discussed infra.
13

Without such consent, there would be insufficient connections to the parties or
transaction sufficient to justify any jurisdiction at all. The state does, of course, provide
support for the parties’ agreement, principally in the form of judicial enforcement of the
award, conditioned on the respect for minimum standards of procedural fairness. The
consent underlying arbitration remains qualitatively different from the implied
submission to government courts that arguably results from living in society. Arbitration
agreements empower a particular adjudicator to decide specific questions with respect to
a limited number of persons, constrained by a contractually-conferred mission.

8

ruling on his or her authority. National practice diverges in both (i) the timing of court
examination of arbitral authority and (ii) the impact that an arbitrator’s jurisdictional
ruling will have in a judicial proceeding.
Diversity results from the fact that an arbitrator’s jurisdictional power, at least in
commercial arbitration, 14 derives from national law and institutional rules, 15 not from the
treaty framework imposed by the New York Convention. 16 Consequently, the expression
Kompetenz-Kompetenz has thus taken on several lives, giving rise to a constellation of
related but distinct notions, often subject to undue mystification. 17 While commentators
sometimes refer to “the internationally recognized doctrine” of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 18

14

A different regime obtains for investment arbitration under the ICSID Rules, under
which awards are subject to review not by national courts, but by an internal annulment
process. See Article 52 of the 1965 Washington Convention. Treaty foundations also
exist for other supra-national adjudicatory bodies, such as the European Court of Justice,
the International Court of Justice, and the European Court on Human Rights.
15

For institutional incarnations of the principle, see e.g., ICC Rules Article 6,
UNCITRAL Rules Article 21, AAA International Rules Article 15, LCIA Rules Article 23
and ICSID Rules Article 41.
16

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330
U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1958). Twenty four countries originally
signed the Convention. The rest have joined by accession or succession. The most recent
adherents include Afghanistan, Liberia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, bringing
to one hundred thirty-eight (138) the total number of countries bound by the treaty.
Although the Convention requires courts to respect arbitration agreements and awards,
grounds for invalidating an arbitration clause lie with national law. For example, Article
V(1)(a) speaks of the parties incapacity “under the law applicable to them” or the
agreement’s invalidity under “the law to which the parties have subjected it.” In this, the
Convention is not unlike Section 2 of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act, which leaves the
validity of an arbitration agreement to state contract law.
17

Unfortunately, more than one symposium has given the principle an unfortunate
oversimplification, with sweeping generalizations that derive either from the ignorance of
a novice or (in some instances) the polemical mischief of someone who knows better but
for ideological reasons suggests that “international jurisdictional standards” represents a
synonym for the way things are done in France.
18

DAVID JOSEPH, JURISDICTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THEIR
ENFORCEMENT (2005), Section 13.23, at 392. Compare Laurent Lévy, Anti-Suit
9

it would be more accurate to speak of doctrines in the plural. 19 Variations derive both
from disparate implementations of the principle and from divergent views on what
exactly is meant by a “jurisdictional question”. 20
To illustrate, if German courts are asked to hear a matter which one side asserts is
subject to arbitration, they would decide immediately on the validity and scope of the
arbitration agreement. 21 In neighboring France, challenge of arbitration clauses must
normally wait until an award has been rendered. 22
Across the Channel in England, litigants have a right to declaratory decisions on

Injunctions Issued by Arbitrtors, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBIRTRATION 115 (E. Gaillard, ed. 2005) suggesting that “in upholding their
jurisdiction, arbitrators implicitly declare than any other court .. is prevented from ruling
on the same matter.” Id. at 117. While consistent with French doctrine, this position
would not represent expectations of most American arbitrators, familiar with possible
judicial decisions on jurisdiction during arbitral proceedings. Other perspectives in this
collection of essays on anti-suit injunctions include contributions by Axel Baum, Frédéric
Bachand, Matthieu de Boisséson, José Carlos Fernnández Rozas, Philippe Fouchard,
Christopher Greenwood, Konstantinos Kerameus, Julian Lew, Michael Schneider and
Steven Schwebel.
19

In some literature, it has also been suggested that so-called “anti-suit injunctions”
issued against arbitration violate the principle that arbitrators determine their own
jurisdiction. See Emmanuel Gaillard, Il est interdit d’interdire, 2004 REV. ARB. 47
(2004), discussed infra. The usefulness of such a perspective depends on what version of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz principles are taken as a standard baseline.
20

As models for various wrinkles on the problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the current
paper focuses on the law of six legal systems: England, France, Germany, Switzerland,
the United States and the UNCITRAL Model Law. This selection was made to further
analytic clarity, and in no way implies a lack of interest or importance with respect to
other legal systems.

21

ZPO, Section 1032(1).

22

NCPC, Article 1458. In some countries, notably Greece, distinctions seem to be made
between decisions confirming jurisdiction (review permitted) and denying jurisdiction
(review not permitted). See STELIOS KOUSSOULIS, JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2000) at 59-62.

10

arbitral authority only if they take no part in the arbitration. 23 In Germany the
admissibility of such applications depends on whether the arbitral tribunal has already
been constituted. 24 By contrast, it seems that courts may entertain applications for
jurisdictional declarations at any time in Sweden 25 and in Finland. 26
In Switzerland, courts asked to appoint an arbitrator will normally apply a prima
facie standard in deciding whether the arbitration clause is valid, but engage in full
consideration of jurisdiction (at least as to law) in the context of award review. 27
American courts, however, may order full examination of the validity of an arbitration
clause at any stage of the arbitral process to determine whether, as a matter of fact and
law, the parties have indeed agreed to arbitrate. 28
The United States generally permits parties to give arbitrators the final word on
some aspects of arbitral power. 29 A similar result would seem to obtain in Finland. 30 In

23

1996 English Arbitration Act, Section 72.

24

ZPO, Section1032(2), permitting applications only before the tribunal’s constitution.

25

1999 Swedish Arbitration Act, Section 2, discussed in Kaj Hobér, Arbitration Reform
in Sweden, 17 ARB. INT’L 351 (2001) at 357-58; Christopher Seppälä, Comment on
Section 2 of the Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999 Dealing with the Right of Arbitrators to
Rule on their Own Jurisdiction, in THE SWEDISH ARBITRATION ACT OF 1999 FIVE YEARS
ON: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 45 (Lars Heuman & Sigvard
Jarvin, eds. 2006).
26

Petri Taivalkoski, Le nouveau droit finlandais de l’arbitrage international, in
RECHERCHE SUR L’ARBITRAGE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARÉ 126 (1997).
Making reference to Section 50 of the 1992 Arbitration Act (23 October 1992/967), Dr.
Taivalkoski writes, “Quant à la demande principale concernant la validité de la
convention d’arbitrage, le droit finlandais prévoit la possibilité d’intenter une action
déclaratoire de nullité contre la convention d’arbitrage indépendamment de toute action
au fond.” Id. at 158 .
27

LDIP, Articles 7 and 179(3).

28

Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp. 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).

29

See discussion of First Options, infra.

11

other countries, however, the effect of such agreements remains far from clear. 31
In light of this multiplicity of applications, the temptation exists to suggest that
the term Kompetenz-Kompetenz be exiled from the arbitration lexicon, and that scholars
abandon any hope of rationalizing the principle. Such radical change would be illadvised, however. Only the most compelling reasons justify banishment of time-honored
notions. 32 The remedy for confusion will normally lie in a fuller appreciation of the
contextual application of the term, a task to which we now turn.
The modest suggestions of this paper are threefold. First, discourse about arbitral
jurisdiction suffers considerable damage through loose jargon divorced from specific
national practice. What matters is when courts examine the parties’ actual agreements
about arbitral authority and the effect (if any) that judge give those agreements. Second,
agreements to submit jurisdictional questions to arbitration should be honored but not
presumed. Finally, although arguments about the timing of judicial intervention remain
finely balanced, the weightier considerations argue for postponing most jurisdictional

30

Gustaf Möller, The Arbitration Agreement, LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION IN
FINLAND 7 (Finnish Arbitration Association 2004), noting as follows: “[T]he parties may
by a separate arbitration agreement confer on the arbitrators the power to finally
determine the matter of jurisdiction in a final and binding award. A specific separate
arbitration agreement as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal will give the tribunal
the power to decide this question and has the effect that a party expressly waives his right
to challenge the award on jurisdiction. Conversely, if the arbitral tribunal – subjectg to a
specific agreement to make a final decision on jurisdiction – finds that it has no
jurisdiction, such decision would be final.” Id. at 17.
31

See discussion of jurisdictional agreements in German law, infra.

32

One recalls the words of Jean Portalis, an illustrious author of the French Civil Code:
Tout ce qui est ancien a été nouveau; l'essentiel est d'imprimer aux institutions nouvelles
le caractère de permanence et de stabilité qui puisse leur garantir le droit de devenir
anciennes. (“All which is old was once new; the essential is to imprint on new
institutions the character of permanence and stability capable of guaranteeing their right
to become old.”) Discours préliminaire sur le projet de Code civil (1804).

12

inquiry until after the award has been rendered.
B.

Judicial Intervention: When and to What Extent?
1. The Shadow of Public Power

On its face, Kompetenz-Kompetenz addresses the powers of arbitrators, in
particular their right to make jurisdictional rulings. The flip side of the equation,
however, reveals a rule about courts, and the limitations on judges’ ability to hear certain
matters imposed when litigants decide (or allegedly decide) to submit controverted
questions to private dispute resolution. This reverse perspective highlights the heart of
understanding how the principle works in practice.
Although private, arbitration proceeds in the shadow of public coercion.
Arbitrators have no marshals or sheriffs, and thus parties often ask judges to stay
litigation, compel arbitral proceedings, seize assets or grant res judicata effect to an
award so as to preclude competing court actions. The contours of arbitral power thus
concern not only arbitrator and litigants, but also national legal systems which must
establish guidelines for when and to what extent courts may intervene to review or to preempt the arbitrator’s jurisdictional ruling.
From the perspective of a national legal system, challenges to an arbitrator’s
authority raise two distinct questions. The first relates to the point in the arbitral process
when courts ought to examine arbitral authority to prevent or correct an excess of
jurisdiction. 33 The second addresses the matter of when (if ever) courts should defer to
an arbitrator’s jurisdictional determination as final.
33

The somewhat awkward phraseology, “preventing or correcting” imposes itself by
virtue of the fact that judges sometimes intervene at the beginning of the process (to
compel arbitration or to consider competing court litigation) and sometimes at the end (to
review awards).

13

2. Timing
The first inquiry concerns the timing of judicial intervention. Paradigms range
from the American approach (courts may intervene at any moment) to the French model
(courts wait until after an award is rendered). The difference becomes significant when
one side to the dispute makes application to a court with supervisory (curial) competence
over the arbitration, asking that the proceedings be stopped or that a case be heard
notwithstanding an alleged arbitration clause. 34
Between these two extremes, many legal systems provide hybrid timing solutions
that vary according to the specific posture in which arbitral jurisdiction has been
challenged. One standard might apply when a legal action is brought in respect of
matters purportedly referred to arbitration. Another standard might pertain to motion for
declaratory judicial determination of preliminary jurisdictional questions. Distinctions
might be made depending on whether the applicant has or has not taken part in the
arbitration. 35
3. Effect of an Arbitrator’s Determination
The other question relates to the effect of an arbitration agreement on
jurisdictional questions. A legal system might take the position that all arbitral decisions

34

On the costs and benefits of different timing options, see Christopher Seppälä,
Comment on Section 2 of the Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999 Dealing with the Right of
Arbitrators to Rule on their Own Jurisdiction, in THE SWEDISH ARBITRATION ACT OF
1999 FIVE YEARS ON: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 45 (Lars
Heuman & Sigvard Jarvin, eds. 2006).
35

In England, for example, one can see the interaction of 1996 Act Sections 9 (stay of
legal proceedings in respect of matters referred to arbitration), 30 (jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction), 32 (application for judicial determination of preliminary
questions) and 72 (person who takes no part in arbitration may apply for court
declaration). Compare the situation with respect to pre-award judicial intervention in
Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, all discussed infra.
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on jurisdiction may be reviewed de novo by the appropriate court. 36 However, such is not
the only option, or even the most sensible one. An alternative would be for courts to ask
what jurisdictional matters the parties agreed the arbitrator would decide, and to defer
accordingly.
Each option presents its own risks, requiring lawmakers to navigate between
policy dangers much as Odysseus had to sail between Scylla and Charybdis. If courts
may defer to arbitrators on jurisdictional matters, intellectual sloppiness (or a desire to
clear dockets) might lead judges to accept mere contract recitals rather than to engage in
rigorous inquiry into what the parties really meant. The other risk lies in undue rigidity,
precluding recognition even of the litigants’ clearly expressed wishes for finality in
arbitral determinations about jurisdiction issues.
In systems where courts may defer to an arbitrator’s jurisdictional determination,
judges must still examine arbitral authority. However, the analysis takes place at a
different level, asking whether the parties intended an arbitrator to have the last word on a
particular jurisdictional issue. The pertinent question is what the contract provides. 37
With the obvious exception of challenges based on public policy (non-arbitrable
subjects), analysis would normally focus on the parties’ pre-dispute intent. Courts must
examine the facts of each case as they bear on the parties’ pre-dispute expectations. If
36

In most cases, courts will have the last word on jurisdiction, rendering misplaced the
fretting about arbitrators’ “unfettered discretion” such as evidenced in Ottley v.
Sheepshead Nursing Home, 688 F. 2d 882 (2d Cir. 1982) at 898 (Lombard, J., dissenting).
37

The alternative of no judicial review does not necessarily conflict with the first and
second timing alternatives. It might be that an American court, examining jurisdiction
early in the game when a motion is made to compel arbitration, comes to the conclusion
that the parties intended for the relevant issue to be given to the arbitrator for decision.
As discussed below, the two timing extremes are represented by the French model (which
defers judicial intervention until the award stage) and the situation in the United States
(where courts may address arbitral jurisdiction at any moment).

15

(and only if) the litigants intended arbitration of a particular jurisdictional question, the
matter would be given to the arbitrator for ultimate disposition, not just an expression of
preliminary views. However, in all events courts would first look seriously at the parties’
expectations.

4. A Cautionary Tale about an (Allegedly) Lazy Professor
The point about the binding nature of an agreement to arbitrate jurisdiction might
be illustrated by the following scenario. Imagine a publication dispute between a law
journal and a learned professor. Having written an article for the journal, the professor
asserts that the editor agreed to pay a $1000 royalty. On failure to pay, she files an
arbitration claim based on what she believes to constitute a valid arbitration clause in the
license to publish.
“No way!” the editor replies. “On its face, the clause provides that an arbitrator
has jurisdiction only over claims filed within thirty days after the dispute arises. This
lazy professor missed that deadline, having waited to file her claim on the 4th of July,
more than two months after our early May disagreement on the matter.”
The professor sees things quite differently. She replies that no differences arose
until the middle of June. She recalls no discussion in May, and challenges the editor’s
recollection.
Primitive Kompetenz-Kompetenz notions would permit an arbitration to go
forward notwithstanding the challenge, at least until a competent court directs otherwise.
The French approach would go further, allowing an arbitrator to address his or her
authority free from judicial interference until after an award has been rendered.
It might be that the author and the journal decide to establish an explicit process
16

by which to resolve their jurisdictional differences. They sign a written agreement to
have an arbitrator determine when the disagreement arose: the first week of May or the
middle of June. They agree that the same proceeding will address entitlement to the
$1000, and that both questions will be addressed by an eminent French scholar whom
they jointly appoint as sole arbitrator.
After hearing the witnesses and reading the parties’ submissions, the arbitrator
finds no evidence of a disagreement before the 15th of June. 38 This means the author’s
claim was timely filed on the 4th of July. Further, the arbitrator finds that the editor did
indeed agree to pay $1000 for the article.
Does any sound policy gives the editor a jurisdictional escape hatch? Having
agreed to submit the time limits to arbitration, why should the Editor be allowed to
renege on the bargain and ask courts to decide de novo when the disagreement occurred?
Although a judge might be skilled at weighing the evidence, the parties submitted the
question to arbitrators.
Any such a second bite at the jurisdictional apple would seem inconsistent with
the whole thrust of modern arbitration law, aims to give res judicata effect to arbitral
awards based on valid agreements. Any arbitral award should, of course, be subject to
challenge for jurisdictional infirmity, such as physical coercion or forgery in the
arbitration clause. However, an agreement accepted with informed consent, followed by
fair proceedings, should bind both sides. Having lost the arbitration, the editor should not
be permitted to refuse the author her $1000 fee by re-opening the dispute. Indeed, if the

38

The time limits in this scenario, we remember, are restrictions on arbitral authority, not
statutes of limitations. The latter remain substantive. The hypothetical presumes that the
challenge is launched against the right to arbitrate, not substantive recovery.
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award is made abroad, refusal to grant recognition might well violate the New York
Convention.
In this cautionary scenario, a particular issue (the date of the Editor/author
disagreement) started out being characterized as “jurisdictional” but ended (by the
parties’ consent) as a matter of the “substantive merits” in their dispute. There is nothing
unusual about such transformation. Without going as far as the proverbial Humpty
Dumpty, 39 most thoughtful people accept that words have different meanings in different
contexts, and that language would be misapplied if labels used against one background
are transferred to another with no adjustment to take into account their function. 40
5. A Word on Procedural Context
The standards by which courts evaluate arbitration clauses often vary according to
the procedural context in which the clauses present themselves. Much depends on what
might be called the “mechanics” of judicial review, with some countries applying
different criteria to pre-award and post-award judicial scrutiny, to distinguish between
prima facie and full review. On occasion, legal systems permit jurisdictional challenges
brought in the course of court actions (“stop the lawsuit so we can arbitrate”) but deny
requests for declarations about ongoing arbitrations (“stop the arbitration because we
39

In an episode from the sequel to Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty asserted,
“When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.”
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1872). The whimsical reference serves
as a warning against careless vocabulary. However, language can also be misapplied if
labels in one context are transferred automatically to another, with no adjustment to take
into account their purpose.
40

Some things are said to go without saying. Nevertheless, they may go much better
with the saying. For example, the word “run” can be used as a verb and noun, with quite
different meanings, depending on its context. When we have a head cold, our noses run.
As a financial institution fails, there may be a run on the bank.
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should be in court”). 41 In some instances a court will address jurisdiction differently
depending on whether or not the arbitration has actually begun. 42 Different rules might
also apply according to whether the arbitration is conducted locally or abroad. 43
Several scenarios merit consideration. First, applications might be brought to
review awards, either partial or final. Such requests could be made at the place of
arbitration (motions to vacate or to confirm an award) or at the enforcement situs
(motions to recognize or to enforce an award). Second, a respondent in a court action
might assert an arbitration clause as a bar to a lawsuit brought on the merits of claim,
usually for breach of contract. Finally, a litigant considering that a dispute should be
heard in court rather than in arbitration may petition for a judicial declaration (combined
with an injunction in some countries) about the scope or validity of an arbitration clause.
Such actions might be brought either before or during the arbitration.
6. Review Standards
Differences relate not only to when and whether courts may address arbitral
jurisdiction, but on the standards of review applied when they do examine the validity of
the arbitration clause. The most significant dividing line relates to whether the judge will
41

In systems that permit injunctions, like the United States, motions for declarations
related to arbitrations would likely be combined with motions to enjoin or to compel the
arbitral proceedings.
42

See discussion of German ZPO Section 1032(2) and French NCPC Article 1458. In
many countries, of course, the various procedural postures are not always easily
separated. In the United States, for example, applications to stay lawsuits and motions to
compel arbitration are often made before the same court at the same time.See e.g.,
Intergen v. Grina, 344 F. 3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003), 344 F. 3d 134, in which the defendants in
a lawsuit moved both to compel arbitration and to stay legal proceedings. See discussion
in George Smith & Sarah Holloway, Intergen N.V. v. Grina: Fundamental Contract
Principles Trump Policy Favoring International Arbitration where Nonsignatories are
Involved, 20 ADR & THE LAW 266 (AAA, 2006).
43

Such seems to be the case in Switzerland, as discussed infra.
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make a full inquiry into the parties’ intent, or simply a summary examination, applying
what is sometimes called a prima facie standard.
For example, a seller might bring a judicial action to collect the price of an
engine. In response, the buyer (who alleges the engine was defective) might move to stay
litigation, asserting that the parties had agreed to arbitrate their dispute. The seller might
reply with allegations that the arbitration clause was void.
In the alternative, the buyer might file an arbitration for product malfunction,
alleging an engine explosion that caused personal injury and loss of profits. Here it
would be the seller (preferring to be in court) who asks a judge to address the validity and
scope of the arbitration agreement, perhaps arguing that the person who signed the clause
lacked authority, or that the clause was not broad enough to cover the tort action for
personal injury or the financial claim for lost profits.
German law illustrates how these procedural postures evoke different judicial
responses. Courts in Germany would address challenges to the arbitration clause in the
context of a lawsuit, with the buyer arguing that the claim should be heard by arbitrators.
A judge could also hear the seller’s application (if brought before arbitration began) for a
declaration that the arbitration clause was invalid. However, if the arbitration was in
progress (and no lawsuit had been brought), the arbitrators would simply rule on their
own jurisdiction and proceed with the case. Judicial pronouncement on the allegedly
defective arbitration clause would await challenge to an award, whether partial or final. 44
Matters get even more complicated in legal systems where different standards of

44

See German ZPO Article 1032(1) and Article 1032(2). Applications for declaratory
relief seem permitted only before the tribunal has been constituted. Compare English
Arbitration Act Section 9 and Section 72.
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review apply according to the procedural posture of the arbitration. French judges, for
example, asked to hear a claim can address the validity of an arbitration clause only in the
most superficial manner, and only in the event no arbitral tribunal has been constituted.
At that point the court can ask whether the clause was clearly void (for example, the
document might lack any signature), but must put off until later any more complex
questions (such as disputes about whether the scope of the arbitration clause covers the
dispute). 45 Once the arbitration has started, however, judges must sit on their hands until
the award is made, when they provide a full examination of alleged defects in the
arbitration clause. 46
In some countries, courts distinguish between arbitration held at home or abroad.
Swiss courts, for example, make a full and comprehensive review of the validity of the
arbitration clause when the arbitration has its seat abroad. By contrast, when the
arbitration is held in Switzerland, judges engage only in a summary examination of
arbitral jurisdiction (examen sommaire). Full review must wait until the award stage.
In other nations (such as the United States) courts engage in full examination of
arbitral power regardless of whether the arbitration has begun, and irrespective of
whether they are being asked to hear the merits of the claims. The court might decide
that the lawsuit should stop and the arbitration should proceed. Or vice versa. Or, the
court might pass this jurisdictional question back to the arbitrators themselves for their
determination.

45

See also French NCPC Article 1458.

46

NCPC, Article 1458, permitting pre-arbitration review only to determine if the
arbitration clause is manifestment nulle. Standards for judicial review are contained in
other provisions, for example Article 1502 for international arbitration.
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7. The Judge’s Role: Preventive or Remedial?
As a general matter, pre-award requests for declarations and injunctions implicate
a preventive role for courts. The jurisdictional foundation of an arbitral proceeding must
be monitored before anyone knows what the arbitrator will decide. The arbitrator’s
jurisdiction becomes an issue because judges are asked to make a respondent participate,
or to tell a claimant that the arbitration lacks jurisdictional foundation. 47
By contrast, when arbitral jurisdiction becomes an issue in the endgame, after an
award is rendered, judges exercise a remedial function, correcting mistakes that allegedly
occurred earlier in the arbitral process. The validity of an award might be subject to
judicial scrutiny at the arbitral seat, through motions to vacate or to confirm under local
law. 48 Or the award might be subject to scrutiny when presented for recognition abroad,
by a winning claimant seeking to attach assets or a prevailing respondent asserting the
award’s res judicata effect to block competing litigation. Normally (but not always) the
New York Arbitration Convention would be invoked. 49 At this point, a different set of
options present themselves. Courts then face the choice of either giving effect to the

47

9 U.S.C. § 4 provides that courts may compel arbitration “upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration …is not in issue.”
48

9 U.S.C. § 10 permits vacatur of an award “where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers.” For a U.S. Supreme Court pronouncement on determining arbitral jurisdiction
at the award stage, see First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). In
international cases, the New York Convention Article V provides that courts need not
recognize an award if the arbitration agreement “is not valid” (Article V(1)(a)) or if the
award “deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration.” (Article V(1)(c)).
49

For a case where an award was found subject to neither the domestic provisions
(Chapter 1) of the Federal Arbitration Act or the international provisions (Chapter 2), see
Bechtel Co v. Department of Civil Aviation of Dubai, 360 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.D.C. 2005).
For a case implicating both national statute and the New York Convention, see Yusuf
Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997).
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award (by confirmation, recognition or enforcement) or rejecting its validity (by vacatur
or non-recognition).
C.

Three Meanings of Kompetenz-Kompetenz

When questions are raised about the validity or scope of a particular arbitration
clause, one option would be for the arbitration to stop automatically, until matters have
been clarified by a judge. It is against this extreme position, which denies arbitrators any
right at all to rule on their own authority, that one must begin to explore the various
meanings of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 50
If a legal system does allow the arbitration to proceed in the face of a
jurisdictional challenge, the story could unfold in several ways. At least three different
approaches might be envisaged.
First, the arbitrators might offer an opinion on the limits of their own authority,
but without in any way restricting the court’s consideration of the same question.
Although the arbitration does not necessarily stop, neither do related judicial actions.
Courts proceed pursuant to whatever motions might be available under local law.
Second, courts could refrain from entertaining any jurisdictional motions until
after an award had been rendered. The arbitrators would then have the first word on
jurisdiction. 51
50

See e.g. the Kansas Supreme Court decision in MBNA America Bank v. Credit ,
discussed infra.
51

As explained more fully below, some legal systems distinguish between judicial
consideration of arbitral jurisdiction in connection with (i) request for a declaratory
judgment and (ii) the context of a court action on the merits of the claim. Moreover,
distinctions are often made between applications that can be filed before, as opposed to
after, an arbitral tribunal has been constituted. Finally, varying evidentiary standards (full
review as contrasted with summary examination) frequently apply depending on when
(before or after the award is rendered) the court examines arbitral authority.
23

The third meaning given to Kompetenz-Kompetenz requires that courts defer
completely to an arbitrator’s decision about his or her own authority. The arbitrator gets
the last word as well as the first. However, such a result requires that judges first
determine that the parties did in fact agree to such finality. 52
1. No Automatic Stop to the Arbitration
Under the first hypothesis, the arbitrator’s right to make jurisdictional rulings
operates in tandem with a rule allowing judges to examine an arbitrator’s jurisdiction
before an award has been rendered. In some countries, courts may step in from day one,
at any time in almost any circumstance. 53 In others, courts might have full power to
address arbitral jurisdiction in the context of lawsuits on the merits of the claim, but only
limited margin to maneuver through declaratory judgments. 54
The arbitrator’s right to rule on jurisdiction holds significant practical value (at
least for the party wishing to arbitrate) notwithstanding the possibility of court
intervention. A recalcitrant respondent cannot bring the proceedings to a halt just by
52

Depending on the legal system, judicial proceedings to address the finality of the
arbitrator’s ruling could take place either before or after the award had been renderd.
This question of timing would be a separate issue from the matter of finality.
53

In the United States, for example, courts address arbitration questions in connection
with motions to stay court proceedings or to compel arbitration, as well as to confirm or
vacate awards. Limits do exist on appellate review of lower court orders on arbitration.
See 9 U.S.C. § 16. For United States cases, see Three Valleys Municipal Water District v.
E.F. Hutton, 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991) (courts determine whether contracts void
because of signatory's lack of power to bind principals); Engalla v. Permanente Med.
Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (malpractice claim against health care provider referred
to ad hoc arbitration that left administration to the parties rather than independent
institution; habitual delays in the process found to constitute evidence of fraud by health
care provider). See also Brake Masters Systems Inc., v. Gabbay, 206 Ariz. 360, 363
(2003), stating, “Our arbitration statutes and the weight of authority from other
jurisdictions allow either a pre-arbitration or a post-arbitration determination of
arbitrability.”
54

See German ZPO Section 1032(2).
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challenging jurisdiction. 55 Moreover, whether courts ultimately substitute their own
views for those of the arbitrators depends on the facts of each case. In some instances a
judge might order the proceedings suspended, either permanently or until the
jurisdictional facts have been determined. 56 In others, the arbitration clause may be
found to be robust enough to cover the controverted dispute. 57
As mentioned, even in countries that permit courts to address arbitral jurisdiction
before an award is rendered, distinctions are often made between judicial actions on the
merits of a dispute (where a defendant asserts the action is preempted by an arbitration
clause) and requests for declaratory judgments about potential or ongoing arbitrations
(where a respondent asserts defects in the arbitration clause). With respect to court
actions on the merits, judges usually possess full power to address jurisdictional
questions, particularly in countries following the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law.
For declaratory decisions, however, the law sometimes limits the circumstances in which
such applications may be made. 58

55

See U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Howsam, Bazzle and First Options, discussed
infra. For an English case expressing a similar view, see, e.g., Christopher Brown Ltd v.
Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer, [1954] 1 Q.B. 8, stating that arbitrators
whose authority is challenged are entitled to inquire into the merits of the jurisdictional
issue, not for the purpose of binding the parties, but to satisfy themselves (as a
preliminary matter) about whether they ought to proceed with the arbitration or not. The
same basic principle has been enacted into the 1996 English Arbitration Act at § 30,
although the Act now provides timing limitations on judicial review. See discussion of
Act § 72, infra.
56

See discussion infra of Sandvik v. Advent.

57

See discussion infra of Pacificare v. Book.

58

In England, only a person who takes no part in arbitration would normally be
permitted to seek a court declaration on the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. 1996 Arbitration
Act, § 72. In Germany an application for a court declaration on the arbitration clause
may be made only before the arbitral tribunal is constituted. Th arbitration proceedings,
however, may still be commenced while the court action is pending. See ZPO Section
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In this regard, it is important not to confuse the allocation of functions between
arbitrators and the supervisory arbitral institution with the allocation of responsibility
between arbitrators and national courts. For example, under the Arbitration Rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce, if the ICC Court is “prima facie satisfied” that an
arbitration agreement may exist, any jurisdictional challenge of a deeper nature goes to
the arbitrators. This does not mean, however, that national courts will be deprived of
power to make jurisdictional determinations when asked to stay litigation, enjoin
arbitration or vacate an award. 59
2. Giving Arbitrators the First Word
In other legal systems, recourse to courts must wait until the end of arbitration,
after an award has been rendered. This version of Kompetenz-Kompetenz lays down
rules about the stages in the arbitral process at which judges may intervene. The positive
part of the principle addresses itself to arbitrators, permitting them to decide challenges to
their own authority. The so-called “negative effect” of the principle speaks to courts, 60
telling judge to wait until arbitration ends before inquiring about the validity or effect of

1032(3). By contrast, in the United States courts may direct proceedings stayed during
determination of issues on which arbitral jurisdiction depend. See Sandvik AB v. Advent
Int’l Corp. 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
59

But see Apollo v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989), discussed infra, where the court
relied in part on the ICC Rules to limit the court's own review function. When the
defendant questioned whether the arbitration clause remained valid after contract
assignment, the federal court turned the matter over to the arbitrators themselves.
60

Emmanuel Gaillard, L’effet negative de la competence-compétence, in ÉTUDES DE
385 (J. Haldy,
J-M. Rapp & P. Ferrari, eds., 1999). The “negative effect” might be considered as part of
the arsenal of doctrinal tools to combat dilatory tactics of a party wishing to sabotage the
proceedings. See Emmanuel Gaillard, Les manoeuvres dilatoires des parties et des
arbitres dans l’arbitrage commercial international, 1990 REV. ARB. 759.

PROCÉDURES ET D’ARBITRAGE EN L’HONNEUR DE JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET
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an arbitration clause. 61
Best exemplified by French law, this approach means that if an arbitrator has
already begun to hear a matter, courts must decline to hear the case. The judge has a
limited jurisdiction to hear a case only if the arbitration has not begun, and only if the
alleged arbitration agreement is found to be clearly void (manifestement nulle). Given
the importance of French doctrine in this field, the full text merits consideration:
When a dispute which has been brought before an arbitral tribunal pursuant to an
arbitration agreement is brought before a governmental court, the court must
declare itself without jurisdiction. If the dispute has not yet been brought before
the arbitral tribunal, the court must also declare itself without jurisdiction unless
the arbitration agreement is clearly void. 62
At issue here is the timing, rather than the extent, of judicial review. Going to
court at the beginning of the proceedings can save expense for a defendant improperly
joined to the arbitration. On the other hand, judicial resources may be conserved by
delaying review until the end of the process, by which time the parties might have settled.
Even in countries that allow judicial intervention before an award is rendered, a

61

The negative effect of arbitration clauses sometimes extends beyond jurisdictional
matters, to judicial orders for provisional measures, see Elliott Geisinger, Les relations
entre l’arbitrage commercial international et la justice étatiqe en matière de mesures
provisionnelles, 127 SEMAINE JUDICIAIRE 375 (December 2005); JEAN-FRANÇOIS
POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, DROIT COMPARÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL
(2002), Section 6.3.2.2, at 554-555.
62

See Article 1458, Nouveau code de procédure civile:

Lorsqu’un litige dont un tribunal arbitral est saisi en vertu d’une convention d’arbitrage
est porté devant une juridiction de l’État, celle-ci doit se déclarer incompétente. Si le
tribunal arbitral n’est pas encore saisi, la juridiction doit également se déclarer
incompétente à moins que la convention d’arbitrage ne soit manifestement nulle.
Although certain provisions of domestic French arbitration law do not apply to
international arbitration, such is not the case for Art. 1458, which falls within Title I of
Book IV of the NCPC. See NCPC Art. 1507 and Décret du 12 mai 1981, Arts. 55 and 56,
providing for non-application of certain provisions in Titles IV, V and VI.
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core element of modern arbitration law resides in recognition of separate spheres of
responsibility for courts and arbitrators. Pale hints of the negative aspect of KompetenzKompetenz can be found, for example, in a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision which
adopted a “wait and see” approach with respect to public policy questions related to
arbitration of treble damages claims. 63
This is not to say, however, that the French timing mechanism itself has gained
widespread acceptance. Such across-the-board deference to arbitrators (or alleged
arbitrators) commands no wide international consensus. Outside the French hexagon,
legal systems follow a more flexible and nuanced approach with respect to court
intervention. Significant departures from French practice can be seen not only in the
United States, but also in important arbitral venues such as England, Sweden and
Switzerland, as well as nations such as Germany which follow the UNCITRAL Model
Arbitration Law. 64
The point is not trivial, since scholars sometimes cloak the Gallic perspective with
wider acceptance than may actually be the case. Readers even encounter references to
principles “generally recognized in comparative law” 65 which, on closer examination,
63

See discussion infra of Pacificare v. Book.

64

See discussion infra, Section I-D.

65

See Emmanuel Gaillard, Il est interdit d’interdire, 2004 REV. ARB. 47 (2004),
suggesting that anti-suit injunctions (courts prohibit lawsuits or arbitrations through
contempt-of-court sanctions) “fail to recognize this principle very generally accepted in
comparative law”. (Anti-suit injunctions “méconnaissent ce principe [compétencecompétence] principe très généralement reconnu en droit comparé.”) Id. para. 21, page
61. While not explicitly addressing “positive” (arbitrator rights) and “negative” (judicial
restraint) principles, the essay’s context (court actions that trump arbitration) clearly
infers reference to the latter. The essay’s title derives from a leftist slogan (“It is
forbidden to forbid”) of the May 1968 Paris uprisings, when university walls sported
gems such as Ni Dieu ni maître! (Neither God nor master!), La lutte continue (The
struggle continues) and Sexe, c'est bien, a dit Mao, mais pas trop souvent. (Sex is good,
28

describe nothing more than the parochial French approach (however commendable).
Whatever the optimum policy might be on timing judicial intervention, the temptation to
blur lines between the “is” and the “ought” of legal doctrine must be resisted. 66
3. The Arbitrator’s Decision is Final
a)

Jurisdiction as a Question of Substantive Merits

Regardless of when judges entertain motions on arbitral jurisdiction, the parties
might agree, expressly or impliedly, to subject the jurisdictional question to arbitration.
In legal systems following this third approach, jurisdictional questions themselves are
considered capable of settlement by arbitration, pursuant to agreement by the parties. 67

said Chairman Mao, but not too often). Professor Gaillard presents a more subtle
message in La reconnaissance, en droit Suisse, de la seconde moitié du principe d’effet
négative de la compétence-compétence, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE & DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 311 (2005) at 312: “La
même unanimité [compétence des arbitres pour connaître de leur compétence] ne se
retrouve pas en droit comparé lorsque la règle s’adresse non plus aux arbitres mais aux
juridictions étatique.” (The same unanimity [jurisdiction on jurisdiction] does not appear
in comparative law when the rule addresses itself to courts).
66

As a policy matter, Professor Gaillard suggest that “anti-suit injunctions negate the
very basis of arbitration, that is, the parties’ consent to submit their disputes to
arbitration.” See Emmanuel Gaillard, Reflections on the Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in
International Arbitrtaion, in Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration 203 (L.
Mistelis & J. Lew, eds. 2006), at 213. While true in many cases, this approach might on
occasion presume its own conclusion, in that some legal systems see the “basis of
arbitration” as more limited than full party autonomy. The policy underpinning for the
“negative” jurisdictional principle was also summarized by Professor Gaillard in his
contribution to the Briner Festschrift, cited supra: “Il convient également [en plus de
permettre aux arbitres de poursuivre leur mission lorsque leur compétence est contestée]
de s’assurer que le même contentieux ne puisse être aussitôt porté devant les juridictions
étatiques qui, en l’absence de convention d’arbitrage, auraient été compétentes pour
connaître le fond de l’affaire.” (One must also [in addition to allowing arbitrators to
pursue their mission when jurisdiction is contested] provide that the same dispute is not
brought before state courts which, in the absence of an arbitration clause, would be
competent to address the merits of the matter.) Id. at 312.
67

On the notion of “merits” in an international arbitration, see Veijo Heiskanen, Dealing
with Pandora: The Concept of Merits in International Commercial Arbitration,
forthcoming in ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL.
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Under these circumstances, an arbitrator’s determination on his or her own authority will
be final. The parties’ agreement transforms the jurisdictional difference into a disputed
question of fact or law, whose substantive merits the litigants submit to final
determination by an arbitrator. 68
The application of this line of reasoning will in all events depend on the facts of
each case. In some instances, the parties may indeed have agreed to submit a
jurisdictional question to final and binding arbitration. In other instances, an assertion
that they have done so will be preposterous, unable to withstand analysis except by
ignoring reality in favor of fiction. The parties’ agreement, determined on a case-by-case
basis, will determine whether this brand of Kompetenz-Kompetenz makes sense. In each
instance, the question for judges will be: what did the parties intend to submit to
arbitration?
Legal systems disagree on whether judges should ever be permitted to accord
finality to an arbitrator’s decision on his or her authority, even on a finding of the parties’
prior consent. In practice, giving arbitrators the last word on jurisdictional questions
means that some litigants may well lose their access to court. The peril derives not so
much from isolated mistakes, whether by arbitrators or by courts, but from the risk that
an overburdened judiciary might fall into a systematic proclivity toward granting
jurisdictional authority to arbitrators, even when contracts are ambiguous on the matter.
Long gone are the days when judges exhibited blanket hostility to arbitration.
Today, courts often perceive arbitration as a way to clear crowded dockets. Even the best
of judges may be tempted to exchange rigorous reasoning for the convenience of a
68

For an illustration, see the “cautionary tale” discussed infra in connection with the new
German approach to Kompetenz-Kompetenz.
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finding that the parties really did want jurisdictional questions addressed by arbitrators.
Such a tendency seems to have been a factor in recent changes in German law, which
now reduces the prospect of never-bargained-for arbitrations by requiring that all
questions of arbitral authority go to judges. 69
This approach, however, may create even more problems than it resolves. A
judicial monopoly on final resolution of jurisdictional questions imposes serious
restrictions on party autonomy, particularly among sophisticated business managers. The
result is a serious limit on the liberty of contract that has long bolstered healthy
commercial transactions in free economies.
b)

German Doctrine: Then and Now

Prior to Germany’s adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in 1998, court
decisions had recognized that an arbitral tribunal might be granted the power to rule on
its own jurisdiction pursuant to a specific clause, accepted by both parties, that implicitly
dispensed with subsequent judicial review. In a landmark decision, Germany’s highest
court, the Bundesgerichthof, had decided that the parties to a commercial contract could
submit the question of arbitral authority to final and binding arbitration. 70 What the court
called a Kompetenz-Kompetenz-Klausel, or “jurisdiction on jurisdiction clause”, was
deemed sufficient to insulate the arbitrator’s decision on the matter from judicial scrutiny.
Currently, the prevailing opinion in Germany (both scholarly and judicial) seems
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See references to work by Peter Schlosser and decisions of the BGH, discussed infra.
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BGH, 5 Mai 1977, III ZR 177/74. Reported in 68 BGHZ 356, at 358. See discussion
in Peter Schlosser, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT
(1989) at § 556. See generally, JAN K. SCHÄFER, RICHARD H. KREINDLER & REINMAR
WOLFF, SHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT KOMPENDIUM FÜR DIE PRAXIS (2006), at §§ 191-193.
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to hold that such Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses are invalid. Germany case law has held
that the parties may not restrict judges from examining arbitral jurisdiction in the context
of challenges to either interim or final awards. 71 Whether such a position constitutes
sound doctrine remains open to debate, as discussed later.
c)

French and Swedish Perspectives

French law seems to include a more nuanced position with respect to the finality
of an arbitrator’s jurisdictional determinations. 72 Unlike Germany, France has known no
marked break with prior case law, which may account for the fact that the Gallic position
seems to be elaborated through scholarly comment. 73

71

See BGH, 13 Januar 2005, III ZR 265/03. Reported NJW 16/2005 at 1125. The case
states that a court may decide on arbitral jurisdiction without waiting for a preliminary
award to be rendered under ZPO Section 1040 (the equivalent of Article 16 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law). See also BGH decision (February 2006) reported in 2006
SCHIEDSVZ 161, at 164, finding no violation of ordre public when jurisdiction was
addressed only in a final (rather than preliminary) award, given that courts would have
the opportunity to addres the matter then. Review of a final award would normally be
made underZPO Section 1059, while review of a preliminary jurisdictional award would
proceed under ZPO Section 1040. As discussed infra, other provisions of German law
relevant to arbitral jurisdiction in other contexts include ZPO Article 1032(1) (courts
before which an action is brought shall consider the validity of an arbitration clause
raised as a defense to the action) and ZPO 1032(2) (application for determining the
admissibility of arbitration may be brought prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal.)
72

See e.g., Laurence Franc, Contractual Modification of Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards: The French Position, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 215 (1999), suggesting that
French law prohibits party agreement on any modification of judicial review.
73

See PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD, & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, TRAITÉ DE
L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1996), § 659 (at 414), asserting that the
arbitral power to make jurisdictional rulings has “all too often” been understood as giving
arbitrators power to decide alone on their authority, which would be “neither logical nor
acceptable”. (Trop souvent encore, le principe de la compétence-compétence est compris
comme donnant aux arbitres le pouvoir de décider seuls de leur investiture, ce qui ne
serait ni logique, ni acceptable.”) The French original speaks of arbitral “investiture”,
which might be interpreted as appointment, a narrower notion than jurisdiction.
However, the English version clearly uses the term “jurisdiction”. See FOUCHARD,
GAILLARD & GOLDMAN (E. Gaillard & J. Savage, eds. 1999) at § 659 (page 400).
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As a starting point, it is clear that the legal framework for judicial review of
awards bears a mandatory character. The grounds on which courts set awards aside
(enumerated in Nouveau code de procedure civile) may not be abrogated by contract. 74
Less evident, however, is the proposition that a ban on waiver of statutory
annulment standards necessarily means limitation of the questions which by contract may
be submitted for final determination by arbitrators. What might be a jurisdictional
question in some contexts could become a matter of the merits in an arbitration where
both sides clearly submitted the issue to arbitration.
For example, one party to a bill of lading might contend that it incorporated by
reference the arbitration clause in a related charter party. Posed in those terms, the matter
would normally be a jurisdictional question ultimately to be determined by courts.
However, nothing in French law suggests that the two parties cannot, in a clear and
distinct agreement, agree to be bound by an arbitrator’s determination on that question.
Sweden seems to take a similar position, albeit in a more explicit fashion. After
providing that arbitrators may rule on their own jurisdiction, Section 2 of the Swedish
Arbitration Act adds that this principle “shall not prevent a court from determining such a
question” and that the decision of arbitrators on their jurisdiction “is not binding” but
rather subject to the full panoply of grounds for challenging awards. 75 Again, it is not
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For cases in which French courts have voided arbitration clauses attempting to change
judicial review, see Cour d'appel de Paris, 27 Oct. 1994, Diseno v. Société Mendes, 1995
Rev. Arb. 261. See generally cases cited in FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN § 1597,
speaking of the “mandatory nature” of the organization of challenge to awards” (le
caractère impératif de l’organisation des voies de recours). For a critique of the logic of
the French position, see Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the
Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 449, at 454 n. 22 (2005).
75

Arbitration Act 1999, 4 March1999. See generally, Christopher Seppälä, Comment on
Section 2 of the Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999 Dealing with the Right of Arbitrators to
33

certain that the mandatory nature of judicial review necessarily prohibits parties from
submitting jurisdictional questions to arbitration if they so wish.
d)

The American “Arbitrability Question”

In the United States, a clear line of judicial pronouncements holds that in some
situations arbitrators may rule on their own powers without subsequent de novo review
by courts. In the sense used by American courts, such grants of jurisdictional power are
not legal fictions, but require evidence of the parties’ real intent expressed in concrete
language either in the main contract or in a separate agreement.
Jurists from outside the United States may find the terminology unfamiliar. Court
decisions speak of the “arbitrability question” in the same way that the rest of the world
refers to a jurisdictional issue. If an “arbitrability question” has been submitted to
arbitration, then courts defer to the arbitrator on the matter.
Admittedly, the words “Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause” do not figure in American
cases. However, after the “arbitrability question” decisions have been broken down and
decorticated, one finds that judges in the United States have been using the same
conceptual framework as the pre-1998 German cases. In this context, one might recall
how the middle-aged cloth merchant in Molière’s Bourgeois Gentilhomme learned, much
to his delight, that he had actually been speaking prose all along, without ever being
aware of this rhetorical skill. 76 The difference, however, is that courts in the United

Rule on their Own Jurisdiction, in THE SWEDISH ARBITRATION ACT OF 1999 FIVE YEARS
ON: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (Lars Heuman & Sigvard
Jarvin, eds. 2006; Symposium Proceedings, University of Stockholm, October 2004).
76

Jean-Baptiste Poquelin (Molière), Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme (The Would-Be
Gentleman) (1670), Act II, Scene 4. Monsieur Jourdain, a nouveau riche draper, has
hired a philosophy teacher to increase his oratorical skill. On learning that language
which is not poetry is prose, the newly enlightened merchant exclaims with amazement
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States seem happily oblivious to the link between American legal notions and the
doctrines elaborated in the rest of the world to meet similar juridical problems.
In addressing jurisdiction, American courts sometimes say the issue is not only
“who decides what,” but also “who decides who decides”. This formulation provides
another way of asking when arbitrators may determine the contours of their own
decision-making authority. 77
The American approach often involves the transformation of a jurisdictional
matter (normally for courts) into the substantive merits in the arbitration itself (for the
arbitrators). Jurisdictional challenges usually relate to the arbitrator’s authority to decide
an issue or to exercise a particular procedural power. Once it has been determined that
the parties agreed to entrust to the arbitrator the adjudication of disputes on such
questions, then almost by definition the question is no longer one of jurisdiction.
Arbitrators receive their power from the parties’ consent. If a court decides that the
parties asked the arbitrator to decide a matter (for example, time eligibility requirements
for arbitration), then in essence this constitutes the court’s jurisdictional determination.
When the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate is disputed, however, courts
will generally refuse to compel arbitration until they resolve whether the arbitration
clause exists at all. 78 In some events, the existence and content of the parties’ agreement

and pride, “Par ma foi! il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose sans que j'en
susse rien.” (“My Lord! For more than forty years I have been saying prose without
knowing anything at all of the matter.”)
77

See e.g., Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 287
(1999). See also discussion infra of First Options v. Kaplan.
78

See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).
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may have to be determined by a jury. 79
The recent decision in Alliance Bernstein Investment v. Schaffran 80 illustrates the
various ramifications of the American approach. A former employee of a New York
hedge fund alleged wrongful termination, claiming that he had been fired for cooperating
with government investigations into wrongdoings by his employer. 81
The employment relationship was subject to rules of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), which provided for mandatory arbitration with one important
exception: claims of employment discrimination. 82 Normally, the arbitration clause
would have been invoked by the employer, on the assumption that juries tend to possess a
more sympathetic predisposition toward employees. 83

79

China Minmetals Materials Ltd. V. Chi Mei, 334 F.3d 274 (3d. Cir. 2003), involving
allegations of a forged contract in a dispute about what (if anything) a New Jersey
company (Chi Mei) agreed to sell to a Chinese corporation (Minmetals). The court
stated, “If there is doubt as to whether such an agreement exists, the matter, upon a proper
and timely demand, should be submitted to a jury. Only when there is no genuine issue of
fact concerning the formation of the agreement should the court decide as a matter of law
that the parties did or did not enter into such an agreement.” Id. at 281.
80

445 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006). Contrary to the suggestion by some commentators, this
case seems to be focused on jurisdiction from a contractual perspective, not subject
matter arbitrability in the public policy sense. Compare note in 17 WORLD ARB. & MED.
REP. 171 (2006), at 172.
81

In particular, the former employee asserted that his employer had violated the “whistle
blower” provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
82

NASD Rule 10201(b) provides that “a claim alleging employment discrimination …in
violation of a statute is not required to be arbitrated” unless the parties have explicitly
agreed to arbitration of the discrimination action either before or after the dispute arose.
In other words, the submission of a discrimination claim must be specific, rather than
covered in a broad “blanket” arbitration clause covering disputes in general.
83

Not all wrongful dismissals will be the result of discrimination. For example, an
employee might be wrongfully terminated because he is fired without reason in violation
of his or her contract, or for a reason not otherwise permitted by law, such as reporting on
the misbehavior of a boss. Discrimination has traditionally been conceptualized as
dismissal for reasons of bias based on race, religion or gender. In this case, the question
36

In this case roles were reversed. For reasons that are not entirely clear from the
face of the decision, the employer (not the employee) moved for a declaratory judgment
that the “whistle blower” action (alleging retaliation for cooperation with government
investigator) constituted an “employment discrimination” claim by the employee, and
thus was not subject to arbitration. The arbitrator’s authority thus depended on whether
the employee’s claim could be characterized as an “allegation of discrimination” within
the meaning of the NASD Rules.
The court did not see its role as deciding whether or not the arbitrator possessed
jurisdiction to hear the claim. 84 Rather, the question was who (judge or an arbitrator)
would decide whether the allegations of termination for “whistle blowing” were subject
to arbitration, or instead amounted to the type of discrimination claim that was carved out
of the scope of the arbitration clause. 85
The starting point for analysis lay in the relevant NASD Rules, under which the
arbitrators were expressly “empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of all
provisions under the [NASD] Code” in a way that was “final and binding” on the

was whether the allegedly unfair termination (retaliation) was to be characterized as
“discrimination” or simply a firing that was contrary to the law for other reasons.
84

The claim of non-arbitrability related to the scope of a contract provision (NASD Rule
10201), not any public policy limits on arbitration of “whistle-blower” claims. If public
policy had been at issue, the result would likely have been different.
85

In its opening paragraph, the court stated that the issue before it was not “whether the
claims must be arbitrated, but rather … who will decide the arbitrability question.” 445
F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006). The distinction is sometimes ignored. A recent summary of
Alliance Bernstein suggested that the case “held that an employee’s claim [for violation
of the statute] is for an arbitrator to decide. See 17 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 171
(2006). While the commentary later states the holding correctly, the introductory slip of
the pen reveals a general tendency to conflate the two issues.
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parties. 86 The court’s job, therefore, was to ascertain what the parties meant by that
language. 87
According to the Second Circuit, a presumption exists that the parties would
normally intend an “arbitrability question” to be determined by a judge. 88 The
presumption might, however, be overcome. 89 To do so would require “clear and
unmistakable” evidence that the parties wished the question to be decided by
arbitrators. 90 This intent could be found, for example, in a separate agreement providing
for arbitration of “any and all controversies” including interpretation of the provisions of
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NASD Rule 10324 provides, “The arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and
determine the applicability of all provisions under this Code and to take appropriate
action to obtain compliance with any ruling by the arbitrator(s). Such interpretations and
actions to obtain compliance shall be final and binding upon the parties.
87

Since American contract law is generally a matter for states, the court normally looks
to state law for guidance about the parties’ intent. See First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, at 944 (1995); John Hancock Life Ins. v. Wilson, 254 F. 3d 48, at 53 (2d Cir. 2001).
88

First Options, supra, at 944-45.

89

See also PaineWebber v. Bybyk v. 81 F. 3d 1193 (1996), holding that whether an
investor’s claims against a brokerage firm were subject to arbitration was a question for
the arbitrators. The matter in Bybyk involved NASD time limitations on eligibility for
arbitrations. Although the court on occasion referred loosely to these arbitration
eligibility requirements as a “statute of limitations” the case did not concern a proper
statute of limitations arising under the applicable law, which would clearly have been for
the arbitrator. See discussion of “admissibility” infra.
90

Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F. 3d 205, at 208 (2d Cir. 2005). The case
at bar was covered by the American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration
Rules (for domestic transactions), which provided in Rule R-7 that “the arbitrator shall
have power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections to the
existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” One might note that this
language could be subject to misinterpretation if the “arbitrability question” presented
was whether one side had indeed signed the arbitration agreement. Clearly, arbitrators
cannot pull themselves up by their own jurisdictional bootstraps. Question of “scope” of
an arbitration clause (which might be subject to an arbitrator’s binding jurisdictional
determination) must be distinguished from questions about who is a party (on which an
arbitrator will rarely have the last word, absent a clear separate agreement on the matter,
concluded by the very party contesting jurisdiction).
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the relevant arbitration rules. 91
In Alliance Bernstein the court was careful to keep close to the language of the
arbitration provisions. The language of the relevant rule did not provide for “any and all”
matters to be arbitrated, but only for power to “interpret and determine the applicability
of” provisions under the NASD code, which would include the scope of the exclusion for
discrimination claims. 92 Since there was no disagreement that both sides had accepted
the NASD rules, 93 the parties’ intent to arbitrate their differing interpretations of the rules
could be ascertained from the four corners of the documentation before the court. The
arbitrator’s decision on this matter would not be subject to later judicial second guessing.
Rather, the “whistle blower” claim would be subject to arbitration if, and only if, the
arbitrator so determined.
The Court found the question of whether “whistle blower” claims were arbitrable
was for the arbitrators, and thus insulated that finding from review for “excess of powers”
under the Federal Arbitration Act. 94 The award might well be attacked on other
jurisdictional grounds, however. For example, the arbitrator would still lack power if an
irregularity could be found in signature of the agreement containing the reference to
arbitration. Perhaps the person who signed was not authorized to do so. Or, the
signature might have been compelled by a gun at the head. Or, maybe the signature was
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In cases where only one party to the dispute is a member of the NASD, a separate
agreement would be required to indicate such a clear intent to arbitrate jurisdictional
questions. See John Hancock, 254 F. 3d at 54-55.
92

NASD Rule 10324.

93

The employer was a member of the NASD itself, and the employee had signed a socalled “Form U-4” agreeing “to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise
between me and my firm … under the rules, constitutions or by-laws” of the NASD.
94

9 U.S.C. § 10(4).
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a forgery. But the decision on jurisdiction over the “whistle blower” claim could not be
disregarded because a judge later disagreed with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the
rules.
Under this approach, once a precise question has clearly been delegated to an
arbitrator, it ceases to be “jurisdictional” in the context of the case to which it is relevant.
Since the arbitrator has been empowered to hear the matter, any further inquiry must be
limited to “What did the arbitrator decide?” That decision might relate to a matter which,
in the abstract, would be characterized as jurisdictional. However, the parties’ intent
prevails, and the arbitrator will determine the matter in a final way.
Such allocation of functions between judges and arbitrators explains itself
principally by reference to contract principles. 95 Absent an express or implied waiver of
the right to go to court, a litigant will not normally be denied recourse to otherwise
competent tribunals. But once such a waiver has been given in the form of an arbitration
clause, it is hard to see why a litigant should be permitted to renege on this bargain to
arbitrate.
Reasonable people, of course, might argue about what the parties had in mind
when they made their bargain. One judge might think that another judge got it wrong, or
was misguided, in her reading of how the relevant arbitration rules or contract affected
the questions that would be submitted to arbitration. But these debatable matters of fact,
do not call into question the jurisdictional principle that the parties to a dispute may
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Regulatory impulses also come into play, although usually only at the margins. Even if
the parties to a dispute authorize adjudication through arbitration, courts will hesitate to
enforce private decision-making that runs afoul of public policy, either by virtue of
touching subjects too sensitive to be removed from government tribunals (e.g., claims of
discrimination) or because the decision-making process is tainted with bias or corruption.
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empower arbitrators to decide controversies about the pre-conditions to arbitration.
American judges who review questions of jurisdiction must look beyond labels,
and instead fix their scrutiny on the parties’ real deal. If two litigants intended to submit
a question to final and binding arbitration, then the arbitral determination holds,
regardless of whether the question would initially have fallen within the arbitrator’s
mission. In this sense, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause remains alive and well in the
United States.
In defining “arbitrable questions”, courts are in the business of drawing lines
between jurisdiction and merits, often in a manner that enlarges the arbitrator’s authority.
Although issues of substance (merits of the dispute) and jurisdiction (arbitrator's right to
hear the case) should be treated differently by courts, the two categories are not fixed
immutably in the real world. A particular question might be characterized as “substantive
merits” in one dispute and “jurisdiction” in another. If indeed the parties to an arbitration
agreement clearly intend for a matter to be decided by arbitration, then a “jurisdictional”
label would be inappropriate if it were to lead courts to usurp the arbitral function. To
ignore this possibility might, in some circumstances, put a country in breach of its New
York Convention obligations. The wrinkles on this topic are sizable, and thus it has been
addressed in greater detail below in the discussion of the new German arbitration law.
D.

Paradigms and Hybrids: Another Look at Timing
1. Policy Concerns

Fixing the point in time for court intervention involves a relatively clear (albeit
difficult) choice between costs and benefits related to the expenditure of either public or
private resources. Under one model, a party unhappy with having to arbitrate may go to
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court at any moment for the purpose of contesting arbitral power. Another paradigm,
however, provides for court challenge of arbitral authority only after an award is
rendered.
Court challenge to jurisdiction at the beginning of the process can save time and
expense for the litigants. If a judge finds the alleged arbitral clause to be void, or too
narrow in scope to cover the dispute, then neither side need waste time or money in
arbitration. The parties are free to pursue their litigation in the appropriate judicial
forum.
By contrast, government funds can be preserved by delaying judicial review until
after the award has been rendered. In many legal systems, similar or analogous concerns
about economy of judicial resources impose restraints on appeal of interlocutory lower
court decisions. 96
If questions of authority are left to the end game, perhaps there will not even be a
jurisdictional challenge in court. The case might settle, or the party resisting arbitration
might prevail. And if the matter does go to court, the arbitrator may have done much of
the intellectual heavy lifting, sorting facts and law to provide the reviewing judge a
helpful analytic road-map.
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See, e.g., Section 16 of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S. C.§ 16). See also
discussion of the “collateral order” doctrine in Lauro Lines SRL v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495
(1989) and Digital Equipoment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Ind., 511 U.S. 863 (1994). See
also 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b), involving appeal when an order involves “a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion”. See
also, International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Local Lodge, 410 F.3d
204 (5th Cir. 2005); ATAC Corp. v. Arthur Treacher's, Inc., 280 F.3d 1091 (6th Cir.
2002); Salim Oleochemicals v. M/V Shropshire, 278 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2002). For
conversations on this topic, thanks are due to Ward Farnsworth, Gary Lawson and Louise
Ellen Teitz.
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2.

Extremes: France and the United States
a)

United States

American arbitration law traditionally has given parties a right to raise a matter of
arbitral authority at any time, whether before or after the award. Such determinations
would usually be made pursuant to litigation under Sections 3 and 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, providing for stay of court litigation and orders to compel arbitration. 97
This approach means that a party who never agreed to arbitrate will not need to
waste time and money in a proceeding that lacks an authoritative foundation. Moreover,
either side can request clarification about the scope of the arbitrator’s power before
substantial sums are spent needlessly. The prospect of award vacatur on jurisdictional
grounds cannot be excluded, but it may be less likely to hang as a Sword of Damocles in
cases of obvious jurisdictional defect.
b)

France

By contrast, the French model delays court consideration of jurisdictional matters
until the award review stage. 98 This approach reduces the prospect of dilatory tactics
designed to derail an arbitration. A bad-faith respondent will be less able to add the cost
of a court challenge at the same time that the arbitration is going forward. 99
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See generally discussion in Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton, 925
F. 2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991). In Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, , 513 U.S. 265 (1995)
and Vimar Seguros v. Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) judges determined arbitral
jurisdiction at the outset of the process, rather than waiting to see what the arbitrators
would decide. See also the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Pacificare, Howsam, Bazzle,
and Buckeye, infra.
98

NCPC, Article 1458.

99

For a recent case of the Cour de Cassation interpreting the French version of
compétence-compétence in the context of an ICC arbitration, see SARI Métu System
France, Cass. 1re civ., C., 1 Dec. 1999, holding that only the clear nullity of an arbitration
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Another benefit from the French paradigm lies in its potential for higher quality
jurisdictional review by judges, who will be able to benefit from the arbitrators’ earlier
consideration of the matter. And government resources may be conserved for the simple
reason that a settlement might obviate the need for judicial review.
A cynic, of course, might note that the French rule can have practical advantages
for arbitrators themselves, who will not be declared incompetent until after collecting
their fees. But as Rudyard Kipling might have written, that is another story.
3. Hybrids: England, Switzerland and the UNCITRAL Model
Countries that delay judicial intervention until the award stage aim to preserve
government resources. By contrast, legal systems that permit court rulings on arbitral
jurisdiction at any moment allow litigants to avoid the expense of an invalid proceeding.
Attempts to find a middle way in the timing of jurisdictional challenge have not
always proved easy. Like the man who hoped to get his girlfriend drunk without
emptying the wine bottle, 100 efforts at meeting both goals have often served
disappointment.
Nevertheless, some legal systems do explore hybrid solutions. England,
Switzerland and the UNCITRAL Model provide examples.

agreement would bar application of the principle by which an arbitrator was permitted to
rule on his own jurisdiction.
100

In Italian, the observation traditionally takes on a more matrimonial nuance: Non puoi
avere la botta piena e la moglie ubbriaca.
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a)

England 101

The position in England seems once to have been roughly analogous to that in the
United States, in that arbitrators addressed jurisdiction subject to general control by the
competent court. 102 Such remains the case with respect to final awards, where
dissatisfied litigants may challenge arbitrators’ mistakes on substantive and procedural
jurisdiction. 103.

Things have become a bit more complex since 1996. 104 Today, the

English Arbitration Act gives an arbitral tribunal the right to rule on its own substantive
jurisdiction. 105 The right to challenge arbitral jurisdiction by declaration or injunction is
open only to a person “who takes no part in the proceedings.” 106 This power can be
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Since the 1996 Arbitration Act does not apply in Scotland, but governs arbitrations
with their juridical seat in England, Wales or Northern Ireland, this paper will resist
reference to “British” arbitration law. Since 1536 England and Wales have been part of
the same legal system. However, to avoid the cumbersome expression “England and
Wales or Northern Ireland”, more convenient terms such as “English arbitration” or
“arbitration in England” will be used.

102

See e.g., opinion by Devlin, J., in Christopher Brown Ltd v. Genossenschaft
Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer, [1954] 1 Q.B. 8. See MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C.
BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1982 edition) at 514-15, discussing the possibility of
declaratory relief on questions of jurisdiction under the law as it stood prior to 1996.
103

See 1996 Act, Section 67 (substantive jurisdiction) and 68(2) (“serious irregularity”
defined to include “the tribunal exceeding its powers”).

104

The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators has attempted to provide comprehensive
enlightenment through two valuable studies: Guidelines for Arbitrators as to How to
Deal with Challenges to Their Jurisdiction, 68 ARBITRATION 3 (2002) and Guideline on
Jurisdictional Issues in International Arbitration, 70 ARBITRATION 308 (2004), also
reproduced in 17 WOLRD TRADE & ARB’N MATERIALS 113 (April 2005) . See also Peter
Aeberli, Jurisdictional Disputes under the Arbitration Act 1996: A Procedural Route
Map, 21 ARB. INT’L 253 (2005)
105

1996 Act, Section 30.

106

English Arbitration Act ' 72. Non-participants may challenge jurisdictional defects
regardless of whether failure to participate was by choice or by inadvertence, and
regardless of whether in hindsight non-participation seems justified. The English
Arbitration Act in ' 30 provides for arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction as a
preliminary matter but in ' 67 also permits judicial challenge of any jurisdictional
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particularly useful in connection with what are sometimes called “unilateral” arbitration
clauses, which permit one side the option to litigate in court rather than to arbitrate. If the
other side begins an arbitration before the option has been exercised, the power to request
a declaration provides the machinery for vindicating the right to litigate. 107
Most challenges to substantive competence must wait until an award has been
rendered. 108 At that time courts will have an opportunity to review excess of authority as
well as the arbitrators’ improper arrogation of powers. 109 On occasion, a jurisdictional
ruling may also give rise to allegations of procedural irregularity. 110
The Act does permit application for judicial determination on a “preliminary point
determination. In ' 9 the Act provides for stay of litigation only if the court is satisfied
that the arbitration agreement is not “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.”
107

See Law Debenture Trust Corp. v. Elektrim, [2005] 1 All E.R. 476, 2005 WL
1630790. The case is discussed in Simon Nesbitt & Henry Quinlan, The Status and
Operation of Unilateral or Optional Arbitration Clauses, 22 ARB. INT’L 133 (2006).

108

Arbitration Act § 67.

109

See Arbitration Act § 68. See Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impreglio
SpA [2005] UKHL 43.

110

For a case in which an arbitrator’s jurisdictional decision was challenged on grounds
of procedural irregularity, see Aoot Kalmneft v. Glencore International A.G. ([2002] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 128 (Queen’s Bench, 27 July 2001), 2001 WL 825106). An ad hoc London
arbitration addressed a dispute between an oil trading company and an oil production
entity in Kalmykia. The oil trader claimed that it had paid for oil never delivered, while
the production company alleged it had been the victim of fraud by one of its officers, who
allegedly had no authority to conclude the agreement. In an interim decision, the sole
arbitrator ruled that he had jurisdiction. The production entity challenged this award inter
alia on the grounds that a finding of validity for the arbitration clause prejudged the case
on the merits. By finding that the officer had authority to commit to arbitration, the
arbitrator gave an implicit preview of his views with respect to the binding nature of the
main agreement. Justice Coleman rejected the challenge, finding that an arbitrator may
“rule on his own jurisdiction at the outset, even if that involves deciding whether there
was a binding contract to arbitrate and even if his decision on that matter gives rise to a
conclusion in respect of a major issue on the merits of the underlying claim in the
arbitration.” Id., Paragraph 84. See discussion in Robert Knutson, Procedural Fairness,
Kompetenz-Kompetenz and English Arbitral Practice, 6 LCIA NEWS 5 (November 2001).
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of jurisdiction.” In this latter context, courts may consider the matter only on agreement
of all parties, or if the arbitral tribunal grants permission and a court finds that addressing
the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs. 111
Otherwise, a party seeking annulment of an arbitrator's decision for excess of
jurisdiction may do so only after attempting to remedy the problem through the
appropriate arbitral procedures. In the interest of arbitral efficiency, court challenges to
awards can only be brought after any available institutional review. 112 And a “use it or
lose it” principle requires that challenges for excess of authority must be made
“forthwith” or within the time provided by the arbitration agreement. 113 To rebut the
presumption that the right to object has been waived, the challenging party must show
that it did not know, and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered, the
grounds for objection. 114 In this respect, the Act leads to a result different from the one
obtaining in Switzerland, where defendants may lose their right to challenge an award's
jurisdictional underpinnings by boycotting the proceedings. 115
111

1996 Arbitration Act, § 32. If the parties have not all agreed, an application requires
permission of the arbitral tribunal. In this latter instance, the court must be satisfied not
only of potential cost savings, but also that the application was made without delay and
that there is “good reason” why the matter should be judicially decided.

112

Act § 70(2) speaks of “any available arbitral process of appeal or review.” However,
courts are not necessarily bound by the arbitral institution's decision on the matter.
Challenge to an award must also be delayed until exhaustion of any application to correct
an award under Act § 57, in default of the parties’ agreement otherwise.
113

1996 Arbitration Act § 73 (1). In some instances, the arbitral tribunal may set the
appropriate time limits for challenge.

114

Id., Section 73. The English Act is more severe than the analogous provisions in
Article 4 of the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, which covers only a party who
actually “knows” of a procedural defect.

115

See Westland Helicopters v. Emirates Arabs Unis, Arabie Saoudite, Etat du Qatar,
ABH et Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), Swiss Tribunal fédéral, 19 April
1994, 120 II 155 ATF (1994), also reported in 12 ASA BULLETIN 404 (1994).
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Arbitral jurisdiction might also be tested in court if one party brings a court action
for a claim which the other party says is covered by the arbitration agreement. Arbitral
authority is put at issue in a motion to stay legal proceedings, and the point is decided
then and there. Like analogous provisions in Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law,
English arbitration law contemplates that in some instances there might be simultaneous
proceedings by courts and arbitrators regarding the competence of the arbitral tribunal. 116
b)

Switzerland 117

Although not free from scholarly debate, 118 Swiss case law seems to distinguish
between arbitration held inside and outside of the country. Federal statute provides that
arbitral tribunals shall rule on their authority, normally through interlocutory decisions, 119
and that objections to jurisdiction must be raised before the tribunal prior to any defense
on the merits. 120 Moreover, state courts must decline jurisdiction unless they find that the
116

1996 Arbitration Act § 9. This section requires a stay of proceedings only so far as
they concern that matter to be referred to arbitration and only if the court is satisfied that
the arbitration agreement is not “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.”

117

See generally, BERNHARD BERGER & FRANZ KELLERHALS, INTERNATIONALE UND
INTERNE SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER SCHWEIZ (2006) at Chapter 2, Section 7 (II),
paragraphs: 607-617; PIERRE LALIVE, JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & CLAUDE REYMOND,
LE DROLIT DE L’ARBITRAGE (1989), AT 379-386; WERNER WENGER, Commentary on
Article LDIP 186, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SWITZERLAND 459-477 (2000). See
also Zina Abdulla, The Arbitration Agreement, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN
SWITZERLAND 15 (G. Kaufmann-Kohler & B. Stucki, eds. 2004), at 29-32.
118

See work by J.-F Poudret & G. Cottier, discussed infra. See also Werner Wenger,
Kommentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht, Internationales Privatrecht, Basel,
discussed in Tribunal fédéral, ATF 122 III 139, (Fondation M v. Banque X, 29 April
1996) and Andreas Bucher, Le nouvel arbitrage international en Suisse, at 55, n. 130,
discussed in Tribunal fédéral, ATF 121 III 38 (Compagnie de Navigation et Transports
SA v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA, 16 January 1995).
119

Article 186 of the Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé (LDIP) provides that
such jurisdictional rulings should be made “en general / in der Regel”.

120

Id., Article 186(2).
48

arbitration clause void, inoperative or incapable of being applied. 121
If the seat of the arbitration is in Switzerland, courts engage in only summary
examination of arbitral authority. 122 When the arbitral seat lies outside of Switzerland,
however, the Tribunal fédéral has called for a fuller and more comprehensive
examination of the validity of the arbitration agreement. 123 This inquiry would generally
occur at the time the clause is invoked in a Swiss court action on the merits of the
dispute, allegedly brought in disregard of the agreement to arbitrate. In applying Article
II of the New York Convention (requiring reference to arbitration unless the clause is
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed), courts would not limit themselves to
a summary (prima facie) examination of the validity of the agreement to arbitrate.

121

Id. Article 7, providing for courts to verify that the arbitration clause is not “caduque,
inopérante ou non susceptible d’être appliqué.”

122

Tribunal fédéral, ATF 122 III 139, Fondation M v. Banque X (29 April 1996), which
holds at consideration 2(b): “Il est généralement admit que, si le juge étatique est saisi
d’une exception d’arbitrage et que le tribunal arbitral a son siège en Suisse, le juge se
limitera à un examen sommaire de l’existence prima facie d’une convention d’arbitrage,
afin de ne pas préjuger de la décision du tribunal arbitral sur sa propre compétence.” (“It
is generally accepted that if a state judge hears a defence based on arbitration, and the
arbitral tribunal has its seat in Switzerland, the judge will limit himself to a summary
examination of the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, in order not to
prejudge the arbitral tribunal’s decision on its own jurisdiction.”)
123

Tribunal fédéral, ATF 121 III 38, Compagnie de Navigation et Transports SA v. MSC
Mediterranean Shipping Company SA (16 January 1995). The court stated at
consideration 3(b), “En revanche, si le tribunal arbitral a son siège à l'étranger, le juge
étatique suisse, devant lequel une exception d'arbitrage est soulevée, doit statuer sur ce
moyen de défense avec plein pouvoir d'examen quant aux griefs soulevés, et en
particulier celui déduit de l'article II al. 3 de la Convention de New York, sans pouvoir se
limiter à un examen prima facie.” (By contrast [to arbitration conducted inside
Switzerland] if the arbitral tribunal has its seat abroad, the state judge before whom the
arbitration exception is raised must decide on this defense with full powers of
examination concerning the grounds for challenge, and in particular that of Article II (3)
of the New York Convention, without limiting himself to a prima facie examination.)
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The logic of this distinction (which has not gone unquestioned 124) seems to be
that when arbitration occurs abroad, Swiss courts might not get a chance at a later time to
correct an arbitrator's erroneous decision about jurisdiction under the questionable
agreement. By contrast, most arbitration conducted inside Switzerland will be subject to
judicial review on the grounds enumerated in the federal conflicts of law statute, which
include excess of jurisdiction. 125
Comparisons are sometimes made between jurisdictional review in France and in
Switzerland. Notwithstanding some inferences to the contrary, one can see as many (or
more) differences as similarities. For arbitrations inside the forum state, both countries
delay full judicial review of arbitral authority until the award stage. There the similarity
ends, however. Swiss law contains nothing equivalent to the extreme French position
that requires courts, while the arbitration is ongoing, to refrain from addressing even the
clearest indications of an arbitration clause’s invalidity. 126 On the contrary, Swiss courts
verify the validity of arbitration clauses in a summary fashion (prima facie) when asked
either to appoint an arbitrator or to hear disputes allegedly subject to arbitration. 127 And

124

See Jean-François Poudret and Gabriel Cottier, Remarques sur l'Application de Article
II de la Convention de New York, 13 ASA BULLETIN 383 (1995). The authors write, “Si
cette solution doit certes être approuvée, la motivation qui la soutient repose toutefois sur
une distinction peu convaincante et même infondée...” Id., at 387. See also works by
Wenger and Bucher, cited supra.

125

Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé, Article 190. In some instances the
parties may waive challenge to the award. See discussion infra of LDIP Article 192.

126

Article 1458, French Nouveau code de procédure civile.

127

See Articles 7 and 179(3) of the Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé. See
decision of Swiss Tribunal fédéral, ATF 122 III 139, Fondation M v. Banque X, discussed
supra and in François Perret, Parallel Actions Pending Before an Arbitral Tribunal and a
State Court, ASA Special Series No. 15 (January 2001) at 65-66. With respect to
consideration of arbitration clauses prior to appointment of an arbitrator, the federal
statute calls for an examen sommaire (summary examination).
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as already noted, when the arbitral seat is outside Switzerland, Swiss courts are free to
engage in a full inquiry into the validity of the arbitration clause.
Moreover, Swiss case law has held that an arbitrator will be deprived of
jurisdiction to hear a matter if a case has already begun before a foreign court. This
application of lis pendens has been criticized, since it permits a bad-faith litigant to
paralyze an arbitration by starting litigation abroad before a Swiss arbitral proceeding has
begun. 128 Recent federal legislation gives arbitrators sitting in Switzerland the right to
rule on their own jurisdiction even if a foreign court has already been seized of the
matter. 129

128

See Fomento de Construcciones y Contrats S.A. v. Colon Container Terminal S.a.,
Swiss Tribunal fédéral, 14 mai 2001 ( Ie Cour Civile), BGE 127 III 279/ATF 127 III
279; reported in 2001 REV. DE L’ARBITRAGE 835 (commentary by Jean-François
Poudret); Elliot Geisinger and Laurent Lévy, Applying the Principle of Litispendence
[2000] Int’l A.L.R. (Issue 4). See also Adam Samuel, Fomento - A tale of litispendance,
arbitration and private international law, in Liber Amicorum Claude Reymond: Autour de
L’Arbitrage 255 (Bredin, Lalive, Poudret & Terré, eds. Litec, Paris 2004). Under Article
9 of the Swiss LDIP, an arbitral tribunal in Geneva was required to suspend its work in
deference to a judicial action begun in Panama. Some observers consider the case might
have been better decided on the rationale that participation in the Panama litigation
constituted a waiver of the right to arbitrate. See also, Matthias Scherer &Teresa
Giovannini, Geneva Court Will Not Enforce Foreign Anti-Arbitration Injunction, IBA
Arbitration Committee Newsletter 42 (September 2006) (commenting on decision of
Geneva Tribunal of First Instance, 2 May 2005, rejecting an application to stay
arbitration (2005 ASA Bulletin 728, with note by M. Stacher).For a more general
perspective on parallel court proceedings, see Martine Stückelberg, Lis Pendens and
Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague Conference, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 949 (2001).
For another perspective on anti-suit injunctions, see John Fellas, Anti-suit Injunctions in
Aid of Arbitration, 20 INT’L ARB. REP. 25 (April 2005).
129
See Article 186, al 1bis, LDIP, which provides as follows: “Il [le tribunal arbitral]
statue sur sa compétence sans égard à une action ayant le même objet déjà pendante entre
les mêmes parties devant un autre tribunal étatique ou arbitral, sauf si des motifs sérieux
commandent de suspendre la procédure.” [“The arbitral tribunal decides on its
jurisdiction without regard to an action with the same object pending between the same
parties before another national court or arbitral body, unless serious reasons demand
suspension of the procedure.”] Modification du 6 octobre 2006. The provision is
expected to enter into force early in 2007, either the day of its acceptance by the voters in
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In some events an arbitrator’s excess of jurisdiction may escape any judicial
scrutiny, even if the arbitral seat lies in Switzerland. Although proper monitoring for
excess of authority would normally be provided under the federal conflicts of law
statute, 130 the parties may by agreement dispense with such review if both sides are nonSwiss. 131
c)

The UNCITRAL Model Law

Countries that follow the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law provide yet another
twist on the timing of judicial review. The statute dates from 1985, when the United
Nations sponsored a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 132 which has
been enacted in more than fifty countries. 133
The UNCITRAL Model gives the arbitral tribunal an explicit right to determine

the event a referendum, or (if no referendum is held) on the first day of the second month
following the deadline for a referendum, which has been fixed at 25 January 2007. See
also Communiqué, Département fédéral de justice et police (Alexander Markus, Office
fédéral de la justice) 17 May 2006.
130

Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé, Article 190(2)(b) & (c).

131

Loi fédérale sur le droit international privé, Article 192. Non-Swiss parties are
defined as having neither domicile, habitual residence or business establishment in
Switzerland.

132

Drafted by the U.N. Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration received General Assembly
approval on 11 December 1985. See U.N. General Resolution 40/72, 40 GAOR Supp.
No. 53, A/40/53, at 308. See generally HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS,
GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1989); Henri C. Alvarez, Neil Kaplan, & David W. Rivkin, Model Law Decisions
(2003); Pieter Sanders, The World of UNCITRAL Arbitration and Conciliation (2nd edn,
2004).
133

The geographically and culturally diverse countries that have adopted the UNCITRAL
Model Law include Australia, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Mexico,
Nigeria, Russia, Scotland, Singapore, Spain, and New Zealand. Within the United States,
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, and Texas have adopted the Model Law on a
state level.
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its own jurisdiction in the form of a “preliminary” award, subject to challenge on a
request from a party within thirty (30) days. 134 Arbitrators, of course, may choose to
delay decisions on jurisdictional matters until the final award.
The Model Law does not prevent courts from finding an arbitration clause to be
void in the context of a judicial action on the substantive merits of the case, assuming
judicial jurisdiction exists over the relevant parties and/or dispute. 135 The Model Law
envisions the possibility of simultaneous proceedings by courts and arbitrators regarding
the competence of the arbitral tribunal. 136 Article 8 provides that a court must refer
parties to arbitration only if it finds the arbitration agreement not to be “null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.”
Controversy does exist on the standard for pre-award review. Some authorities
hold to “full review” while others adopt a “prima facie review” approach that refers
parties to arbitration unless the arbitration clause appears void on its face. 137
The “prima facie” approach leaves open the question of whether a court’s
decision is subject to being re-opened at a later stage. A judge might say, “I’ve given the
clause a quick glance, and it looks fine to me.” Presumably this would not preclude a
134

Article 16, Model Arbitration Law of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law.

135

See HOWARD HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH NEUHAUS, GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1989), at 306: “This provision
provoked debate between those who considered that the court should have power to stay
the arbitral proceedings in order to prevent potentially needless arbitration and those who
would have ... had the court suspend its own proceedings in order to avoid delay and
needless court intervention.”
136

Holtzmann and Neuhaus note that "a court might still consider the jurisdiction of the
tribunal in considering whether a substantive claim should be referred to jurisdiction...."
See HOWARD HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH NEUHAUS, supra at 486.

137

See Frédéric Bachand, Does Article 8 of the Model Law Call for Full or Prima Facie
Review of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Jurisdiction?, 22 ARB. INT’L (2006).
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later jurisdictional attack on the award, which under the UNCITRAL Model would be
available for invalidity of the arbitration agreement or arbitral decisions falling outside
the scope of the arbitration submission. By contrast, if the judge’s quick glance
determines the clause is void, the parties would seem to be stuck with that decision, since
by definition there would be no award to review.
E.

The First Word and the Last
1. Base-line Positions

One way to summarize the different base-line positions on determinations of
arbitral authority might be to ask when arbitrators have the first word on their
jurisdiction, and when they have the last. Here is how the landscape might be described.
1. In most modern legal systems, an arbitrator will have the “first word” on
his/her jurisdiction, unless a court of competent jurisdiction says otherwise. The
arbitral tribunal need not stop the proceedings just because a party questions some
aspect of arbitral authority.
2. The fact that arbitrators can have the first word does not mean that they always
do have the “first word”. A litigant might go to court to challenge arbitral
jurisdiction without waiting for an award. Such is the situation in the United
States and Germany.
3. By contrast, in other countries courts must generally wait to examine
jurisdiction until an award is rendered. This is the rule in France, subject to
certain narrow exceptions.
4. In all major legal systems, the “last word” on arbitral jurisdiction will normally
be for courts at the time an award is subject to scrutiny in the context of a motion
to vacate, confirm or grant recognition.
5. Countries differ dramatically, however, on whether and when the parties may
entrust a jurisdictional matter to final and binding arbitration, thus in effect
transferring the “last word” from the courts to the arbitrators. In the United
States, deference to an arbitrator’s jurisdictional decision requires a finding that
“the arbitrability question” has clearly been given to the arbitrators. Courts might
make this finding either at the beginning of the arbitral process (when one side
tries to compel arbitration) or at the end (when an award is presented for review).
Other legal systems (notably Germany) deny deference to agreements that purport
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to subject jurisdictional questions to final determination by arbitrators. Results
may depend on whether the purported agreement on jurisdiction takes the form of
a separate agreement or a clause in the main commercial contract.
2. The Devil in the Detail
Being human, judges like arbitrators sometimes get it wrong. Errors can creep
into a judge’s understanding of the parties’ intent on jurisdictional questions. The results
may be either denial of a party’s day in court (in a so-called “pro-arbitration” decision) or
disregard of the parties’ bargain to arbitrate (in a so-called “anti-arbitration” decision).”
Although trivial, the point is of utmost importance in connection with rules on
arbitral jurisdiction. The establishment of any principle bears a danger of misapplication,
a fact that might be taken into account by policy-makers in determining whether the rule
is likely to provide an optimum balance of efficiency and fairness.
Some risks are greater than others. By allowing parties to grant arbitrators final
authority on jurisdictional matter, a legal system increases the peril that faulty contract
interpretation will result in some litigants will being denied their day in court. Judges
might take a mere contract recital for a manifestation of genuine party consent. The
problem is particularly delicate in complex large-scale commercial fact patterns, where
legal principles often end up being indicative rather than dispositive. 138
The complexity of other policy concerns facing legislators can be seen in the
various wrinkles engrafted on the major guidelines set down for establishment of arbitral
jurisdiction. As has been mentioned elsewhere, these include (i) special rules on

138

In contrast, the United States federal court decisions set forth relatively firm rules for
problems that repeat themselves with routine regularity in American arbitration: class
actions in consumer lending, and time limits in securities complaints against brokers.
See discussions of Bazzle and Howsam, infra.
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declaratory court decisions, 139 (ii) mechanisms to address preliminary points of arbitral
jurisdiction, 140 (iii) varying appellate procedures for decisions that implicate arbitral
jurisdiction, 141 (iv) different standards by which courts address arbitral jurisdiction before
(as opposed to after) an arbitration has begun, or before (as opposed to after) an award
has been rendered. 142 As to the wisdom of these nuances, only time will tell.
II.

Clarifications
A.

Supra-National Adjudicatory Bodies

In most instances, Kompetenz-Kompetenz refers to how national courts exercise
supervisory competence, as discussed earlier. However, the phrase KompetenzKompetenz has also been applied in forms of international dispute resolution that proceed
largely independent of close national court supervision, including the practice of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration and arbitration under the rules of ICSID, the International

139

Some countries such as England and Germany restrict the right of courts to provide
declaratory decisions about arbitral authority, but not the power to address arbitral
jurisdiction in the context of an action on the underlying dispute.

140

Compare UNCITRAL Article 16 (immediate appeal of jurisdictional ruling) with
Section 32 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act, which permits an application to the court
for a determination on substantive jurisdiction if made by all parties or with the
permission of the arbitral tribunal. English law also provides for interim awards on
jurisdiction, subject to court review. See Sections 31(4) and 67 of the 1996 Act. On the
policies behind bifurcated hearings to address jurisdictional decisions separately, see John
Gotanda, An Efficient Method for Determining Jurisdiction in International Arbitrations,
40 COLUMBIA J. TRANS. L. 11 (2001).
141

For the position in the United States, see 9 U.S. C. § 16, providing different standards
for appeal of lower court decisions on arbitral jurisdiction, depending on whether the
court finds for or against the arbitrator’s power.
142

French courts address arbitral jurisdiction only if the arbitral tribunal has not yet been
“seized” of the matter, and must limit their inquiry to whether an arbitration clause is
clearly void (manifestement nulle). NCPC Article 1458. Compare the situation under
UNCITRAL Article 8. Similarly, in Switzerland courts generally review an arbitration
clause on a prima facie basis (examen sommaire) before the award, but reserve plenary
review following an arbitrator’s decision. LDIP Ariticles 7 and 179(3).
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Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. 143 The import of this jurisdictional
principle takes on a different cast when the arbitral tribunal is not subject to immediate
and well-established forms of control by national courts.
An example of arbitration removed from the review of national courts can be
found in the ICSID system, which pursuant to treaty provides a structure for arbitration of
investment disputes between host states and foreigners. 144 ICSID tribunals render their
awards outside the framework of national arbitration statutes. The Convention forecloses
challenge to awards on normal statutory grounds 145 in favor of ICSID’s special system of
quality control under its own internal challenge procedure. 146
Consequently, jurisdictional determinations are by necessity subject to the
143

See generally cases summarized in Pierre Lalive, Some Objections to Jurisdiction in
Investor-State Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT
CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 376 (2002 ICCA Congress, London) at 378-380.
144

The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Washington 18 March 1965 (ratified by 140 nations)
established the International Centre for Investment Disputes (ICSID) to hear disputes
between Convention states and investors from another party to the Convention. See
generally EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LA JURISPRUDENCE DU CIRDI (2004); RUDOLF DOLZER
& MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); Abby Cohen Smutny,
Arbitration Before the International Centre for Investment Disputes, 3 BUS. LAW INT’L
367 (September 2002).
For ICSID arbitration in the United States, this rule has never been tested in a court
action raising the conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act (allowing motions to
vacate awards) and the Washington Convention (which excludes such vacatur). The US
Constitution in Article VI (2) lists both treaties and federal statutes as the “supreme Law
of the Land,” without establishing a hierarchy. On some matters statutes clearly override
treaties. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-499 § 1125, providing that no treaty shall require
“exemption from (or reduction of) any tax imposed” on gains from disposition of US
realty. When Congress is silent courts look to canons of statutory interpretation such as
“last in time prevails” or “specific restricts general.” See Detlev Vagts, The United States
and its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 313 (2001).
145

See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States Article 52, ICSID Basic Documents 25 (1985). See generally
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND
ARBITRATION 46–50 (Duke 1992).
146

57

arbitrators’ jurisdiction alone, absent evidence that the parties never consented in any
way to ICSID arbitration. 147 While this may at first blush appear to be similar to the
situation in other forms of arbitration, 148 there is no judiciary to exercise supervisory
power, since Article 26 of the Washington Convention provides that consent to ICSID
jurisdiction shall (unless otherwise stated) be deemed to constitute consent to arbitration
“to the exclusion of any other remedy.” 149
Similar non-national Kompetenz-Kompetenz principles might be appropriate for
the emerging field of tax treaty arbitration. Recent proposals have been elaborated by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 150 and in research sponsored
by the International Fiscal Association. 151

147

Convention Article 41 provides that “The Tribunal shall be the judge of its own
competence.” See also Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 41. The
Centre’s jurisdiction is addressed in Article 25 of the Washington Convention itself.

148

See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION (2001) at 521, comparing ICSID
Article 41 with ICC Rule 6 and Article 21 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
149

See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION (2001) at 347, noting that
consent to ICSID arbitration means that “the parties have lost their right to seek relief in
another forum, national or international.”
150

See Proposals for Improving Mechanisms for Resolution of Tax Treaty Disputes,
Public discussion draft, February 2006 (OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs), proposing
amplification of the “Mutual Agreement Procedure” in Model Income Tax Convention
Article 25.

151

WILLIAM W. PARK & DAVID R. TILLINGHAST, INCOME TAX TREATY ARBITRATION
(2004). In this connection, the IFA-sponsored study makes the following proposal: “In
the event that an arbitral tribunal fails to decide a claim because it deems the matter to be
outside the scope of the convention, and thus governed solely by national law, either
Contracting State or the taxpayer may challenge this finding before a Jurisdictional
Review Panel. This Panel shall be constituted according to the process provided in
Article 5. The Panel shall consider de novo whether the claim is governed by the
Convention. The decision of the Panel shall be final. Following a decision that a claim is
governed by this Convention, a new arbitral tribunal shall be constituted pursuant to
Article 5 and shall be bound by the Panel’s jurisdictional determination.” Id., page 97,
including Proposed Article 8(c) of Supplement to Double Tax Convention Article 25,
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B.

Applicable Law

If a question arises about whether an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to decide its
jurisdiction, what procedural law should be applied to test the limits of the principle?
The quick answer (not very helpful) would be that the matter will be determined under
whatever arbitration principles might be deemed appropriate by the forum where the
challenge arises. For example, if the arbitrators’ jurisdictional determination has been
questioned before French courts, the applicable procedural law would be the Nouveau
Code de Procédure Civile. If in the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act. In
England, the 1996 Arbitration Act. And should a litigant, by some extraordinary
boldness, challenge the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in ICSID arbitration the
judges seized of the matter would (one hopes) look to the 1965 Washington Convention.
The answer is much more complex in reality. National legal systems quite rightly
look to other legal systems through a variety of mechanisms, including reference to a
transnational procedural lex mercatoria 152 or in some cases the law applicable to the
merits. 153 In a federal system, the laws of different political subdivisions might compete.
152

Rhône Méditerranée v. Achille Lauro, 712 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983). See also Isover St.
Gobain v. Dow Chemical France et al., ICC Case 4131 (1982), ICC COLLECTION OF
ARBITRAL AWARDS, Volume I: 1974-85 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains, eds., 1990),
upheld by the Paris Cour d’appel, 21 October 1983, 1984 REV. ARB. 98; English language
extracts in 9 ICCA YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 132 (1984).
153

Pepsico v. Officina Central de Asesoria, 945 F.Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also
DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS , THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (14th edition, L. Collins, gen. ed.,
2006), Rule 57(1), at 712, suggesting that “the material validity, scope and interpretation
of an arbitration agreement” are governed by the parties’ chosen law or (in the absence of
choice) the law most closely connected with the arbitration agreement, normally that of
the arbitral seat. This formulation is a considerable improvement over that in the prior
edition, which included the “effect” of an arbitration agreement in the ambit of applicable
law.” While true as far as it goes, the rule fails to mention that the “effect” of arbitration
agreements can also be determined by the arbitration law of the arbitral seat, the treaty
context, and law of the recognition forum, regardless of the parties’ choice.
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Depending on the issue, procedural questions in the United States might be subject to one
of three different chapters of the Federal Arbitration Act, 154 as well as state contract
principles regarding interpretation of the New York Convention. 155 Or state law might
apply, either by virtue of the arbitral seat 156 or the parties’ choice. 157
C.

The Autonomy of the Arbitration Clause

A frequent source of confusion about the arbitrator’s right to rule on his or her
jurisdiction lies in the interaction of Kompetenz-Kompetenz principles and the doctrine of
“separability” or the “autonomy” of the arbitration clause.

158

Many eminent authorities

have addressed the interaction of the two principles, 159 which when all is said and done
are designed to create presumptions that help the arbitration process run smoothly. 160
154

FAA Ch. 2 implements the New York Convention, and Ch. 3 the Panama Convention.

155

Article II of the New York Convention requires “an arbitral clause in a contract or an
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties….” See Kahn Lucas v. Lark Int’l , 186 F.3d
210 (2d Cir. 1999), holding that “signed by the parties” applies to arbitral clauses in
contracts as well as separate arbitration agreements. For a contrary holding, see Sphere
Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir.1994). Little evidence
indicates how many arbitrators reflect on the comma before taking jurisdiction.
156

New England Energy v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988).

157

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Volt Information
Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).

158

See Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separabiltiy” in
Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 121 (2003); Adam Samuel,
Separability of arbitration clauses - some awkward questions about the law on contracts,
conflict of laws and the administration of justice, [2000] ADRLJ 36; Christian Herrera
Petrus, Spanish Perspectives on the Doctrines of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and
Separability: A Comparative Analysis of Spain’s 1988 Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 397 (2000).
159

See e.g., Pierre Mayer, L'Autonomie de l'arbitre dans l'appréciation de sa propre
compétence, 217 RECUEIL DES COURS 320 (Académie de droit international de La Haye
1989) at 339-352.
160

Redfern and Hunter state, “There are essentially two elements to this [jurisdictional]
rule: first, that an arbitral tribunal can rule on its own jurisdiction; and secondly that, for
this purpose, the arbitration clause is separate and independent from the terms of the
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Kompetenz-Kompetenz is distinct from, but intersects functionally with, the notion
that an arbitration agreement can be operationally detached from the main contract in
which it is found. Often conceptualized as a matter of “separability,” the principle that an
arbitration clause possesses contractual autonomy permits the arbitrators to do their job,
notwithstanding what their award might say about the validity of the contract in dispute.
The separability doctrine gives the arbitration clause the status of a contract autonomous
from the principal agreement in which it is encapsulated. 161 Thus arbitrators may decide
issues relating to the validity of the main contract (such as allegations of fraud in the
inducement, or "per se" violations of antitrust law) without risk that their power will
disappear retroactively. The autonomy of the arbitration clause recognizes the
contracting parties' presumed intent that the arbitrator should be empowered to decide on
the validity or survival of the principal commercial contract. Otherwise the arbitrators
might be stripped of power at the very moment when evaluating important aspects of the

contract containing the transactions between the parties.” ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN
HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, LAW & PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (4th ed. 2004), Section 5-42, at 254. See
also JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003), Section 14-19 at 334. These authors
write, “While competence-competence empowers the arbitration tribunal to decide on its
own jurisdiction, separability affects the outcome of this decision… Without the doctrine
of separability, a tribunal making use of its competence-competence would potentially be
obligated to deny jurisdiction on the merits since the existence of the arbitration clause
might be affected by the invalidity of the underlying contract.”
161

See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
Surprisingly, one recent decision has invoked First Options v. Kaplan to question the
validity of the separability doctrine. See Maye v. Smith Barney, 897 F. Supp. 100
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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parties' business relationship. 162
Separability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz can serve much of the same function, in
that both notions create mechanisms to prevent a bad faith party from stopping the
arbitral proceedings before they have begun. The autonomy of the arbitration clause
operates with respect to defects in the main contract which might otherwise taint the
arbitrator's jurisdiction. The doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, on the other hand, gives
the arbitrator the right to pass upon even alleged infirmities in the arbitration clause itself.
To illustrate the difference between the separability of the arbitration clause and
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, assume that an arbitration clause has been included in a
marketing agreement by which a consultant agreed to help an American corporation
obtain a public works contract in the Ruritania. It might be alleged both that (i) the
person who signed the agreement for the American corporation was not authorized to do
so and (ii) the consulting agreement was void because the payments thereunder were
earmarked in part to bribe government officials. 163 Separability notions would permit the

162

Many countries permit the arbitration agreement to be subject to a different law than
that of the main contract. On separability, see generally Peter Gross, Separability Comes
of Age in England, 11 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 85 (1995), discussing Harbour
Assurance Co. (U.K.) v. Kansa General International Assurance Co., [1993] 3 All E.R.
897; MATTHIEU DE BOISSESON, DROIT FRANÇAIS DE L'ARBITRAGE (2d Ed., 1990), at
pages 482-484 and 491-493 (''575 and 579); and cases discussed in ADAM SAMUEL,
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1989), at
155-172. See generally Adam Samuel, Separability and the US Supreme Court Decision
in Buckeye v. Cardegna, 22 Arbitration International 477 (2006).; Adam Samuel,
Separability of arbitration clauses - some awkward questions about the law on contracts,
conflict of laws and the administration of justice”, [2000] ADRLJ 36.
163

Or the illegality might derive from a violation of antitrust law, or a lender not being
authorized to engage in banking in the relevant jurisdiction. See Worthen B. & T. Co. v.
United Underwrit. Sales Corp., 251 Ark. 454 (1971); but see Shepard v. Finance
Associates of Auburn, Inc., 366 Mass. 182 (1974). Compare Harbour v. Kansa Harbour
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arbitrators to find the main contract void for illegality without destroying their power
under the arbitration clause to do so. 164 Separability would not, however, prevent the
court from determining whether the individual who signed the agreement was authorized
to bind the corporation to arbitrate; nor would separability save from ultimate annulment
or non-recognition an award based on an arbitrator's erroneous assumption about such
corporate power. 165
On the other hand, French principles permit the arbitrators to go to the end of the
proceedings and decide the matter of the corporate signature, rather than having the
question to be referred to the appropriate court at the outset of the arbitration. 166
However, without a separability principle, the arbitrators’ right to rule on their own
jurisdiction would not save the validity of an award that had declared the main contract
void because of illegality.
The situation in American case law has been subject to several key decisions of

Assurance, [1993] Q.B. 701 and 10 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 194 (1994); Peter
Gross, Separability Comes of Age in England, 11 ARB. INT’L 85 (1995).
164

Contracts to engage in bribery are generally void throughout the world, while
contracts to arbitrate are not. A court probably could, however, refuse to enforce the
award if the arbitrator had decided that the contract did not implicate bribery when in fact
(in the court's view) it did. While the arbitrator's finding on the validity of the contract
would normally be entitled to deference, many statutes and treaties contain explicit
provisions for judicial refusal to enforce awards that violate public policy. See e.g.,
French N.C.P.C. Article 1502(5) and New York Convention Article V(2)(b).
165

See e.g., South Pacific Properties v. Egypt, French Cour de Cassation (6 January
1987), [1987] REV. ARB. 469, note Ph. Leboulanger. Translation and note by Emmanuel
Gaillard, 26 I.L.M. 1004 (1987).
166

German law as it now stands might permit the parties to enter into a "KompetenzKompetenz clause" that could insulate the arbitrator's findings on the signature from any
judicial review, although it is not clear whether such findings would withstand a
challenge to the validity of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause itself.
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the United States Supreme Court. In the landmark American Prima Paint decision, 167 a
claim was brought for fraud in the inducement of the purchaser of a paint business. The
buyer sought rescission in court rather than before the bargained-for arbitral tribunal.
The court in essence asked, “Who, court or arbitrator, shall decide whether there was
fraudulent inducement of a contract?” Without the autonomy of the arbitration clause,
the question would have been for the court, since an arbitrator could not have declared
the main agreement to be rescinded without thereby invalidating the arbitration clause.
Separability of the arbitration clause permitted the fraud charge, with respect to the main
agreement, to be characterized as related to the merits of the case, rather than to the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
The principle was recently affirmed in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna
where the United States Supreme Court affirmed the doctrine in the context of a
consumer dispute heard in state court and involving an alleged violation of state
statute. 168 This classic separability case involved a challenge to arbitral jurisdiction

167

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).

168

126 S.Ct. 1204 (2006). A decision by Justice Scalia found that the Florida Supreme
Court failed to adhere to the teachings of Prima Paint in a putative class action against a
check cashing service accused of making usurious loans in violation of Florida law.
Claimants argued that because the contract was allegedly void, the arbitration clause was
unenforceable. The action was brought by the borrowers, with lenders seeking to compel
arbitration. The Court held that the illegality did not invalidate the arbitration clause,
which was separable (autonomous) from the main agreement. Although the Court
reached the right result, a bit of careless phraseology has the potential to create mischief
in subsequent cases. Justice Scalia asserted, “Applying them [general arbitration
principles] to this case, we conclude that because respondents challenge the Agreement,
but not specifically its arbitration provisions, those provisions are enforceable apart from
the remainder of the contract. The challenge should therefore be considered by an
arbitrator, not a court.” Id. at 1209 These sentences imply both too little and too much.
First, an arbitration clause might well be invalid even if a challenge aims at the main
agreement, as in event of forgery or lack of capacity. Second, arbitrators do not lose the
right to “consider” jurisdiction simply due to challenge launched against the arbitration
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based on the alleged invalidity of a loan agreement. Had the view of the state court
prevailed, the arbitrators would have had no power to consider their own jurisdiction.
From the start, the charge of “void contract” would have taken away that opportunity,
since the allegedly invalid loan agreement would have been inseparably linked to the
arbitration clause. 169
III.

Taxonomy: What is a Jurisdictional Question?
A.

Existence, Scope and Public Policy

In practice, an arbitrator’s right to decide a question will often depend on how that
question is characterized by the reviewing court. Labeling matters as “jurisdictional”
puts them into the realm where judges would normally expect to exercise some scrutiny,
depending on the circumstances of the case and the approach of the relevant legal system.
To reduce the risk of simply presuming one’s own conclusions about what is or is
not jurisdictional, it might be helpful to suggest three common categories of defects in

provisions. Instead, any consideration of the provisions is simply subject to judicial
scrutiny, absent the parties’ agreement otherwise. Justice Alito did not participate and
Justice Thomas dissented on the basis that the FAA does not apply in state court
proceedings to displace a state law prohibiting enforcement of an arbitration clause. See
generally, Alan Scott Rau, Separability in the United States Supreme Court, 2006
STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. REV. 1 (2006); Adam Samuel, Separability and the U.S. Supreme
Court Decision in Buckeye v. Cardegna, 22 ARB. INT’L 477 (2006).
169

Whether the arbitration law of the United States should allow arbitration of such
consumer disputes remains open to question. In Europe the pre-dispute arbitration clause
in the usurious loan agreement would most likely be void. See Article 6.1 of the 1993
European Union Directive on Unfair Contract Terms, which invalidates “unfair” contract
terms in consumer contracts. Articles 3 and 4.1 set out the basic notion of an unfair
contract, which include terms not individually negotiated if they cause a significant
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract. An annex
contains an indicative and non-exclusive list of “the terms which may be regarded as
unfair” including paragraph “q” which presumes a term to be unfair if it has the effect of
“excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any other
legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to
arbitration not covered by legal provisions…”

65

arbitral authority.
(i) Existence of an arbitration agreement. In some instances there may be no
binding agreement to arbitrate (for example, due to absence of signatory
authority), or strangers to the agreement might have been joined through fraud,
forgery or duress. 170
(ii) Scope of authority. An arbitrator might be asked to decide substantive
questions which the arbitration clause never submitted to his or her determination.
Or the arbitrator might disregard party-agreed rules on how the arbitration was to
be conducted, perhaps by exceeding limits on arbitral powers; 171
(iii) Public policy. An arbitration might purport to address subjects that a
relevant legal system says may not be arbitrated (subject matter arbitrability 172),
or which a court feels lie within its exclusive purview. 173 Or an award might give
effect to illegal conduct. 174
The first two flaws relate to the contours of the parties’ contract. The third derives from
public policy, regardless of what the parties might have agreed.
There is no magic in this tripartite classification, which commends itself only as a
170

See e.g., Chastain v. Robinson- Humphrey, 957 F. 2d 851 (11th Cir. 1992) (forgery);
Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, 121 F. 3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997). See also
decisions in Sphere Drake v. All American, Three Valleys and Sandvik, discussed infra.
See generally, BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS (2005).
171

On occasion, arbitral institutions may also play a role in excess of authority. For
example, if disputes are to be settled by arbitrators appointed by the International
Chamber of Commerce, a tribunal should not normally be constituted by the American
Arbitration Association or the London Court of International Arbitration. See Maritime
International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094
(D.D.C. 1982).

172

Subject matters that have traditionally been sensitive (notwithstanding that many are
not considered arbitrable) include competition law, securities regulation, bankruptcy and
intellectual property. See e.g., Alain Prujiner, Propriété intellectuell et arbitrage:
quelques réflexions après l’arrêt Caillou, CAHIER DE PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE,
MÉLANGES VICTOR NABHAN (2004).
173

See discussion infra of United States v. Stein, concerning the right to legal fees in a
criminal tax investigation.

174

An arbitrator would not likely be permitted to render an award giving effect to a sale
of illegal arms to terrorists or ordering payment for slaves or heroine. Nor would an
arbitrator be permitted to reinstate a pilot dismissed from employment for showing up
drunk at the cockpit. See discussion infra.
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starting point for analysis. Jurisdiction remains a notoriously slippery term. Different
statutes employ different terms, and divergent intellectual pigeon-holes to organize
grounds for jurisdictional challenge. 175 In the real world, an alleged problem sometimes
involves a combination of factors, or represents shades of gray on a jurisdictional
continuum.
Violations of public policy, of course, will defeat the enforcement of arbitration
agreements regardless of the parties’ wishes, at least within the forum whose norms have
been offended. 176 The problem with public policy, of course, lies in its malleability and
potential for mischief when applied through a parochial lens. Although courts can hardly
be expected to enforce an arbitration agreement related to an arms sale to terrorists, the
“public policy” shibboleth frequently finds itself invoked with respect to concerns of
much less magnitude. 177
The other two categories of jurisdictional shortcoming (existence and scope of the
clause) might be remedied by the parties’ agreement. If the challenge relates to the very
validity of the arbitration clause, the issue could be submitted to final arbitral
175

Compare: 1996 English Act, Section 67 and Section 68, French NCPC Article 1502,
Swiss LDIP Article 190, FAA Section 10 FAA, UNCITRAL Model Law Article 34.

176

It might be that one country finds it intolerable for the arbitrator to have applied the
parties’ choice-of-law clause in a way that disregards its competition law, while another
country might be offended if the arbitrator does ignores the choice-of-law clause.
177

See e.g., Nagrampa v. MailCoups Inc. 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006), refusing to
recognize an arbitration agreement because it would have required a California resident
to travel to Boston for arbitration, notwithstanding that she was an admittedly savvy
businesswoman who “knew her industry inside and out.” Id. at 1310 (dissent by
Kozinski). Finding an arbitration clause unconscionable (a matter held to be for judge
rather than arbitrator), the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court decision dismissing a
California state action brought by the franchisee. The prize for parochialism may well go
to Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063,
1068-69 (N.D. Ga. 1980), vacating award simply because it applied a French interest rate
to an international contract involving a company from France.
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determination through a second agreement legitimately concluded by the party sought to
be bound. Such a result has been accepted in some legal systems, 178 but not others. 179
Without such a subsequent agreement, however, arguments about proper parties will
inevitably be subject to review by a court asked to enforce the award. 180
Problems of scope might be addressed in the initial arbitration clause itself. At
the time of concluding their transaction, foresighted parties could give arbitrators explicit
authority to adjudicate challenges to the extent of their powers and the range of matters
covered by the arbitration clause. Again, the extent to which a grant of jurisdictional
power will be recognized in court depends on the relevant judicial system.
Even if a legal system does not give final effect to an arbitrator’s jurisdictional
ruling, it might well accord interim deference by delaying judicial review until after an
award. The timing for challenge, however, remains a question separate from the effect of
the jurisdictional decision and the parties’ intention in that regard.
B.

Common Trouble Spots

An arbitrator’s jurisdiction to hear a matter will normally depend on several
distinct lines of inquiry: (i) the existence of an agreement to arbitrate; (ii) the scope of
the agreement with respect to parties, subject matter and procedural powers; (iii) public
policy that might override the agreement, by making the subject non-arbitrable or the
governing law inapplicable.
178

See Astro Valiente Compania Naviera v. Pakistan Ministry of Food & Agriculture
(Emmanuel Colocotronis No. 2), [1982], 1 W.L.R. 1096, 1 All E. R. 578 (disagreement
on whether charter party terms incorporated into a bill of lading). See also discussions of
the law in the United States (infra) and Finland (supra).

179

See discussion infra of the German BGH decision of 13 January 2005.

180

The subsequent arbitration agreement would in essence transform a jurisdictional
question (in the first dispute) into one of the substantive merits (in the second).
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With respect to the first two “contract-related” categories, common questions
arise with respect to implied agency; waiver of right to arbitrate (for example, by
initiation of court litigation or undue delay), survival of an arbitration clause after
assignment, and authority of a corporate officer. Even if a valid arbitration agreement
exists, its substantive and procedural limits may be circumscribed in ways that require
serious examination. Did the parties intend that tort claims arising out of the contract
would be subject to the arbitrator's jurisdiction? Were statutory causes of action (for
example, relating to antitrust violations) included within the arbitrator's mission? Did
the arbitrators exceed their authority by disregarding the applicable law 181 or the basic
terms of the contract? 182 While some countries create presumptions about certain aspects
of jurisdiction, 183 care must be taken that they not be misapplied.
The process for constitution of the arbitral tribunal also affects arbitral power.
Arbitrators possess jurisdiction only if appointed according to the parties' agreement. If
the parties agreed to arbitration by a tribunal appointed by the International Chamber of
Commerce, there is no basis to oblige the defendant to participate in an arbitration
convened by the American Arbitration Association. 184 Interpreting the parties' intent as

181

For example, arbitrators who apply provisions of United States antitrust law,
notwithstanding the merchants' agreement that the contract shall be subject to the laws of
another country, might exceed their jurisdiction, unless the mandatory norms of the
United States (as place of performance) preempt the contractually-designated law. See
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

182

See e.g., Mobile Oil v. Asamera, 487 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

183

In England, for example, the House of Lords decision in Lesotho Highlands
(discussed infra) might be seen as creating the presumption that arbitrators who exercise
statutory powers do so within their mandate, notwithstanding that the powers have been
exercised incorrectly.

184

For an analogous problem, see Guinea v. MINE, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C.C. 1982), and
Geneva Office des Poursuites, 26 I.L.M. 382 (1987).
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to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal becomes particularly problematic when courts
are called to repair pathological clauses lacking particulars about the arbitral situs or
institutional rules.185 In some cases, the arbitrators' qualifications will be established in
part by the institutional rules to which the arbitration agreement refers. 186
Procedural powers exercised by arbitrators can also become jurisdictional issues.
Did the parties authorize the arbitrators to consolidate two proceedings? Did the parties
authorize the arbitrators to punish a party for failing to produce documents? Did the
parties authorize the arbitrators to award compound interest?
Sound analysis will depend on the contextual configuration in which jurisdictional
questions are asked. The problem areas sketched below have in the past fertilized
disagreements about arbitral authority.
a)

Who is a Party?

When arbitrators assume jurisdiction over a non-signatory to the arbitration
agreement (perhaps because two or more corporations are related through common
ownership), the task of determining who agreed to arbitrate may be complicated by the
form in which contract documents were signed. 187 Corporate restructuring provides

185

See e.g., Jain v. De Méré, 51 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 1995); National Iranian Oil Company
v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1987); Marks 3-Zet-Ernst Marks GmbH v.
Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2006). In the last case, the contract between German
and American entities provided only for “arbitration in the Hague under the International
Arbitration rules.”

186

For example, the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce require arbitrator
"independence." Arbitration qualifications incorporated into a contract through reference
to institutional rules often overlap public policy limits on biased arbitrators, just as
arbitration rules on notice and the right to present one's case will frequently echo due
process requirements of municipal arbitration law.
187

For example, in South Pacific Properties v. Egypt, an arbitral tribunal had to determine
whether the government of Egypt was bound by an arbitration clause in an investment
contract concluded by an Egyptian state-owned corporation but also initialled by a
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another fertile source for confusion as to the proper party to an arbitration agreement. 188
b)

Meaning of Contract Terms

In commercial arbitrations, disputes frequently raise questions about what
controverted events are covered by the clause, and what procedural powers have been
given to an arbitrator. For example, a party might assert that a transaction occurred
before the arbitration clause entered into effect, or that the arbitrator’s power to award
punitive damages had been expressly circumscribed. 189
c)

Waiver, Delay and Other Post-Contract Events

Arbitrators are often presented with questions arising out of events subsequent to
contract formation. Invalidity might be asserted on the basis of assignment, 190 waiver of
the right to arbitrate, 191 failure to observe statutory or contractual time limits, or undue
delay in pursuing a claim. 192 For example, the arbitrator might be asked to determine
whether one party's recourse to courts constitutes waiver of the right to compel

government minister with the ambiguous words "approved, agreed and ratified." Egypt v.
Southern Pacific Properties, Ltd., Judgment of July 12, 1984, Cour d'appel, Paris 1987
J.D.I. (Clunet) 129; 1986 Rev. Arb. 75. See 23 I.L.M. 1048 (E. Gaillard trans. 1984).
Affirmed by Cour de cassation Judgment of Jan. 6, 1987, Cass. civ. lre, 1987 J.D.I.
(Clunet) 469 (with commentary by Ph. Leboulanger), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1004 (E.
Gaillard trans. 1987). The I.C.C. award itself (Case No. 3493) is published in 22 I.L.M.
752 and 1986 Rev. d'Arbitrage 105. Following a subsequent ICSID award against Egypt
(ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, 20 May 1992), the parties reached a final settlement in
December 1992. See 8 Int. Arb. Rep. 328 (Jan. 1993).
188

See also discussion supra of U.S. Court of Appeals decisions in Sarhank, Intergen,
and Bridas v. Turkmenistan; English Queen’s Bench decision in Kazakhstan v. Istil and
U.S. district court decision in Fluor Daniel v. General Electric.
189

See also discussion infra of the Scalia opinion in Pacificare.

190

Apollo v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989).

191

Cabintree v. Kraftmaid, 50 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 1995).

192

Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193, 647 N.E.2d 1308
(1995).
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arbitration, or whether delay in bringing a claim bars arbitration by virtue of a statute of
limitations or an eligibility requirement contained in arbitration rules. 193
d)

Ab Initio Invalidity of the Arbitration Agreement

The validity of an arbitration clause may be in doubt not only because of gross
consensual defects related to physical duress and forgery, but also due to the lack of
authorized signatures required by the corporate by-laws or inadequate incorporation of
institutional arbitral rules. 194
e)

Procedure

In addition to excess of jurisdiction with respect to substantive contract questions,
an arbitral tribunal may act outside the limits to their authority set by the parties with
respect to procedural matters. The arbitral tribunal may be improperly constituted (under
a set of institutional rules other than the ones specified in the contract), or the arbitral
tribunal may deny one side its right to be heard during the arbitral proceedings. An

193

See, e.g., Paine Webber v. Landay, 903 F. Supp. 193 (D. Mass. 1995) (six year time
limit for bringing claim under NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure held to be a question
for arbitrator to decide); Smith Barney v. Luckie, New York Ct. App., 21 Feb. 1995, 63
U.S. Law Week 2531 (7 March 1995) (statute of limitations questions must be resolved
by courts; New York law not pre-empted by Federal Arbitration Act). Compare New
York cases cited in Paine Webber v. Landay at n. 5 of Judge Woodlock's opinion. See
also Zwitserse Maatschappij van Levensverzekering en Lijfrente v. ABN International
Capital Markets, 996 F. 2d 1478 (2d Cir. 1993) (initiation of judicial proceedings in the
Netherlands resulted in waiver of right to arbitrate); Khalid Bin Alwaleed Foundation v.
E.F. Hutton, U.S. Dist. Ct. N. D. Ill., E.D. (1990), reported in XVI Yearbook Comm. Arb.
645 (1991) (participation in pre-trial discovery did not constitute waiver of right to
arbitrate).
194

See Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d. 1136 (9th
Cir. 1991), concerning securities law violations brought by government entities against
investment company. The government entities resisted arbitration on the grounds that the
individual who signed the agreements allegedly on their behalf did not have authority to
do so. The Court of Appeals held that whether the signatory had authority to bind the
plaintiffs was a question for the courts to decide, and remanded the case to the district
court for a determination on the matter.

72

increasingly important source of jurisdictional difficulty lies in the multiparty dimension
of many business disputes. Problems arise from attempts to consolidate related
arbitrations 195 and to appoint arbitrators for claims against more than one defendant. 196
For better or for worse, the Federal Arbitration Act does not authorize forced
consolidation of different arbitration proceedings, even if they present similar questions
of law and fact. 197
Since specific examples often provide greater insight than general definitions, 198 a
list of illustrative jurisdictional problems has been appended to this essay. 199 In no way
do these scenarios exhaust the variety of situations in which the arbitrator’s right to make
a jurisdictional ruling could become an issue. Rather, they are presented as further
examples of when and how challenges to arbitral power arise.
C.

Admissibility

Often we understand what something is by considering what it is not. The
essence of arbitral jurisdiction might be put into starker relief through a comparison with
195

Consolidation difficulties are illustrated by the now legendary story of the Macao
sardine case as retold in Michael Kerr, Arbitration v. Litigation, 3 ARB. INT'L 79 (1987).

196

Siemens and BKMI v. Dutco, Cour de cassation (France), 7 January 1992, Chambre
Civile No. 1, Cass., 1992 Rev. d'Arbitrage 470. (two defendants and a three person
arbitral tribunal).

197

See United Kingdom v. Boeing, 998 F.2d 68 (1993). The United Kingdom moved to
consolidate arbitrations with Boeing and Textron, Inc., both of which had contracted with
British Ministry of Defense to develop an electronic fuel system. The Court ruled that
consolidation of separate proceedings cannot be ordered absent the parties’ consent. An
earlier decision in Neurus Shipping, 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975), was distinguished on its
facts. In the United States, forced consolidation will be possible only in a jurisdiction
(like Massachusetts) that does provide for joinder of related parties. See New England
Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988), discussed infa.
198

Sylvia Plath once observed that “the concrete can save when the abstract might kill.”
SYLVIA PLATH, THE JOURNALS OF SYLVIA PLATH 287 (1982).

199

Appendix I, infra.
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what is sometimes called “admissibility”.
A precondition to arbitration (limiting an arbitrator’s right to hear the case) is not
the same thing as a precondition to recovery (restricting one side’s right to obtain
damages). For example, arbitrators might well have authority to hear a dispute over
mismanagement of a brokerage account, but deny the claim on the basis that the statute of
limitations had passed. 200
Notions of admissibility would normally be used to describe constraints on the
right to file claims in cases clearly subject to arbitration. Since the matter is properly
before the arbitrators, their decisions would usually not be reviewable in court. 201
Admissibility might relate to whether a claim is ripe enough (or too stale) for
adjudication, or to arbitral preconditions (such as mediation) or time bars (a prohibition
on claims more than six years after the alleged wrong). 202
200

Other illustrations of pre-conditions to recover can be found in long-term supply
contracts, which often provide for arbitration of disputes about price adjustments.
Frequently, price modification will require the arbitrators (i) first to find a change in
market conditions, and (ii) then to establish how far (and in what direction) the prices
should be modified to reflect such changed conditions. Both questions remain matters of
the substantive merits of the case, since the parties intended them to be addressed by the
arbitrators rather than courts. The two-fold nature of the arbitrators’ task simply
represents the parties’ assessment of the most efficient and logical way for analysis to
proceed.

201

There might, however, be some situations in which valid jurisdictional challenges
could be mounted to improper decisions on admissibility. If a contract says no actions
may be filed before 2010, a putative award in 2005 would appear to most observers as an
excès de pouvoir (subject to annulment) rather than simply an unreviewable mistake
about calendars.

202

For a comparison of jurisdiction and admissibility in investment arbitration, see Ian
A. Laid, A Distinction without a Difference? An Examination of the Concepts of
Admissibility and Jurisdiction in Salini v. Jordan and Methanex v.USA, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID,
NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (T. Weiler ed.
2005). See also contribution by Jan Paulsson in INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE &
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 601 (2005).
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In some instances, jurisdictional and admissibility questions may overlap. For
example, a brokerage contract might be subject to rules that make an investor’s claim
ineligible for arbitration unless filed within six years after the allegedly inappropriate
advice or trade. In addition, a statute of limitations might exist in the law applied to the
merits of the dispute. The latter question (statute of limitations) would clearly fall to the
arbitrators as part of their decision on the merits. 203 The former (eligibility for
arbitration) might or might not be for arbitrators, depending on the parties’ intent as
evidenced in the applicable arbitration rules.
It may not always be apparent why distinctions should be made between (i) the
time bar in a statute of limitations and (ii) a time restriction on arbitration eligibility.
However, the difference is crucial. The statute of limitations (a matter of admissibility)
bars recovery itself, whether before courts or arbitrators. The limitation applies to the
claimant’s right to receive damages, regardless of the forum. By contrast, the
jurisdictional limit, restricting eligibility for arbitration, says only that the case must be
brought in court rather than before the arbitrator.
Preconditions to arbitration do not always lend themselves to facile analysis. In
one intriguing case, Vekoma v. Maran Coal, 204 Switzerland’s highest court annulled an
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Statutes of limitations relating to arbitration law (rather than the underlying claim) are
for judges. For example, in a motion to compel arbitration opposed on the basis that it
was made too late, an American court found that the Federal Arbitration Act failed to
provide its own statute of limitations, and thus borrowed analogous limitations from state
law principles at the place where the court was sitting. See National Iranian Oil v. Mapco
Int’l, 983 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1992).

204

See Tribunal fédéral (Bundesgericht) decision in Transport-en Handelsmaatschappij
Vekoma B.V. v. Maran Coal Co., Civil Division I, 17 Aug. 1995, reprinted 14 (No. 4)
ASA BULL. 673 (1996) with commentary by Philippe Schweizer. See generally, Paul
Friedland, Swiss Supreme Court Sets Aside an ICC Award, 13 (No. 1) J. INT’L ARB. 111
(1996); Pierre Karrer & Claudia Kälin-Nauer, Is There a Favor Iurisdictionis Arbitri?, 13
75

award in which the arbitrators had declared themselves competent to hear a claim
arguably brought after the contractually stipulated time limits. The contract required
claims to be filed within thirty days after the parties agreed that their differences could
not be resolved by negotiation. The arbitrators found that settlement negotiations had
broken down in April 1992, and thus a May filing was timely. The respondent took the
position that failure to settle occurred in January, when a letter from the claimant met
with silence.
The court vacated the award, finding the arbitration clause lapsed by May when
the claim was filed. Saying that negotiations might fail as a matter of either fact or law
(“tatsächlich oder normativ”), the court found failure as a matter of law when the
January offer went unanswered. 205 Whether the court was right to review the arbitrators’
determination about time limits depends largely on the parties’ intention in drafting their
contract. Here as elsewhere, jurisdictional determinations often remain very fact
sensitive.
One questionable aspect of this decision is that the Swiss court apparently deemed
its review powers greater on questions of law than of fact, perhaps analogizing to review
of cantonal court decisions. As a policy matter, this distinction is highly problematic. If
arbitrators wrongly assume Company A acted as agent for Company B in signing an
arbitration clause, they exceed their authority as to Company B whether from
misunderstanding the law of agency or from a factual mistake about who signed the
(No. 3) J. INT’L ARB. 31 (1996); François Knoepfler & Philippe Schweizer, Jurisprudence
suisse en matière d'arbitrage international, 1996 REV. SUISSE DR. INT’L & DR. EUROPÉEN
573. Compare an arbitral tribunal’s treatment of missed deadlines, deemed not to rise to
the level of a jurisdictional defect. Tribunal fédéral Decision of 24 March 1997, 15 ASA
BULLETIN 316 (1997).
205

See 14 ASA BULLETIN 676-78, at ¶ 3.
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contract.
At this point, the distinction between “admissibility” and “jurisdiction” might
provide a helpful segue into a deeper analysis of the nature of jurisdictional challenges.
As we shall see, it is not always an easy task to distinguish between a decision that goes
beyond the arbitrator’s mandate and one that is simply wrong.
D.

The Nature of Authority: Out of Bounds or Just Wrong?
1. Party Consent

The party raising questions about the arbitrator’s authority is not just saying that
the arbitrators have made (or might make) an incorrect decision about whatever question
has been put at issue. Rather, jurisdictional challenges argue that arbitrators have gone
(or will go) out of bounds whatever their decision, whether right or wrong. At stake is
not whether claimant breached the contract or owes $10 million, but rather the identity of
the forum (arbitration or court proceeding) that will address and adjudicate the questions
of contract breach and damages. Even if the respondent did breach, and does owe the
money, an arbitrator lacking jurisdiction would not be authorized to hear the arguments.
A jurisdictional challenge asserts that the arbitrator has no right at all to hear a
matter or exercise a procedural power. The challenge may be directed at the case in its
entirety, a particular question (such as a competition counterclaim), or the exercise of a
procedural power (such as imposing sanctions for failure to produce documents or
granting interest). The problem may also rest with the absence of a precondition to
arbitration, such as the expiry of time limits. 206

206

A precondition to recovery, of course, is not the same thing as a precondition to
arbitration. For example, arbitrators might well have the right to hear a case, but deny the
77

The labels applied to excess of authority may vary from country to country, with
related terms (“jurisdiction”, “authority”, “powers” and “mission”) often used almost
interchangeably, or with slight contextual nuances to indicate what the arbitrator was
authorized to decide rather than how the arbitrator was authorized to decide. In some
legal systems, excess of authority may overlap with notions related to clear legal error.
For example, courts in the United States have given themselves power to set aside awards
for “manifest disregard of the law”, 207 a malleable term most often applied when
arbitrators have exceeded their authority, 208 also a statutory basis for vacatur. 209
These jurisdictional questions remain neutral as to the merits of the case. It
makes no difference whether claimant or respondent is right on the question of contract
interpretation. The only issue is whether the arguments should be heard by arbitrators
rather than courts.

claim on the basis that the statute of limitations had passed. The distinction is sometimes
referred to as between jurisdiction and “admissibility”. See discussion infra.
207

See e.g., Noah Rubins, “Manifest Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur of Arbitral
Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363 (2002); Hans Smit, Manifest
Disregard of the Law in New York Court of Appeals, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 315 (2004).
See also Stephan Wilske & Nigel Mackay, The Myth of the ‘Manifest Disregard of the
Law’ Doctrine, 24 ASA Bulletin 216 (2006).
208

See Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40
TEX. INT'L L.J. 449, at 530-533 (2005), analyzing the doctrine through the lens of two
recent Court of Appeals cases, Hoeft v. MVL Group, 343 F. 3d 57 (2d Cir 2003) and
George Watt & Son v. Tiffany, 348 F3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
209

For a recent rejection of a losing party’s “manifest disregard” challenge, see St. John’s
Mercy Medical Center v. Delfino, 414 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The arbitrator did not
cite relevant law and then ignore it….”). By contrast, the court did vacate for “manifest
disregard” in Patten v. Signator Insurance Agency, 441 F. 3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006), where
the arbitrator dismissed a claim against an insurance company by one of its sales agents,
invoking a time limitation in an earlier contract with a different company. In theory the
Court distinguished non-reviewable error in contract interpretation from reviewable
excess of authority. The court then lost its way, however, and went on to cite substantive
Massachusetts law to find that the award was in “manifest disregard of the law”.
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Attempts to grapple with the nature of arbitral jurisdiction often fall prey to two
divergent intellectual tendencies. The first conflates substantive errors on the merits
(misinterpretation of the law) with errors of jurisdiction for the purpose of subjecting
arbitral decisions to judicial review. After all, it might be argued, the parties never
authorized the arbitrators to make a mistake. Thus from one perspective, each time the
arbitrators go wrong in law they go beyond their mandate. 210 According to this view,
since mistakes are not authorized, by definition they constitute an excess of authority.
The reverse tendency conflates jurisdictional questions with the dispute’s
substantive merits, but for the opposite purpose: to deny courts the opportunity to second
guess arbitrators. Rather than saying that mistakes of law are questions of jurisdiction,
some American courts find that jurisdictional questions have become questions of
substance, submitted to the arbitrators by virtue of the parties’ agreement. Such a
characterization exercise has been performed on questions such as time bars to arbitral
authority, the right to consolidate cases, and the power to grant punitive damages. 211
Admittedly, it is not easy to articulate an intellectually rigorous test for
distinguishing jurisdictional error from other types of mistakes, either for commercial

210

Such was the position once taken in England by Lord Denning, who once suggested
(albeit in an administrative context) that “Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in law it goes
outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void.” See LORD DENNING, THE
DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW 74 (1979). See also Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of
Harrow School, [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736, 743 (C.A.) ("The distinction between an error
which entails absence of jurisdiction and an error made within jurisdiction is [so] fine . . .
that it is rapidly being eroded."). See generally the House of Lords decision in Anisminic
Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, [1969] 1 All ER 208.
Happily for the health of English law, the House of Lords in 2005 rejected this position a
year ago in the Lesotho Highlands decision.
211

See discussion infra in Part V.
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arbitration or for law in general. 212 As with most legal problems, the difficulties lie at the
fringes. 213 However, definitional difficulty does not mean that vital distinctions cease to
exist between a decision that is wrong and one that exceeds the authority of the purported
decision-maker. 214
In deciding challenges to arbitral authority, the parties’ intent should serves as the
touchstone and the lodestar. If the arbitrators have addressed (or are likely to address)
questions that the parties submitted to arbitration, they do not exceed their power.

212

For an inquiry into similar questions in public international law, see W. MICHAEL
REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION (1971). See also Alex Lees, The Jurisdictional Label:
Use and Misuse, 58 Stanford L. Rev. 1457 (2006), addressing more rigid applications of
jurisdictional rules that operate “to shift authority from one law-speaking [sic] institution
to another.” Id. at 1460. The matter was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Kontick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (bankruptcy time prescription for creditor
objections not jurisdictional in the sense of dispositive), which described jurisdiction as a
word with “many, too many, meanings”. Id. at 454.
213

In some instances, the very same facts might be relevant both to the merits of a
dispute and to jurisdiction. See Jackson v. Fie Corporation, 302 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2002),
involving enforcement of a default judgment arising from the misfire of a pistol allegedly
made by an Italian manufacturer. Testimony of the plaintiff’s firearms expert (stating the
gun was made by Fratelli Tanfoglio) proved relevant both to the merits of the products
liability action and the court’s personal jurisdiction over the foreign company.

214

The world of education provides a relatively simply illustration of the difference
between simple mistake and excess of authority. In American law faculties, the professor
who teaches a course normally bears responsibility for grading exams. If the lecturer
decides that a paper merits a “B”, then the student receives a “B”, perhaps adjusted for
classroom participation, again by the professor. Now assume that a colleague happens by
chance to read the exam, and finds the grade excessively severe (the student deserved an
“A”) or unduly generous (the paper merits only a “C”). The second professor’s views do
not matter, whether correct or not. Each professor bears the authority and duty to grade
his or her exams. That being said, not all authors would agree that a distinction can be
made between the merits of a dispute and jurisdiction, at least in the context of court
actions. See Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS LAW J.
1613 (2003), examining links between words such as “power” and “ability” in the context
of jurisdiction. One wonders whether the thesis has not been overstated. Simply because
the line between merits and jurisdiction sometimes runs thin does not mean the line never
exists.
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2. The Arbitrator’s Job: Competing Principles
Judicial deference to an arbitrator’s jurisdictional determination implicate several
principles sometimes in tension one with another. 215 First, the arbitrators’ decisions are
normally final on the questions submitted to them, usually referred to as the merits of the
dispute. Second, the arbitrators’ decisions are not final on issues that the parties did not
submit, which is to say, which fall outside the scope of the arbitral authority. Finally,
courts will not defer to arbitrators’ decisions that violate basic notions of public policy in
the forum asked to endorse or give effect to the award.
Renunciation of the right to seek justice through government courts means that an
arbitrator has the right to get it wrong, in the sense of evaluating a controverted event
differently than would the otherwise competent judge. 216 Assuming the risk of a bad
award on the merits of the dispute does not, however, mean giving arbitrators power to
decide matters never submitted to them. The arbitrator’s job is to decide the case. The
court’s job is to support the arbitral process, but only to the extent it does not exceed the
mission conferred by the parties or the limits of public policy.
This distinction between a mistake on the merits and an excess of authority goes

215

By deference, of course, one means something more than hypocritical adornment to
soften the blow of an annulment, where a judge prefaces the vacatur with words such as,
“With greatest respect for the distinguished arbitrator” while really thinking that this is an
award that must be seen to be believed.

216

In mandated, court-annexed "arbitration" within the United States however, the
parties normally retain a right to a de novo trial, making the so-called arbitrator a
conciliator in reality. See 28 U.S.C. § 655. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Understanding
the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration
Programs, 141 U. PENN. L. REV. 2169 (1993). Some state statutes, however, seem to
ignore the principle of consensuality. See e.g. Minnesota's statute requiring arbitration of
motor vehicle accident claims not in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) (Minn.
Statutes § 65B.525), where the state has in essence given an adjudication franchise to the
American Arbitration Association.

81

to the heart of what arbitration is all about. Arbitration is a consensual process unfolding
within an enclosure created by contract. Litigants accept the risk of arbitrator mistake
only for decisions falling within the borders of arbitral authority. A simple error is
normally not subject to challenge, since the parties asked an arbitrator to decide the legal
and factual merits of their dispute. But no court should recognize an award falling
beyond the arbitral authority that gives legitimacy and integrity to the process.
Most modern arbitration statutes acknowledge this prohibits appeals related to the
substantive merits of an award. Unlike judges, arbitrators do not normally find their
decisions reversed for mistake of law. Arbitration statutes do, however, allow challenge
to awards that go beyond the arbitrators’ mission, 217 whether described as an “excess of
jurisdiction,” “excess of authority” or “excess of powers”. 218
A party disappointed by an award will sometimes attempt a “backdoor” appeal
through arguments which depict the arbitrator’s mistake as an excess of authority rather
than a contract misinterpretation. Errors of law in contract interpretation seem to lend
themselves to being portrayed as excess of jurisdiction. An award allowing lost profits,

217

Some arbitral regimes permit annulment for excess of authority only when a tribunal
“manifestly” goes beyond its powers. See Article 53(1)(b) of the 1965 Washington
(ICSID) Convention, insightfully discussed in Philippe Pinsolle, Manifest Excess of
Power and Jurisdictional Review of ICSID Awards, in ICSID Annulment, 2 TRANSNAT’L
DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 39 (April 2005).
218

For the purpose of this analysis, the terms jurisdiction, authority, and powers are used
interchangeably. Slight nuances might exist in certain contexts. For example, “excess of
jurisdiction” might apply to what the arbitrator is authorized to decide, and “excess of
powers” to how the decision is made. However, each expression describes arbitrator
behavior that goes beyond what is permitted by the relevant legal and contractual
framework. See generally statement by Lord Phillips in Lesotho Highlands (at paragraph
51, discussed infra) acknowledging that “the concept of an excess of power that is not an
excess of jurisdiction is not an easy one”. .
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for example, might be portrayed as an arrogation of power not granted by the contract. 219
Sound distinctions between simple mistake and excess of authority rest on two
fundamental principles. First, an agreement to arbitrate normally means accepting that
the arbitrator might make a mistake in evaluating the merits of the parties’ claims and
defenses. It would make little sense to say that an award will be final and binding if
litigants automatically get a second bite at the apple, turning arbitration into foreplay to
court proceedings.
3. Consent and Presumptions
Equally important, however, is the principle that litigants in arbitral proceedings
do not expect to be bound by overreaching intermeddlers. Decisions on matters never
submitted to arbitration deserve no more deference than the opinions of a random
commuter passing through the Paris Métro or New York’s Grand Central Station. This
distinction remains central to the degree of deference that courts should grant an award
that appears to tread on jurisdictional matters.
While such extreme examples may be rare (due to the in terrorem effect of
judicial scrutiny), they do exist. Until enjoined by a federal court, a Florida “arbitration
service” recently conducted one hundred and fourteen (114) “arbitrations” against a bank.
In each instance, a credit card holder received an “award” in the precise amount of the
cardholder’s outstanding debt, even though the bank had never signed an agreement
authorized the arbitration service to decide these disputes. 220

219

See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas v. Société Générale (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d
Cir. 1974).

220

Chase Manhattan Bank v. National Arbitration Council, 2005 WL 1270504 (M.D.
Fla. 2005). One Mr. Charles Morgan acted as sole arbitrator under the auspices of the
National Arbitration Council (NAC), of which he was sole proprietor. The arbitration
83

In the more normal line of cases, analysis is complicated by the different
thresholds that exist for various types of consent. In some instances consent must be
explicit or in writing. On other occasions, circumstances might permit consent to be
inferred or presumed.
This should not be surprising, given the varying manifestations of consent in
aspects of life other than arbitration. Only the most unromantic (or unrealistic) individual
would argue that a woman’s consent to be kissed by her boyfriend must be in writing. A
glance or a phrase can supply the invitation. Her consent to be married, however,
normally requires a higher degree of formality, evidenced by ceremony and explicit
words of acceptance.
Similarly, in determining consent to arbitrate jurisdictional questions, the nature
of the evidence required varies according to the character of the challenge. On one
extreme, a company might say it never agreed to arbitrate anything at all. To meet this
challenge, the other side would normally need to produce a written agreement of some
sort. At the other end of the spectrum, the parties might differ over whether the arbitrator
appointed to decide their dispute has power to award compound interest. Here, one might
rely on inferences or presumptions drawn from generally accepted arbitral practice. In
the middle might fall questions about the validity of an arbitration clause following an
assignment, where the parties’ intent can be ascertained by inferences in some situations

clause in the credit agreement listed three arbitral institutions: American Arbitration
Association, JAMS and National Arbitration Forum. The court granted an injunction
against NAC and Mr. Morgan from conducting arbitrations or issuing awards involving
the bank (Chase), and from accepting any monies from Chase cardholders for arbitration
services.
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but not others. 221
In short, consent implicates a continuum of commitment. Once the major step (an
agreement to arbitrate) has been taken, the details (arbitrator power on matters such as
interest or assignment) might yield more easily to presumptions. 222
4. Public Policy
In order to reflect the interests of persons not party to the arbitration agreement,
legal systems sometimes draw boundaries around an arbitrator’s jurisdiction. Such
“externalities” relate to sensitive public norms that affect all of society. The restrictions
on arbitral power usually take the form of either limits on subjects that may be arbitrated
(either in general or for a specific case)or refusal to give effect to awards whose content
offends the recognition forum’s most basic notions of morality or justice.
a)

General Subject Matter Limits

An arbitrator’s decision may be “out of bounds” not only because it lacks any
foundation in the parties’ mutual consent, but also due to the arbitration’s legal
framework applicable regardless of any agreements between the litigants.
Notwithstanding the protagonists' desires, arbitration has on occasion been limited for
“public policy” (ordre public) reasons with respect to sensitive subject matters such as

221

See AC Equipment Ltd. V. American Engineering Corp., 215 F. 3d 151 (2d Cir.
2003), where a subcontractor challenged the contractor’s assignment of their agreement,
arguing that the assignment invalidated the ad hoc arbitration clause. The court held that
arbitration could be compelled, and an arbitrator appointed, without judicial hearings on
the assignment’s validity. The court distinguished the situation in which a subcontractor
argues that it never agreed to arbitrate at all.

222

For an exploration of consent as a series of concentric circles, see Alan Scott Rau,
Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, forthcoming 2007.
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competition law, securities regulation or civil rights violations.223
An attempt to empower an arbitrator to hear a particular dispute might be
impermissible because the state has taken a monopoly on implementation of the law in
areas where arbitrators (much like foxes guarding a chicken coop) present too great a risk
of getting it wrong. Public policy may be invoked as a catch-all prohibition on the
arbitration of certain categories of disputes, as well as to protect the integrity of the
arbitral process in matters such as arbitrator bias or lack of due process.
Public policy limits on arbitrability per se are less important than they used to be,
in the sense that courts now tend to allow arbitration to proceed with respect to public law
claims related to anti-trust, securities regulation, patents, bankruptcy and state franchise
statutes. 224 Nevertheless, there still exist situations in which courts might feel it proper to
deny arbitrators jurisdiction to hear questions relating to certain statutory claims, out of
concern that the arbitrator might “get it wrong” in a way that injures vital public interests.
To revive an old metaphor, allowing deference to arbitrators’ determinations of
acceptable public policy would be similar to leaving matters of war entirely to generals.
In connection with vital public law claims, it would be hard to see how any submission of
arbitrability to the arbitrator (regardless of whether it was in fact accepted by the parties)
223

It is important to distinguish between invocation of public policy as a bar to
arbitration, and the imposition of public policy to limit the way an arbitrator can or must
decide the case. In the latter connection, See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. V. Benetton
International NV, European Court of Justice, Case 126/97 (ECR I-3055, 1999),
concerning an application to annul an award contrary to European Community
competition law. On public policy in arbitration, see generally, HOMAYOON ARFAZADEH,
ORDRE PUBLIC ET ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL À L’ÉPREUVE DE LA MONDIALISATION (2005)
Chapter II, 79-128.
224

For examples of the abandonment of earlier judicial hostility to arbitration of
statutory claims that implicate vital societal interests, see generally, William W. Park,
International Forum Selection (1995), at 97-100.
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could be immune from independent judicial review.
Challenges to jurisdiction based on public policy do not yield to the same kind of
analysis as jurisdictional limits based on the parties’ agreement. The parties cannot
expect the state to respect a grant of arbitral power on a subject matter that the state
deems non-arbitrable. Similarly, arbitrators would not normally be permitted to
determine their jurisdiction in any final and binding way in an award that furthers the
parties’ fraud. 225
b)

Restrictions for Specific Cases

In some instances, public policy might limit arbitration of a particular dispute
rather than an entire subject matter. The imposition of such jurisdictional restrictions can
be illustrated by the decision in United States v. Stein. 226 Said to be the largest criminal
tax case in American history, the case involves the indictment of former partners of the
KPMG accounting firm, who were accused of conspiracy and tax evasion in connection
with abusive tax shelters. 227 The partners asserted that by contract KPMG must advance
225

For example, a federal Court of Appeals in the United States upheld vacatur of an
award in which the re-incorporation (“redomestication”) of a captive insurance company
from Massachusetts to Bermuda was deemed to be a fraud on the public regulatory
authorities. See in Commercial Union v. Lines, 378 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2004). A captive
insurance company called EMLICO reinsured with Commercial Union a portion of its
liability under policies that EMLICO issued to General Electric, its only policy holder.
General Electric sought to recover asbestos clean-up costs from EMLICO, which in turn
sought to recover these from Commercial Union. EMLICO allegedly had transferred its
corporate domicile to Bermuda by deceiving the Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner
about its solvency. The district court was directed to determine whether the Bermuda
liquidation of EMLICO affected the results in the arbitration. The fraud at issue was not
in the procurement of the re-insurance contract, nor in the procurement of the award (for
example, by bribery), but rather fraud on a governmental body that potentially affected
the outcome of the arbitration.

226

2006 WL 2556076 (SDNY 2006); stay pending appeal denied, 2006 WL 2724079.

227

Employees as well as partners were indicted. For ease of articulation, however, the
term “partners” will be used for both categories of defendants.
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the legal fees incurred for their defense. The firm argued that this “advancement claim”
must be arbitrated pursuant to the terms of a partnership agreement
When the partners brought a court action to enforce their claim for the legal fees,
the firm moved to dismiss the action on the basis of the arbitration clause. The court thus
had to consider whether the dispute over the right to legal fees was itself subject to
arbitration.
The case holds that arbitration of the legal fees issue would violate public policy
even assuming the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. 228 The reasoning requires a
bit of background. Federal prosecutors had been found to have violated the partners’
Constitutional rights to counsel by pressuring KPMG (under threat of indictment and
destruction of its business) to refuse advancement of the legal fees.
Acknowledging the principle that ambiguity in the scope of an arbitration clause
would normally be decided in favor of arbitration, the court nevertheless took jurisdiction
to decide on the question of legal fees. The policy in favor of arbitration was outweighed
by a stronger federal policy in favor of prompt and fair criminal trials. The court
considered arbitration of the legal fees issue would undermine this policy.
The court posited that arbitration involves “unpredictable timing and the
likelihood of delay” and thus “would force the court to do violence to one important
public interest or another.” The interest that tipped the scale was the prompt
determination of whether the defendants had proper counsel, or rather needed
appointment of a lawyer at public expense.
One might disagree with the court’s assumption about the delay occasioned by
228

The decision also addresses rights of several allegedly “non-party” defendants who
asserted that they had never agreed to arbitrate.
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arbitration rather than litigation. However, it is not hard not to understand the concern
that private arbitration should not derail a large criminal case, even if one does not accept
the court’s suggestion that arbitration is slow and unpredictable.
c)

Content of the Award

Questions related to subject matter arbitrability intersect with, but are distinct
from, problem derived from awards that violate public policy by reason of their content.
For example, an arbitrator might well have jurisdiction to decide an antitrust question.
But he or she cannot ignore the relevant law and policies without risking having the
award refused recognition on the grounds that it violates public policy229 or gives effect
to illegal conduct. 230

229

See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985), where
the Court asserted (rightly or wrongly) that “having permitted the arbitration to go
forward, the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the awardenforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws has been addressed [because the New York Convention] reserves to each signatory
country the right to refuse enforcement of an award where the “recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” While
the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at the awardenforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require intrusive inquiry to ascertain that
the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.
230

Obvious examples include awards ordering payment for sales of slaves, heroine or
illegal arms to terrorists. If an airline pilot is dismissed from employment for showing up
drunk at the cockpit, courts can be expected to vacate an award reinstating the pilot. See
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern., 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988),
involving pilot who was intoxicated while flying a commercial plane from Bangor,
Maine, to Boston, Massachusetts. Focusing on the regulations promulgated by the Fedral
Aviation Administration, the court consider the case non-arbitrable, stating the airline
“was under a duty to prevent the wrongdoing of which its Pilot-In-Command was guilty,
and it could not agree to arbitrate that issue.” Id. at 674. This non-arbitrability approach
denies effect to an arbitral finding on the facts that the pilot had not been drunk. Such
violation of public policy in the process of performing employment duties was
distinguished from situations in which public policy was violated outside employment,
giving rise to no workplace violation of a duty. In such instances, an arbitrator might be
given greater leeway with respect to bad behavior. See United Paper Workers v. Misco,
89

Mandatory norms of the place of performance may limit an arbitrator’s
jurisdiction regardless of the applicable law. An arbitrator who ignores American
antitrust laws, in connection with sales to New York consumers, can expect his or her
award to be vacated (assuming an arbitral situs within the United States) even though the
contract provides for Swiss law to be applicable. 231
In this connection, arbitrators may find themselves in a double bind. In applying
the mandatory norms of the place of performance, an arbitrator may exceed his or her
jurisdiction under the law of a country called to enforce the award or monitor the
integrity of the process. In the above example, the arbitrator who applied American
antitrust rules even though the parties asked for a decision according to Swiss principles
could expose the award to annulment for excess of authority in an arbitral situs that did
not share the United States' perspective on the proper role of competition law.
IV.

Items for Further Consideration
Inevitably, no matter how good a legal doctrine, questions arise about its

application in specific situations. The devil always lurks in the details. The following
discussion takes as its springboard several questions drawn from the French, German,
English and American legal systems. Raising these queries in no way suggests that the
legal systems mentioned have proven inadequate. Rather, the various lines of inquiry
reflect a call for further dialogue.

484 U.S. 29 (1987) (marijuana found in car) and Florida Power Corp. v. IBEW, 847 F. 2d
680 (11th Cir. 1988) (drunk driving on employee’s own time).
231

See footnote 19, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614
(1985). Pro-consumer usury prohibitions might also impose themselves on the arbitration
of a loan transaction expressly made subject to the laws of a country without limits on
interest rates.
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A.

“Manifestly Void” Clauses in France

As mentioned earlier, in French law the arbitrators’ power to decide on their own
competence operates in tandem with an explicit provision that puts off jurisdictional
challenges until after an award is rendered. The Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile
provides that if a claim has already been presented to the arbitrators (literally, if the
tribunal has been “seized” of a matter) courts must declare themselves without
jurisdiction to hear the case. If arbitration has not yet begun, courts must also declare
themselves lacking jurisdiction unless the arbitration agreement is “clearly void”
(manifestement nulle). 232
The theory seems to be that a party wrongfully hindered in bringing its arbitration
claim deserves more solicitude than does a party improperly joined to an arbitral
proceeding. To deal with the former risk (dilatory tactics to disrupt arbitration), courts
are given only limited power to examine the validity of the arbitration clause before the
arbitration has begun, and none at all after proceedings have started.
Following an award, however, judicial review will take place on the grounds
provided by the French arbitration statute, which for international arbitration covers a
232

NCPC Article 1458. The full text reads as follows, “When a dispute for which an
arbitral tribunal has been constituted [literally “seized” of the dispute] pursuant to an
arbitration agreement is brought before a governmental court, the court must declare
itself without jurisdiction. If the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted [literally
“seized” of the dispute], the court must also declare itself without jurisdiction unless the
arbitration agreement is clearly void.” Author’s translation. (In the original, “Lorsqu’un
litige dont un tribunal arbitral est saisi en vertu d’une convention d’arbitrage est porté
devant une juridiction de l’État, celle-ci doit se déclarer incompétente. Si le tribunal
arbitral n’est pas encore saisi, la juridiction doit également se déclarer incompétente à
moins que la convention d’arbitrage ne soit manifestement nulle.”) Although certain
provisions of domestic French arbitration law do not apply to international arbitration,
such is not the case for Article 1458, which falls within Title I of Book IV of the NCPC.
See NCPC Article 1507 and Décret du 12 mai 1981, Articles 55 and 56, providing for
non-application of certain provisions in Titles IV, V and VI.
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number of jurisdictional defects: decision in the absence of an arbitration agreement,
irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal, and failure to respect the mission given to
the arbitral tribunal. 233
This system conserves judicial resources by delaying review until the end of the
process, when the parties may have settled or the arbitrator might have gotten it right.
Some authors have called this sequence a “guarantee of good administration of
justice”. 234
One source of puzzlement to many non-French lawyers lies in the fact that the
exception for clauses that are manifestement nulle applies only when the arbitration has
not begun. Why should this be so? Faced with a clause that is clearly void, why should a
court finds its hands tied in declaring the nullity of the proceedings simply because a
purported arbitration has already begun? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the
parties are already before a judge, and thus the risk of delay is less than if no judicial
action had yet begun.
A “manifestly void” clause would seem inoperative regardless of how far along
the sham procedures had run. To some observers, it seems strange to delay judicial
233

Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile Article1502, for international cases. Review in
domestic arbitration can be found in Articles 1483, which provides for annulment of an
award containing analogous jurisdictional defects.

234

Pierre Mayer, L'autonomie de l'arbitre dans l'appréciation de sa propre compétence,
217 RECUEIL DES COURS (Académie de droit international de La Haye) 321 (1989) at
350, suggesting, “L’examen successif est une guarantee de bonne administration de la
justice; le juge pourra s’inspirer de la motivation adoptée par l’arbitre, ou y trouver au
contraire une faille révélatrice.” However, Mayer also argues that when a court action
has been begun before arbitration, the judge should address the alleged jurisdictional
defect without regard to whether “manifest” or not. Id. at 346. Moreover, good reason
exists to suspect that Professor Mayer’s views may have evolved during the past few
years, to the point that he would favor an immediately available summary court
proceeding to decide whether an arbitration clause was clearly void.
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intervention in an arbitration with no consensual underpinning simply because someone
has set a process in motion.
Perhaps, at the beginning of an arbitration, courts might limit their task to
determining whether they can be prima facie satisfied that the arbitration clause exists,
deferring an in-depth analysis of jurisdiction to the moment when the award itself must
be reviewed. But why should all examination of jurisdiction be forbidden?
Since arbitration remains consensual at its core, one might even ask how a
purported tribunal can be “seized” of any matter on the basis of a void clause. There
exists a risk of loading the analytic dice by using the term “arbitration” to refer to a
process that was never accepted by the two sides. As a definitional matter, when a
signature on an alleged arbitration agreement was clearly forged, or signed with a gun at
her head, to label someone an arbitrator would not provide decision-making authority any
more than calling a dog’s tail a “leg” would give the animal five limbs instead of four. 235
Without a grant of authority from the litigants, a would-be arbitrator is no more than a
shameless volunteer.
B.

The New Approach in Germany
1. The Kompetenz-Kompetenz Clause 236

Like the length of women’s dresses, arbitration law often experiences its own
fashion changes from one season to another. Perhaps the most radical of such style shifts
can be found in the German approaches to arbitrators’ jurisdictional determinations.

235

Abraham Lincoln once asked, “If I call a tail a leg, how many legs does a dog have?
Five?” He then answered, “No. Four. Calling a tail a leg does not make it so.”

236

For helpful comments on the German cases, thanks are due to Professor Peter
Schlosser, Professor Klaus Peter Berger, and Dr. Ulrich Lohmann.
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At one time, German courts recognized contract provisions that granted
arbitrators a right to rule on their own authority in a final (rather than temporary) way. 237
In a landmark case arising from a charter party of a refrigerated transport ship,
Germany’s highest court admitted the possibility of an agreement on jurisdiction (eine
Kompetenz-Kompetenz-Klausel). The arbitral tribunal was given power to render a
jurisdictional decision on whether the charterer’s agent was bound to arbitrate, subject to
no judicial second-guessing. 238 The job of deciding whether in fact such a clause existed
in the relevant freight contract (so as to bind the party resisting arbitration) was remanded
to the lower court. This principle followed the lines of an earlier Bundesgerichthof
decision rendered almost a quarter century earlier, 239 and was confirmed in a case
decided as late as 1991, 240 the same year the German Ministry of Justice established a
reform commission whose work ultimately led to enactment of a new arbitration law.
2. The 1998 Reforms
In 1998 Germany adopted the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law. 241 During the

237

See generally Peter Schlosser, The Competence of Arbitrators and of Courts, 8 ARB.
INT’L 189 (1992), at 199-200. See also Klaus Peter Berger, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ARBITRATION (1993) at 359; Klaus Peter Berger, INTERNATIONAL
WIRTSCHAFTSSCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT (1992) at 253.
238

BGH, Urteil v. 5 Mai 1977, III ZR 177/74. Reported in 68 BGHZ 356, at 358. See
discussion in Peter Schlosser, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATEN
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT (1989) at § 556.
239

BGH II ZR 323/55, decided in 1953.

240

BGH III ZR 68/90. See BGH Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1991, 2215.

241

On the 1998 German law, see Friedrich Niggemann, Chronique de Jurisprudence
Étrangère: Allemagne, 2006 Rev. arb. 225; Otto Sandrock, Procedural Aspects of the
New German Arbitration Act, 14 ARB. INT’L 33 (1998); Peter Schlosser ADR II, Institute
of Comparative Law, Chuo University, Japan 335 (Takeshi Kojima, ed. 2004); Klaus
Peter Berger, Das neue Schiedsverfahrensrecht in der Praxis – Analyse und aktuelle
Entwicklungen, in RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT (RIW), Heft 1 (2001).
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drafting stage, the official commentary on Article 1040 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) (the
equivalent of UNCITRAL Model Law Article 16) stated that courts would always have
the last word on arbitral jurisdiction. 242 In essence, questions of arbitrator jurisdiction
were shifted to the category of non-arbitrable subject matters. This principle has been
affirmed by judicial pronouncements and authoritative commentary, asserting that
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses are against public policy 243 and that courts may intervene
at any time to decide arbitral competence. 244 As discussed below, it remains to be seen
whether the logic of these commentators and judicial decisions will be pushed to cover
even separate contracts on arbitral authority, rather than simple jurisdictional clauses
contained a single commercial agreement.

242

See ENTWURF EINES GESETZE ZUR NEUORDNUNG DES SCHIEDSVERFAHRENSRECHTS
July 1995, at page 132 (draft commentary on German adoption of the UNCITRAL Model
Arbitration Law).
243

JOACHIM MÜNCH, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZPO, 2. Auflage, Band 3, § 1040
(München 2001), at 1183 (Rdnr. 26). This commentary argues that the interplay of § 1040
subsections 1 (tribunal may rule on its jurisdiction) and 3 (one month period for challenge
of ruling) establish a mandatory character of judicial jurisdiction. Consequently, the
commentary characterizes Kompetenz Kompetenz clauses as unwirksam, weil gegen
zwingendes Recht verstossend (inoperative because they violate mandatory law). See
also KLAUS-PETER BERGER, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS,
Volume I (2006), at Question 7; Klaus-Peter Berger, The Implementation of the
UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany, 13 INT. ARB. REP. 38 (January 1998).
244

Peter Schlosser in STEIN/JONAS, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, 22.
Auflage, Band 9 (Tübingen 2002) § 1040, Rdnr. 2, at page 489, with cross-reference to
Schlosser’s own comments at § 1032, Rdnr. 11. Professor Schlosser writes, “Aus der
vorläufigen Kompetenz-Kompetenz des Schiedsgerichts folgt auch nicht, dass es das
‘erste Wort’ bezüglich der Wirksamkeit der Schiedsvereinbarung erhalten hätte.” (“It
does not follow from the arbitrator’s preliminary Kompetenz-Kompetenz that he has the
“first word” regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement.”) In referring to the “first
word” on jurisdiction, Professor Schlosser sought to draw attention to the way Germany’s
practice (permitting courts to rule on jurisdiction before an arbitral award) differs from
the legal position in France, where court review of jurisdiction generally waits until after
the award has been rendered. German law provides that courts will always have the “last
word” on jurisdiction, and in some instances may also have the “first word” as well.
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Current case law has endorsed a prophylactic rule that seems to bars such clauses,
regardless of what the evidence might show about the parties’ intent. The prohibition on
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses was confirmed clearly by a 2005 decision of the
Bundesgerichtshof 245 which had followed a shift in approach announced three years
earlier in a case expressing concern that a wrongful assertion of arbitral jurisdiction might
results in deprivation of a party’s “lawful judge” (gesetzlich Richter) 246
The significance of the 2005 decision lies not only in its statements about
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses, but also in its affirmation that judges may provide
jurisdictional input before an arbitrator’s decision on the matter. Thus courts not only the
“last word” on the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, but in some instances the “first word” as well.
To a large extent, this new approach seems to derive from a fear of sloppy judicial
decision-making. Rather than a rigorous analysis to determine the existence of a genuine
agreement to arbitrate jurisdiction, judges were apparently inclined to leave jurisdictional
245

BGH, Urteil 13 Januar 2005, III ZR 265/03. Reported NJW 16/2005 at 1125. The
case is also reported on the DIS database, with notes by Huber/Bach and Wagner/Quinke.
An alleged loss on a brokerage account (typical in arbitration cases) brought a court
action for recovery notwithstanding the arbitration clause. In the course of confirming
the duty to arbitrate, the Court re-emphasized that any jurisdictional decision would be
subject to review. On its facts, the BGH pronouncement gives little difficulty. There was
in fact no award review at all, let alone a challenge to a first award establishing
jurisdictional principles for a second arbitration. In Anglo-American legal thought, the
court’s decision might be labeled dictum. See also BGH decision of 23 February 2006
(III ZB 50/05), reported 2006 SCHIEDSVZ (May/June 2006) 161, reversing the Karlsruhe
OLG refusal to recognize an award rendered in Minsk under the rules of the Byelarus
(White Russia) Chambe of Commerce. Germany’s highest court rejected the contention
that international public policy (ordre public inernational) had been violated by an
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdictional ruling in a final award on the merits. According to the
BGH, no policy violation occurs if the final jurisdictional ruling rested with the
government courts, as was the case in Byelarus. 2006 SCHIEDSVZ 161, at 164.
246

BGH, Urteil 6 Juni 2002, III ZB 44/01. This decision involved an arbitral tribunal’s
finding that it lacked jurisdiction. However, the court in dictum contrasted the facts of its
case with the opposite scenario, where an arbitral tribunal wrongfully assumes
jurisdiction thereby depriving a party of its “lawful judge” (gesetzlich Richter).
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issues to the arbitrators, almost automatically finding Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses on
scanty evidence. In the backlash, legislators and scholars expressed the opinion (rightly
or wrongly) that the UNCITRAL Model Law was inconsistent with such a practice. 247
In discussing the prior lack of analytic rigor, one of Germany’s most eminent
scholars suggests that prior to 1998 his country’s judiciary had become inclined to find
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses even where they did not exist, thus clearing the judicial
dockets even as to a party that had no real intent to waive its right to a court hearing. 248
Professor Schlosser tells of a case in which a corporate liquidator had begun an action in
Germany for a determination that certain goods were not the property of the respondent, a
matter which arose by operation of law apart from the contract subject to arbitration. The
parties to the relevant arbitration agreement had agreed as follows: “For all disputes
arising out of this contract the contracting parties submit themselves to the Chamber of
Commerce of Geneva.” The Bundesgerichthof instructed the lower court to verify the
existence of an oral agreement to arbitrate by which the arbitral tribunal would have had
jurisdiction to decide the scope of the written agreement to arbitrate. 249
The German arbitration statute has an express provision permitting declaratory
court judgments on the validity of arbitration clauses, provided application is made prior

247

See BT-Drucksache 13/5274 at 26 & 44, cited by the Bundesgerichthof in its decision
of 13 January 2005, at 5 & 6. See also ENTWURF EINES GESETZE ZUR NEUORDNUNG DES
SCHIEDSVERFAHRENSRECHTS July 1995, at 132 (draft commentary on German adoption of
the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law), discussed supra.
248

Peter Schlosser ADR II, Institute of Comparative Law, Chuo University, Japan
(Takeshi Kojima, ed. 2004) 335, at 340.

249

Schlosser, id. At 342-343, citing Juristenzeitung 1989, 201.
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to constitution of the arbitral tribunal. 250 Moreover, German judges may examine fully
the validity of the arbitration clause either in the context of a court action on the merits of
a claim 251 or an annulment action of either an interim jurisdictional decision 252 or final
award. 253
It should be noted, however, that German scholars are not unanimous on all
questions related to court review of arbitrators’ jurisdiction. Some writers say that
judicial review is mandatory, and thus the parties cannot by agreement create a de facto
waiver of those provisions through an agreement giving a jurisdictional question to
arbitrators. 254 Others, however, appear to accept that the parties may waive grounds for
award vacatur that are designed to protect private interests, 255 as opposed to public

250

ZPO Section 1032(2) which provides, Bei Gericht kann bis zur Bildung des
Schiedsgerichts Antrag auf Feststellung der Zulässigkeit oder Unzulässigkeit eines
schiedsrichterlichen Verfahrens gestellt werden. (“Prior to the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal, an application may be made to the court to determine whether or not arbitration
is admissible.”)

251

ZPO Section 1032(1). Compare the practice obtaining in France under NCPC Article
1458, which allows pre-award court pronouncements on arbitration clauses only if the
clause is “manifestment nulle” and only if the arbitration has not yet begun.

252
253

ZPO Section 1040(3), analogous to UNCITRAL Model Law Article 16(3).
ZPO Section 1059.

254

Judicial review would normally occur under either under ZPO Section 1040(3) or
ZPO Section 1059, depending on whether the award is interim or final.
255

See Geimer in ZÖLLER, ZPO, 25. Aufl., 2005, § 1059, Rdnr. 2 and 80; SCHWAB &
WALTER, SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT, 7. Aufl., 2005, Kap. 6, Rdnr. 10; Albers in
BAUMBACH, LAUTERBACH, ALBERS & HARTMANN, ZPO, 64. Aufl., München 2006, §
1059, Rdnr. 2. See also GEIMER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (5. Aufl., Köln
2005) at 130-131 (notes 309-311), addressing procedural party autonomy in relation to
foreign judgments. Geimer posits that parties should be able to waive grounds for nonrecognition designed to protect one of the parties, as opposed to government interests
(unmittelbare Staatsinteressen), and to create by agreement a reliable environment for the
resolution of their dispute.
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order. 256 The result of this latter approach would be that courts might give respect to
agreements subjecting jurisdictional questions to final arbitration, provided such
questions are clearly identified.
3. The Parties’ Expectations
At the risk of appearing presumptuous (always a hazard for a foreign lawyer), one
might ask whether a blanket denial of Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses constitute an
overreaction which might in some cases disregard the parties’ legitimate expectations.
The text of the law provides simply that arbitrators may rule on their own jurisdiction,
that jurisdictional challenges must be raised in a timely fashion, and that the arbitrators’
rulings on the matter would normally (in der Regel) take the form of an interim decision
subject to judicial review on a request filed within thirty days of the ruling. 257
These provisions say nothing about when or whether these arbitral decisions
should be final. The statute here is silent about whether parties may create a special
contractual regime submitting jurisdictional questions to final decision by an arbitrator.
While such agreements may be rare in practice, 258 they might in some cases exist.
If the parties have two disputes (one related to the merits, and the other to
jurisdiction), and wish to submit each to arbitration, it is hard to see why they should be
prevented from doing so. Courts should, of course, have the opportunity to verify the
reality of the alleged consent to arbitration. Judicial review would in all events involve
256

Clearly the grounds for vacatur under ZPO 1059(2) (public policy and subject matter
arbitrability) should not be waivable, since these matters directly implicate government
(rather than private) interests.

257

ZPO Section 1040

258

In the adversarial context of preliminary jurisdictional rulings under ZPO § 1040
(UNCITRAL Model Article 16), parties rarely agree on very much, let alone a
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause.
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examination of the validity of the initial agreement allegedly granting the arbitrators
power on jurisdictional questions such as the scope of their procedural powers or the
range of issues covered by the arbitration clause.
The grounds for judicial review envisaged in ZPO Sections 1040 (for interim
decisions) or 1059 (for final awards) certainly remain matters of public policy, and
include lack of arbitral authority. 259 However, it would seem an elevation of form over
substance to suggest that a question of arbitral authority which relates only to what the
parties agreed (bearing no relation to any issue of substantive ordre public) must remain
non-arbitrable (thus eluding a final decision by the arbitrator) notwithstanding an express
contractual stipulation to the contrary.
The matter may well turn out to be a question of what is meant by a decision on
the “merits”. As suggested in the cautionary tale set forth earlier in this paper, 260 the
parties may well wish, in some cases, to grant arbitrators power to decide a jurisdictional
question in the same way they would decide some other questions of contract
interpretation. If so, it would be unfortunate if the new German position on KompetenzKompetenz clauses applied to separate agreements on arbitral authority, 261 and indeed

259

ZPO Section 1059, analogous to UNCITRAL Model Law Article 34, permits vacatur
for invalid arbitration agreement, inability to present one’s case, an award that deals with
a matter not falling within the arbitration submission, or improper constitution of the
arbitral tribunal.

260

See discussion supra in Part II. The time limits in that scenario, we remember, are
restrictions on arbitral authority, not statutes of limitations. The latter remain substantive
in German law. BGB §§ 195 et seq. The hypothetical presumes that the restrictions limit
the right to arbitrate, not substantive recovery.
261

ZPO Section 1059(1)(c) (analogous to UNCITRAL Model Law Article 34) permits an
award to be set aside if it deals with a dispute beyond the scope of the arbitration
submission, and Section 1059(1)(d) permits setting aside of the arbitral award if the
procedure is not in accordance with the parties’ agreement.
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inconsistent with the goal of the UNCITRAL Model Law, to give binding effect to
legitimate arbitral decisions.
Whether made in Germany or abroad, an award should be subject to challenge for
jurisdictional infirmity. 262 However, neither side should be permitted to renege on a
freely-accepted arbitration agreement followed by fair proceedings, even if the agreement
covers matters relating to arbitral authority,.
4. Avoiding Extremes
It is not difficult to sympathize with the concerns of German courts, legislators
and scholars in connection with the confusion and potential abuse caused by earlier
decisions. Loose talk about arbitrators determining their own jurisdiction can give rise to
inappropriate overreaching. A contract’s jurisdictional clause does not necessarily give
the arbitrator competence, any more than pieces of paper can by themselves agree to
anything. 263 Only individuals agree, whether in their own capacity or as agents for
legally cognizable collectivities. Jurisdiction must be determined according to all the
facts and circumstances, not simplistic recitals.
The prospect that a legal principle may be misused does not necessarily justify a
rule that leads to a different type of error. With respect to arbitral jurisdiction, risks exist
at two extremes. On the one hand, courts should not assume the finality of an arbitrator’s
jurisdictional determination merely on the basis of contract recitals taken out of context.
On the other extreme, no good reason has been advanced to prohibit genuine consent to
262

See discussion in Niggemann, Chronique de Jurisprudence Étrangère, supra at 235:
“les tribunaux allemands constatent régulièrement que la décision du tribunal arbitral
étranger sur sa compétence ne les lie pas”. Nigemann goes on to cite New York
Convention Article V(1)(a), related to absence of a valid arbitration agreement.
263

See Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Sphere Drake v. All American Insurance, 256 F.
3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001), at 590.
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arbitration on questions related to the existence of an arbitrator’s power.
As a matter of policy, sophisticated business managers have long been permitted
to agree on final decisions about contract liability and damages. Such decisions normally
benefit from a presumption of deference to the parties’ pre-dispute wishes. Likewise,
business managers may agree to arbitrate such matters. No good reason seems to prevent
similar agreements about the jurisdictional pre-requisites to such arbitration. 264
If the “old style” German Kompetenz-Kompetenz was abused, the remedy might
be better education of judges and lawyers about the dangers of overreaching arbitrators.
With thoughtfulness and care, policy-makers should be able to avoid both extremes in the
pursuit of reasonable counterpoise in the articulation and application of jurisdictional
rules.
C.

Arbitral Jurisdiction and Contract Interpretation
1. The Litigants’ Role in Creating Arbitral Authority

In a commercial agreement, broadly drafted arbitration clauses often give the
arbitrator authority to construe contract language as well as to establish the facts. In an
international context, this interpretative function will occasionally involve determining
which governing law applies.
On occasion, the parties may wish to be more explicit about either the powers
granted, or the restrictions imposed, with respect to the arbitrator’s powers. Sometimes
this may be done through explicit contract language, and sometimes through
incorporation of provisions in the relevant arbitration rules. For example, an arbitrator
264

In a consumer context, sound public policy might call for a higher level of judicial
paternalism. See DAVID QUINKE, BÖRSENSCHIEDSVEREINBARUNGEN UND PROZESSUALER
ANLEGERSCHUTZ (Carl Heymans Verlag 2005). This question was expressly left open by
the BGH above-cited decision of 13 January 2005.
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might be granted, or denied, the right to award attorneys’ fees 265 or to permit third parties
to intervene. 266
What should happen when arbitrators misconstrue (in the eyes of the reviewing
court) contract language relating to their authority? Challenges to an arbitrator’s exercise
of specific powers can set the stage for a battle between two equally important
presumptions: (i) the last word on contract interpretation is normally for the arbitrator;
but (ii) absent the parties’ agreement otherwise, the final say on arbitral jurisdiction
remains for the courts. As in so many other matters related to arbitral jurisdiction, the

265

Article 31 of the AAA International Rules permits arbitrators to follow the European
practice by awarding “the reasonable costs for legal representation of a successful party”.
By contrast, New York CPLR § 7513 endorses the so-called “American rule” by
providing that attorneys’ fees are permissible only if provided in the parties’ agreement.
At least one court has held that reference to the AAA Rules does not satisfy the
requirements of New York law. See CIT Project Finance v. Credit Suisse First Boston,
799 NYS2d 159, 2004 WL 2941331 (2004). This slip opinion may be distinguished on
its facts, given that the relevant clause was drafted restrictively, giving the arbitrator
power to decide only a narrow question whose resolution did not dispose of the claim.
The approach applied more generally permits arbitrators to determine the parties’ intent
with respect to legal frees. See PaineWebber v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996). See
also Shaw Group v. Triplefine International Corp., 322 F.3d 115 (2nd Cir. 2003) and
Stone & Webster v. Triplefine International Corp., 118 Fed.Appx. 546 (2d Cir. 2004),
involving attorneys’ fees in an ICC arbitration. The two Triplefine decisions related to
the same dispute, although the first decision also included Stone & Webster’s parent the
Shaw Group. In the Shaw decision the Second Circuit vacated a lower court decision that
had enjoined a party from claiming as contract damages attorneys’ fees incurred in
opposing motions to stay arbitration. In the Stone & Webster decision the court affirmed
an award of attorneys’ fees (for the arbitration and the court action) notwithstanding the
argument that they were precluded by N.Y. P.P.L.R. § 7513, which imposes the so-called
“American rule” of denying legal fees in breach of contract cases “unless otherwise
provided in the agreement to arbitrate.” The decision upheld the parties’ right to waive
the provisions of New York law by reference to institutional rules (such as those of the
ICC) which provide for arbitrators to allocate legal expenses.
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See e.g., See Rules 22.1(h), LCIA Arbitration Rules, allowing a willing third person
to be joined to a proceeding notwithstanding the objection of one of the parties.

103

resolution of such conflicts will depend on the particular facts and circumstances of the
case. Set forth below are two contexts in which courts have struggled with this tension.
2. Paradigm Cases: Foreign Currency and Punitive Damages
a)

The House of Lords in Lesotho Highlands

One distinctive feature of English arbitration law is its detail. The 1996 Act
seems to contain more specific rules about particular arbitral or judicial powers than any
other major arbitration statute.
Most of these rules, however, contain an important escape hatch: they apply
unless the parties have otherwise agreed, which is entirely as it should be in a legal
system that values party autonomy and flexibility. For example, arbitrators are given
authority to order security for costs (Section 38), to dismiss a claim for inordinate delay
by the claimant (Section 41), to make an award in “any currency” (Section 48), or to
award compound interest (Section 49). In all cases, however, the relevant arbitral powers
are circumscribed by the qualifier “unless otherwise agreed” by the parties. 267 Granting a
“power” to an arbitrator constitutes another way of saying that the arbitral tribunal has
jurisdiction to do something, whether order security for costs, award interest or make a
decision denominated in a particular currency.
In connection with these jurisdictional grants, the question that then arises is,
267

Similarly, courts are given powers subject to the parties’ agreement otherwise. The
most notable example can be found in Section 69, which gives courts the right to correct
an error of law. The Act provides for appeal on question of law (defined as questions of
English law) but permits appeal to be waived either before or after the dispute arises.
This opportunity for waiver of merits review meets the goal of arbitral finality expected
by those members of the international business community who arbitrate in London for
reasons of convenience and expertise, rather than to hear high-priced QC's engage in
clever courtroom debate of matters already decided by the arbitrators. As under prior
law, exclusion of merits review can be made by reference to institutional arbitration rules
providing for waiver of appeal.
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“Who decides whether the parties have otherwise agreed?” Who determines whether a
particular form of authority has been taken from arbitrators? A mistake in contract
interpretation should not normally be reviewable. The arbitrators’ job is to interpret the
parties’ agreement. But what happens if the part of the contract they interpret relates
directly to their powers?
On the one hand, an award might well be recognized even though arbitrators
imperfectly exercised powers granted by the statute. If the contract says that an arbitral
tribunal is authorized to award compound interest, there would normally be no cause for
annulment simply because the chosen rate was different than the one that a reviewing
court might have considered appropriate.
On the other hand, the principle that arbitrators interpret contract language cannot
stand for the proposition that they can create their own jurisdiction ex nihilo. If a contract
says that arbitrators have no authority to award treble damages, it is hard to see how they
could interpret the limitation as a grant.
What an arbitrator might find, however, is that the ban on treble damages was
void under the applicable law. If so, the award could award exemplary damages if
justified by the portions of the contract that were not tainted by invalidity. Similar
findings might be made with respect to other contract restrictions, such as a limitation of
liability clauses that fixed a ceiling on recovery at a percentage of the price of goods sold,
or excluded consequential damages. In all cases, however, the finding would need to be
made as a matter of contract construction (the task given to the arbitrator), not
interpretation of the arbitration law.
The matter has sometimes been subject to a certain ambiguity. The principal
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speech by Lord Steyn in the House of Lords decision in Lesotho Highlands suggested
that the Arbitration Act gave “unconstrained” power to make an award in any
currency. 268 His colleagues disagreed, however. 269 Lord Steyn then went on to posit that
the power was not unconstrained, and that arbitrators had erred in interpreting either the
contract or the Arbitration Act. In either event, he said, the arbitrators would have done
no more than commit error of law. 270
The possibility of a mistake in the interpretation of the Arbitration Act, however,
might be more troublesome. Interpretation of arbitration statutes normally falls to courts.
Arbitrators cannot, simply by their own bare assertion, create powers they do not have. If
an arbitration statute requires awards to be denominated in Sterling, it is hard to see how
an arbitrator’s ipse dixit can generate authority to award Swiss Francs.
The difficulty arises because a decision on whether the parties have “agreed
otherwise” amounts not only to an interpretation of the contract, but also to a de facto
construction of how the Arbitration Act should be applied in a particular circumstance.
By deciding that the parties have or have not “agreed otherwise” the arbitrators expand or
contract their own authority accordingly.
In Lesotho Highlands, Lord Steyn made clear that the most that might have
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Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43 (30
June 2005), reversing the Court of Appeal decision found at [2004] All ER (Comm.) 97
(CA 2003). Id., at Paragraph 22. See generally William W. Park, The Nature of Arbitral
Authority: A Comment on Lesotho Highlands, 21 ARB. INT’L 483 (2005).
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Lords Hoffmann, Scott and Rodgers agreed that error of law does not equal excess of
power. However, they disagreed with Lord Steyn’s construction of Section 48 concerning
an arbitrator’s power to order payment of money in any currency. Lord Phillips (at
paragraphs 43-54) went further and stated that the arbitrators had purported to exercise a
discretion that the statute did not give them.

270

Paragraph 23, HL decision of 30 June 2005.
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occurred in the case at bar was an erroneous exercise of powers that actually existed. 271
An award of Swiss Francs might be an imperfect exercise of arbitral power, but would
not be a jurisdictional invention.
The contours of arbitrator power, however, may be more difficult to ascertain in
other situations. For example, a contractual choice-of-law clause might designate a legal
system that prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. 272 But such a clause
could perhaps be read to designate substantive only state contract law, not including
arbitral procedure. 273 Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, it is not
always obvious when damages are punitive rather than compensatory. 274 To what extent,
then, do arbitrators have the power to confer on themselves, in a final and binding way,
authority to grant punitive damages?
The decision in Lesotho Highlands cannot stand for the proposition that
arbitrators may purposefully ignore their mandate. The arbitrators awarded currencies
considered “appropriate in the circumstances” after having taken careful note of the
contract stipulations 275 and looked only to currencies and exchange rates in the parties’
agreement. Nothing suggests that their award was a fig leaf to cover intentional disregard
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Paragraph 24, HL decision of 30 June 2005.
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See, e.g., New York law as expressed in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354
(1976).
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Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995), upholding an award
for punitive damages in a dispute covered by a New York choice-of-law clause.
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See Pacificare Health Systems v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2002), where a unanimous
Court upheld the right to compel arbitration of claims under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, which provides for treble damages, notwithstanding a
contractual prohibition on punitive damages. The Court suggested that treble damage
awards sometimes serve “remedial purposes” that are compensatory in nature.
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See portions of award cited in Paragraph 10, HL decision of 30 June 2005.
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of the contract.
The risk of pernicious arbitrator willfulness was noted by one observer, whose
comment on Lesotho Highlands raised the specter of arbitrators “misapplying the
Arbitration Act”, “ignore[ing] the parties’ agreement as to applicable law” and “riding
rough-shod through choice-of-law provisions”. 276 Beyond cavil, those who care for the
health of arbitration must remain vigilant to such dangers, mindful of the difficulty in
drawing the line between an arbitrator’s innocent misconstruction of the parties’ contract
and a full-scale disregard of the arbitral mission.
That being said, the House of Lords decision in itself gives no mandate for such
bad behavior. An arbitrator might well apply a power given to him or her by the
Arbitration Act, but do so in an imperfect way. This might occur, for example, if the
arbitrator applied interest or currency rates different from those that the reviewing judge
would have considered appropriate. A wrong decision with respect to exercise of clearlygranted powers does not always equal an excess of authority.
b)

Punitive Damages: The Supreme Court in Pacificare

In Pacificare Health Systems v. Book 277 a group of doctors had filed a nationwide
class action against several health maintenance organizations, alleging that the
organizations had conspired to refuse proper reimbursement for services provided under
the health plans accepted by the physicians. The legal basis for the doctors’ action
included claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
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See Adam Samuel, Lesotho Highlands: Denaturing an Arbitration Statute and an
Express Choice of Law does not Involve the Arbitrator Exceeding his Powers, 23(3) J.
INT’L ARB. 259 (2006), at pages 261, 262 and 263, respectively.
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538 U.S. 401 (2003), reversing In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litigation, 285 F.
3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002).
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commonly known as RICO. 278 This line of attack was attractive for the plaintiff
physicians because the RICO statute allows awards of treble damages, amounting to three
times any actual damage proven. There was a catch, however. The physicians had
agreed to resolve disputes with the health care providers through arbitration. And some
of the arbitration agreements to which they had agreed were explicit in prohibiting
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. 279
The Supreme Court allowed the arbitrators themselves to determine, as an initial
matter, whether they could grant treble recovery under the RICO, notwithstanding the
contract limitation on punitive damages. While the case is sometimes presented as an
example of judges deferring to arbitrators on jurisdictional matters, the court in fact
followed a different (and rather murky) line by denying that it was engaged in
jurisdictional analysis at all. As discussed below, Justice Scalia asserted that it was not
clear (at least to him) that the power to award punitive damages presented a gateway
“arbitrability question”, which is to say, a jurisdictional issue.
The lower courts had refused to require the physicians to arbitrate, reasoning that
278

18 U.S.C. § 1961-68. While some readers might be puzzled that a health care
provider was influenced by racketeers, those familiar with RICO know that it has long
been commonplace to include racketeering counts in ordinary business litigation. Section
1962 makes it unlawful to invest income derived from a “pattern of racketeering” in any
business engaged in interstate or international commerce. Section 1961 defines
racketeering to include not only acts and threats of things such as murder, kidnapping,
arson, robbery and bribery, but also acts indictable under several sections of federal
criminal law. Frequently RICO civil claims are based on alleged conspiracy to commit
mail and wire fraud, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1341 & 1342. Section 1964 provides that
persons injured by violations of RICO shall recover “threefold the damages he sustains”
as well as attorney’s fees.
279

The various agreements provided either that (i) “punitive damages shall not be
awarded [in the arbitrations], (ii) “arbitrators…shall have no authority to award any
punitive or exemplary damages” or (iii) “arbitrators…shall have no authority to award
extra contractual damages of any kind, including punitive or exemplary damages.”
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if arbitrators could not award punitive damages this would deny meaningful relief for
violations of RICO. Presumptively, RICO claims were of such public importance as to
be non-waivable in a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The health care organizations
appealed.
In a relatively brief opinion by Justice Scalia, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld
the health care organizations’ right to compel arbitration. The key to the Court’s
reasoning lies in its assumption about the ambiguity of the term “punitive damages” and
the nature of treble damages in the RICO statute. The Court suggested that some judicial
decisions had given treble damage a compensatory character, “serving remedial purposes
in addition to punitive objectives.” 280 Consequently, the Court expressed agnosticism
about whether an arbitrator would or would not interpret the punitive damage
prohibitions in a way that might cast doubt on the permissibility of treble damages. “We
do not know how the arbitrator will construe the remedial limitations,” wrote Justice
Scalia, and thus it would be “mere speculation” (using the vocabulary of an earlier
decision 281) to presume that arbitrators might deny themselves the power to grant
punitive damages”. It was that very prospect (that treble damages might be found beyond
the arbitrators’ jurisdiction) which had troubled the lower court, anxious to protect the
physicians’ right to recovery. Consequently, the Court would not take upon itself the
authority to decide “the antecedent question” of how the ambiguity concerning punitive
damages is to be resolved. 282
280

Referring to statutory remedies such as those at issue in RICO claims, Justice Scalia
described treble damages as lying “on different points along the spectrum between purely
compensatory and strictly punitive awards.” 538 U.S. 405.

281
282

Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
538 U.S. 407.
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In essence, the Court decided not to decide, but to pursue a “wait and see” policy.
On the theoretical level, therefore, the case cannot be said to give the arbitrators’ power
to make final a determination on the matter of their authority.
Justice Scalia added to the suspense with an intriguing footnote. “If the
conceptual ambiguity [about what the prohibition on punitive damages might mean]
could itself be characterized as raising a ‘gateway’ question of arbitrability,” he reasoned,
then “it would be appropriate for a court to answer it [the arbitrability question] in the
first instance.” 283 The Court then concluded, “Given our presumption in favor of
arbitration … we think the preliminary question whether the remedial limitations at issue
here prohibit an award of RICO treble damages is not a question of arbitrability.” 284
What the Court seems to be saying is that arbitrators would construe a particular
expression in the contract (“punitive damages”) in the same way they interpret any other
contract phrase, taking into account the context of the parties’ relationship and other
terms in the agreement. While the meaning given to these terms might affect one side’s
recovery, it would not enlarge arbitral authority, given that it is already broadly defined
under the common arbitration clause which gives arbitrators the job of interpreting the
language in the parties’ agreement and the applicable law, even (and especially) in close
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538 U.S. 407. But the footnote continues that the phrase “question of arbitrability”
should be applicable only in the kind of narrow circumstance where contracting parties
“would likely have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter, where they are
not likely to have thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and,
consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the risk of
forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to arbitrate.”
There are those who might observe, however, that the heart of arbitral jurisdiction turns
on what the parties were “likely to have thought” about the decisions an arbitrator was
supposed to make.
284

538 U.S. 407, at n. 2.
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cases. 285
From one perspective, Scalia might be saying no more than that the matter is not
ripe for determination until the court knows whether the arbitrators will in fact exceed
their jurisdiction or violate public policy. 286 The troubling aspect of this decision lies in
its susceptibility to misinterpretation, as in essence giving arbitrators de facto power to
determine their own jurisdiction to award treble damages, simply by the way they would
interpret the notion of punitive damages. If the arbitrators held that treble damages under
RICO were not “punitive” in the context of the physicians’ claims, then by definition
these damages would be within their jurisdiction.

Such a result may not be implausible

under the circumstances. Arguments have been made that treble damages make “rough
justice” compensation for the disruption that may result from contract breach but be
difficult to quantify. The slope, however, does not continue indefinitely. At some point
language ceases to be elastic, and the parties’ words impose definite boundaries on what
arbitrators can do.

285

Illustrations of this point arise in many interesting arbitrations. Here are a few.
(1) Professional specialty. A statute might make limitation of liability clauses valid only
in contracts between persons “in the same profession” (French law refers to contracts
“entre professionels de la même specialité”). Since two professional lives are rarely
completely alike, the arbitrator must determine how narrow to draw the concept of
professional “specialty”. (2) “Subject to…” A contract might make one obligation
“subject to” a particular event. Does the expression mean “On condition that” or
“Unless”? Both usages exist. “Bob must take the exam, subject to [unless] being
excused by the Dean. But, “Christine will have dinner at home, subject to [on condition
that] her plane lands on time. (3) A licensee might be entitled to sub-license to an entity
that sells a “range” of the licensee’s products. If the licensee sells three dozen products,
how many constitutes a “range”? Presumably we need more than one, but not necessarily
thirty-six.
286

Of course, when arbitration award can be enforced against assets abroad, this may be
of little consequence.

112

D.

The “Arbitrability Question” in the United States
1. Legal Framework
a)

Overview

In the United States, questions otherwise be labeled “jurisdictional” often find
themselves being classified as matters for the arbitrators to decide along with the merits
of the dispute. As we shall see, this characterization exercise lies at the heart of judicial
deference to the arbitral process.
Unlike the arbitration laws of France, 287 and to a lesser extent England, 288 the
Federal Arbitration Act creates no statutory presumption that courts should await the
award before pronouncing themselves on an arbitrator’s authority to hear a dispute. 289
Early in the arbitral process, courts can decide whether a particular matter has been (or
can be) submitted to arbitration, usually in the context of a motion to compel arbitration
or to stay litigation. 290 Courts remain free to entertain motions related to arbitral
jurisdiction at any moment from the start of proceedings onward. Moreover, when the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate is open to doubt, courts may order the question

287

See NCPC Article 1458, discussed supra.

288

See 1996 Arbitration Act, Section 72, discussed supra, which provides for the right to
challenge the arbitration agreement or jurisdiction through a motion for declaration or
injunction only when the person alleged to be a party to the arbitration “takes no part in
the proceedings”. See also Sections 70(2) (applications and appeals may be brought only
after exhaustion of available arbitral process) and 73 (loss of right to object to lack of
jurisdiction if a litigant takes part in an arbitration without raising the matter in the
proceedings).
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For the German position on the matter, see BGH decision of 13 January 2005,
discussed supra.
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FAA Section 3 provides that federal courts shall stay competing litigation “upon
being satisfied that the issue involved in such [judicial] suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration ….”
113

resolved by a jury. 291
In other ways, however, American arbitration law has been extremely generous in
giving arbitrators both the first and the last word in determining their own authority. The
statutory scheme for international arbitration has been integrated with a practice of
sending jurisdictional questions to arbitrators if there is evidence that such is the path
intended by the parties. 292
The conceptual underpinning of this approach relies on a finding that “the parties
intended that the question of arbitrability [used in the sense of jurisdiction] shall be
decided by the arbitrator.” 293 With a different vocabulary, American courts have in
essence adopted the old German concept of a Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause, by which the
parties may agree to submit a jurisdictional matter to final and binding arbitration. 294 As
discussed more fully below, jurisdictional differences have been manipulated into the
291

See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000); China Minmetals
Materials Ltd. V. Chi Mei, 334 F.3d 274 (3d. Cir. 2003).
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For a survey of cases along these lines, see Robert B. Davidson, Recent U.S. Cases
Affecting the Power of an International Arbitral Tribunal to Determine its own
Jurisdiction, in THE SWEDISH ARBITRATION ACT OF 1999 FIVE YEARS ON: A CRITICAL
REVIEW OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 61 (Lars Heuman & Sigvard Jarvin, eds. 2006;
Symposium Proceedings, University of Stockholm, October 2004).
293

See PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1192, at 1198-99 (2d Cir. 1996). See also
Alliance Bernstein Investments, discussed supra. The principle has also been extended to
class actions in JSC Surgutneftegaz v. Harvard College, 167 Fed.Appx. 266 (2nd Cir.
2006), 2006 WL 354282, affirming 2005 WL 1863676 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Here investors
brought a class action arbitration over dividend policy of a Russian company, whose
shares were evidenced by American Depository Receipts (ADR’s) held in New York.
The court found “the intent of the parties to commit the question of arbitrability to the
arbitrator.” Slip opinion at 3. The contest was not about the existence of the arbitration
clause (accepted by both sides) but rather about whether its scope was broad enough to
cover the parties’ dispute.
294

American courts are often unwilling to use the same vocabulary as other nations,
preferring to talk of “the arbitrability question” rather than jurisdiction. See First Options
of Chicago. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d
589, 596-98 (1st Cir. 1996).
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realm of substantive questions whose resolution the parties are deemed to have given to
the arbitrators.
b)

Void and Voidable Clauses

In the past, judicial decisions often distinguished between “void” and “voidable”
clauses. Under this view, only courts may decide challenges based on allegations that the
agreement is void ab initio, rather than simply voidable at one side’s election. 295
The instinct behind such decisions is understandable. Ex nihilo nihil fit: nothing
comes from nothing. Consequently, a void clause cannot serve as the source of authority
for any putative arbitrator. 296
However well-intentioned, the void/voidable distinction seems unnecessary. The
better approach would be for courts to ask simply, “What did the parties intend?” If the
arbitration clause was for some reason invalid, then there would be no party intent to
arbitrate anything. In some cases the invalidity might taint the entire contract, as in the
event of forgery or unauthorized signature. In other instances, the invalidity might touch
only the arbitration clause, and might be the result of fraudulent misrepresentations about
the arbitral process which gave one side the right to rescind that aspect of the
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See Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp 220 F. 3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000); Three Valleys Mun.
WaterDist. V. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F. 2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991); Canada Life Ass. Co. v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Sphere Drake Ins. v. All
American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Pollux Marine Agencies v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 455 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
In this connection, analytic links are often between an arbitrator’s jurisdictional power
and the separability (autonomy) in the arbitration clause. If the voidness or illegality of
the main agreement does not strike the arbitration clause, the arbitrator continues to have
power to make a jurisdictional determination. By contrast, if the invalidity does infect
the agreement to arbitrate (as might happen in a forged document) the arbitrator would
clearly lack authority. See Harbour Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kansa General Int’l Ins. Co.,
[1993] Q.B. 701.
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transactions. 297
What should matter is simply that the arbitration clause was invalid, regardless of
how that came to be. 298 Mercifully, the void/voidable distinction was finally laid to rest
by the United States Supreme Court in its recent Buckeye decision. 299 An action against a
check cashing service, accused of making illegal usurious loans, was brought by
borrowers in derogation of the arbitration clause. The Court found that the allegation of
“void loan agreement” did not deprive the arbitrators of the right to decide that very
issue, as long as the arbitration clause itself remained sound.
2. The Dictum in First Options
To understand the “arbitrability question” approach, the most convenient starting
point might be First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan. 300 In dictum, this U.S. Supreme
Court decision supplied a verbal hook on which much subsequent case analysis has been
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See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997), involving a
malpractice claim against a health care provider in which habitual delays in arbitration
were found to constitute fraud by the provider.
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For a view along these lines (albeit pursuant to a slightly different line of reasoning),
see Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in International
Arbitration: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come From Nothing?,
13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19 (2002), at 34-36.
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Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S.Ct. 1204 (2006), discussed supra.
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514 U.S. 938, 943. See generally, William W. Park The Arbitrability Dicta in First
Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?, 12
ARB. INT'L 137 (1996), reprinted 11 INT'L ARB. REP. 28 (Oct. 1996); William W. Park,
Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators,
8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133 (1997); reprinted in [2000] ADR LAW J.19 (March 2000). For
an academic tourney on some of the issues raised in First Options, see Thomas
Carbonneau, Comment Upon Professor Park’s Analysis of the Dicta in First Options v.
Kaplan, 11 Int’l Arb. Rep. 18 (November 1996); Alan Scott Rau, Arbitration As
Contract: One More Word About First Options v. Kaplan, 12 INT’L ARB. REP. 1 (March
1997); Thomas Carbonneau, Le Tournoi of Academic Commentary on Kaplan: A Reply to
Professor Rau, 12 INT’L ARB. REP 35 (APRIL 1997). See also, Shirin Philipp, Is the
Supreme Court Bucking the Trend? First Options v. Kaplan in Light of European Reform
Initiatives in Arbitration Law, 14 B.U. INT’L L. J. 119 (1996).
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hung. Almost invariably, these cases cite First Options for the dual proposition that
(i) contracting parties may agree to arbitrate jurisdictional matters (questions about
“arbitrability”) but (ii) such agreement must be founded on clear evidence.
Prior to that decision, general American contract principles certainly existed to
provide a doctrinal foundation for deference to arbitrators’ decisions on their authority.
First Options, however, supplied a high level of visibility and authoritative endorsement
for such deference. 301
In First Options, an arbitral award had been rendered against both an investment
company and its owners with respect to debts owed to a securities clearing house. The
owners (husband and wife) argued that they had never signed the arbitration agreement,
and consequently were not bound by the award. The Supreme Court carefully
distinguished between three questions: (i) did the Kaplans owe money? (ii) did the
Kaplsns agree to arbitrate? and (iii) who (court or arbitrator) should decide whether the
Kaplans agreed to arbitrate?
On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s finding
that the owners had not agreed to arbitrate, without any judicial deference to the
arbitrator’s determination. 302 Whether Manuel and Carol Kaplan were bound to arbitrate
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See A T & T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986),
discussed infra. See also Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration, supra, at
464, note 69, suggesting that the dictum of First Options can be “found fully developed
in earlier Supreme Court decisions.” Not all observers have noticed such full
development.
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The Supreme Court also dealt with the standard a court of appeals should apply when
reviewing a district court decision relating to vacatur or confirmation of an arbitral award
under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court held that a district court's
findings of fact should be accepted unless “clearly erroneous,” but that questions of law
should be decided de novo. The Third Circuit agreed with the owners that they were not
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by virtue of a clause signed by their investment company was a question for courts. It
was for a judge, not arbitrator, to provide the ultimate determination on whether Mr. and
Mrs. Kaplan were in fact bound to arbitrate by reason of the actions of their investment
company, on theories such as agency, alter ego, or lifting the corporate veil.
Although unnecessary to the holding of the case, the Supreme Court's went
further and suggested that in some situations (although not under the facts of Kaplan)
“the arbitrability question itself” might be submitted to arbitration. 303 In such a situation,
the courts must defer (“give considerable leeway”) to arbitrators' decisions on the limits
of their own jurisdiction. However, the burden of showing that a non-signatory intended
to arbitrate remained with the party seeking arbitration. 304
The dictum’s critical language (which in some situations may eclipse the holding
of the case) reads as follows:
If [the parties agreed to submit arbitrability to arbitration] then the court's
standard for reviewing the arbitrator's decision about the matter should not differ
from the standard courts apply when they review any other matter that the parties
have agreed to arbitrate.... That is to say, the court should give considerable
leeway to the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow
circumstances. 305
bound by the arbitration agreement, and therefore had reversed the district court
confirmation of the award against them.
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514 U.S. 938 (1995).
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In the United States, given the absence of any federal common law, the bindingness
of an arbitration clause would be a matter for state law principles.
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For the proposition that arbitrability can be submitted to arbitrators, the Court cited to
alleged authority in labor arbitration: A T & T Technologies v. Communications Workers,
475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) and Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574,
583, n. 7 (1960). Invocation of these labor cases must be approached with caution. In
the United States, the statutory basis for labor arbitration lies in section 301 of the LaborManagement Relations Act of 1947 (commonly called the “Taft-Hartley Act”) rather than
the Federal Arbitration Act. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Admittedly, the law under the FAA and the LMRA has seen a convergence, with courts
routinely citing cases decided under one statute in connection with another. Neither of
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Given the longevity of Supreme Court dictum in the field of arbitration, 306 its
teaching on “the arbitrability question” can be expected to weigh heavily on the future
allocation of functions between courts and arbitrators. At the least, the dictum now
requires judges to ask not only whether arbitrators exceeded their powers, but also
whether the arbitrators were given authority to decide a jurisdictional matter in a way
deserving deference. 307
3. Possible Applications of the Dictum
a)

Multiple Contexts of “Arbitrability”

The dictum may in some instances lend itself to mischief if applied by courts
seeking to reduce their workload. Situations will certainly exist in which parties might
agree to submit a particular question to binding arbitration, even though that question
would normally be characterized as jurisdictional. However, awards may still be
reviewed for excess of authority under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act. At
some point in any chain of agreements, a consensual basis must exist for arbitral
authority over those questions.
One difficulty with the dictum is that the term “arbitrability” can cover so many
the two cited cases actually found an agreement to arbitrate the question of arbitrability.
In AT&T Technologies the Court held that the lower court’s decision to allow the
arbitrator to decide arbitrability was error. Warrior & Gulf said that “it is clear…in this
case [that] the question of arbitrability is for the courts to decide.” 363 U.S.583, n. 7.
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See e.g., the Court's obscure pronouncement on arbitrator "manifest disregard" of the
law in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which has continued to be invoked long after
the holding in the case was overruled.
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See e.g. PaineWebber v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996). For an early expression of
scholarly concern over the potential for confusion, see Thomas Carbonneau, Beyond the
Trilogies: A New Bill of Rights and Law Practice Through the Contract of Arbitration, 6
AM. REV. INT'L. ARB. 1 (1995). See also THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACITCE OF ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2002), at 20-21
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different matters: whether a person ever agreed to arbitrate at all; the scope of an
admittedly valid arbitration clause; and public policy limits on what arbitrators can and
cannot decide. Only the second of those issues (scope of the parties' agreement) would
normally be capable of delegation to arbitrators in a single agreement. The third category
(public policy) would never be capable of delegation.
b)

Existence of Arbitration Clause

Perhaps the most serious challenge to the dictum arises in connection when a
respondent in an arbitration asserts that it never agreed to arbitrate, or a respondent in a
judicial action claims the benefit of an arbitration clause. Delegation of jurisdictional
authority on that question would normally require a separate agreement. A contract
clause purporting to give arbitrators power to determine their own authority does not, in
itself, insulate from judicial review a decision to add a party that never agreed to
arbitrate. 308 The mere narration or recital of the arbitrator's power on a printed form
cannot be confused with a genuine grant of authority.
The suggestion that arbitrators can determine their own jurisdiction with respect
to the identity of the parties, without a separate agreement submitting that question to
arbitration, brings to mind the picture of Baron Münchhausen pulling himself up by his
own pigtail. In many cases such a principle will assume the very proposition (arbitral
jurisdiction) that remains to be proven. In the absence of an arbitration agreement
accepted by the person alleged to be bound with respect to the dispute in question, the
308

In some instances, of course, a person who did agree to arbitrate may be required, by
the terms of the contract or agreed-upon arbitration rules, to accept joinder of a third
party. See LCIA Rule 22.1(h), allowing a willing third party to be joined to a proceeding
notwithstanding the objection of one of the existing litigants. In such a case, however,
the objecting party has accepted the process for joinder by contracting for application of
the LCIA Rules.
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person rendering the award would seem better characterized as a vigilante, intermeddler
or imposter.
This does not mean that a contract may never be interpreted as giving the
arbitrator power to determine whether a particular person agreed to arbitrate at all.
Rather, such agreements must be truly distinct from, and chronologically subsequent to,
the alleged principal agreement. For example, a buyer might sign a purchase contract
with a seller corporation. When a dispute arises, the seller might allege that an arbitration
clause in the contract bound not only the seller corporation, but also its parent entity. Or,
the seller’s parent might claim the benefit of the arbitration clause in attempting to avoid
a court action brought against the parent by the seller. The theory might be advanced that
the subsidiary had contracted as agent for the parent, or that the parent was the alter ego
of the subsidiary.
After a dispute arises, nothing would prevent the parent from agreeing to ask an
arbitrator to determine whether it was in fact bound by the arbitration clause. The arbitral
tribunal to whose authority the parent has consented under the second agreement would
be convened to determine whether the parent bound itself under the first agreement. In
such a case, an arbitral tribunal so constituted would do no more than decide the merits of
a question of fact and/or law about whether the initial agreement empowered the
arbitrator to the extent asserted. 309
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This is exactly what happened in Astro Valiente Compania Naviera v. Pakistan
Ministry of Food & Agriculture (The Emmanuel Colocotronis No. 2), [1982], 1 W.L.R.
1096, 1 All E. R. 578. Buyers of wheat at first refused to arbitrate a dispute with the
shipper over demurrage, on the theory that the arbitration clause in the charter party had
not been incorporated in the bill of lading which by the charter party's terms was to
“supersede”the charter party. The parties submitted to ad hoc arbitration the question of
whether the arbitration clause had been incorporated into the bill of lading.
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c)

Scope

Questions related to the scope of an arbitration clause lend themselves more easily
to application of the “arbitrability question” dictum. Depending on the facts and
circumstances evidencing the parties’ intent, an arbitration agreement might permit
arbitrators to decide what controverted questions are covered by the clause, or to interpret
the extent of their powers.
Not all contract terms, however, lend themselves to such final interpretation by
arbitrators. For instance, courts presumably would not accept an arbitrator’s erroneous
finding that a contracting party named Alpha Corporation really referred to Omega
Limited when the two entities were in fact completely unrelated to one another. An
arbitrator’s construction of contract terms cannot change the parties’ identity. 310
4. Broad and “Open Ended” Clauses
In practice, courts often address jurisdictional questions by reference to the nature
of the arbitration clause itself. A “broad” arbitration clause will be seen as evidence of an
intent to submit many (albeit not all) jurisdictional questions to the arbitrator. Such
expansive, widely-drafted clauses often talk about “all controversies, disputes and
questions” that might be “related to or arising out of” the parties’ agreement. 311
While many contracts do contain such broadly drafted clauses, they are not
universal. 312 On occasion, the parties may submit to arbitration only a single narrow
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See discussion of the Scalia opinion in Pacificare.

311

See e.g., Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgt,. 371 F. Supp. 2d 571 (SDNY
2005); Ryan Beck & Co. v. Fakih, 268 F. Supp. 2d 210 (EDNY 2003).
312

For an example of a narrow clause, see Bristol-Myers Squibb v. SR International
Business Insurance Co. Ltd., 354 F.Supp.2d 499 (SDNY 2005), which held that an
arbitration clause making reference to “any dispute or difference arising under” the
insurance policy did not cover fraud. The insurer sought to rescind policies and the
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question of fact, reserving the rest of the dispute to the competent courts. 313
Consequently, scholars, judges and policy-makers must be careful about presuming their
own conclusion on what arbitration clauses do and do not cover.
In disputes where challenges to an arbitrator’s jurisdiction do not implicate the
existence of the arbitration clause, intriguing questions arise with respect to broadly
drafted clauses that might give arbitrators absolute power to determine their own
jurisdiction. Such “open-ended” clauses might cover “all disputes ever arising between
the parties” and would not include the typical language requiring that arbitration arise
from or be related to a particular contractual relationship. A related problem might
derive from a master agreement subject to an arbitration provision, followed by several
more limited contracts that do not themselves contain arbitration clauses.
While such open-ended language would reduce the prospect of judicial second

policyholder sought a declaratory judgment that the question of fraud was outside the
scope of the arbitration. The court felt bound by the earlier precedent of In Re Kinoshita,
287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1961), which while out of step with modern law stilled controlled
on narrow facts. For a case distinguishing Kinoshita (rightly or wrongly) see S.A.
Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984)(words
“whenever any question or dispute shall arise or occur under” the agreement held broad
enough to include claims of fraudulent inducement to contract). Compare Louis Dreyfus
Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir.2001). ACE
Capital Re Overseas Ltd. v. Central United Life Insurance Co. 307 F.3d 24 (2d Cir.2002).
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See e.g., CIT Project Finance v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 799 NYS2d 159, 2004 WL
2941331 (2004), holding that arbitrators may not grant attorneys’ fees. The court reached
this somewhat surprising conclusion notwithstanding Article 31 of the AAA International
Rules, which provides that arbitrators to follow the European “loser pays” practice of
awarding “reasonable costs for legal representation of a successful party”. The court
relied on N.Y. CPLR § 7513, permitting an award of attorneys’ fees only if provided in
the parties’ agreement. The arbitration clause at issue gave the arbitrators power only
over a specific issue of fact, reserving most of the dispute to courts. By contrast, when
the contract contains a broad clause, courts allow arbitrators to address the parties’ intent
on legal frees. See PaineWebber v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996); Shaw Group v.
Triplefine International Corp., 322 F.3d 115 (2nd Cir. 2003); Stone & Webster v.
Triplefine International Corp., 118 Fed.Appx. 546 (2d Cir. 2004).
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guessing of the arbitrator, the situation would not always be problem-free. Imagine that a
university president asks a lawyer to represent his wayward child in litigation arising out
of an auto accident. A retainer agreement signed by the president includes an arbitration
clause stating that the arbitral tribunal will have power to decide questions relating to its
own jurisdiction. After a dispute about the number of hours spent on the accident case is
referred to a properly constituted arbitral tribunal, the lawyer (who is also an adjunct
member of the university's law faculty) includes in her submission to the arbitrator a
claim for a substantial salary increase for the course she teaches. Must a judge defer to
an arbitral tribunal's decision to hear the salary claim as well as the retainer
disagreement? Normally one would think not, at least if the president was contracting in
a personal capacity (as parent) rather than as an academic administrator.
5. Judicial Deference toward Contract Recitals
Even before the U.S. Supreme Court decision in First Options v. Kaplan, some
American judicial decisions gave evidence of deference to contract recitations which
suggested (either explicitly or by reference to arbitration rules) that arbitrators were able
to rule in a final and binding way on their own jurisdiction. 314 One problematic example
can be seen in the decision by the Court of Appeals in Apollo Computer v. Berg. 315
A contract between a Massachusetts computer company and a Swedish distributor
was terminated and the rights of the bankrupt Swedish distributor were assigned to a third
party. The Massachusetts company claimed that the non-assignment clause in the
314

Instances in labor arbitration have already been mentioned. See A T & T
Technologies v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986), discussed infra.
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886 F. 2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989), at 473. See also sequel to Apollo in Hewlett Packard,
Inc. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1995), vacating a confirmation order and remanding for
further proceedings the award confirmed in 867 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Mass. 1994). Similar
questions were discussed in S.G.S. v. Raytheon, 643 F. 2d. 863 (1st Cir. 1981).
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contract covered the arbitration clause itself, which became void as a consequence of the
assignment.
The court held that the arbitrators' jurisdiction over the claims was a question for
arbitrators themselves to decide. The arbitral tribunal was appointed pursuant to the
Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, which calls for the ICC to
refer to the arbitrators any objections to the validity of an arbitration agreement, as long
as the ICC is prima facie satisfied that an arbitration agreement may exist. 316 On this basis
the American court reasoned that the parties had agreed to submit the arbitrability
question to the arbitrators.
On closer examination the reasoning in Apollo might reveal itself as an exercise in
presuming a conclusion. The problem is not that the parties lacked the power, as a matter
of contract law, to submit the jurisdictional question to arbitration. Rather, it is simply
not certain that they actually did so.
If a full examination of the facts reveals that the arbitration agreement was in fact
automatically terminated by the assignment, then ICC Arbitration Rules become relevant.
This would be relatively evident had the arbitration clause contained a proviso, typed in
large bold letters, to the effect that “The Arbitration clause is void after assignment”. In
such circumstances, it is hard to imagine that any arbitrators could accord themselves
jurisdiction in a final and binding way. A similar result would seem to obtain if the
parties’ had evidenced their intent through selection of an applicable law that yielded the
same result.
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ICC Rules, Article 6(2) (1998 Version). At the time, the applicable rule was found in
Article 8, and referred to the “prima facie existence” of the arbitration agreement, rather
than the ICC Court being prima facie satisfied.
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A better approach might have been simply to make a finding about the effect of
the assignment under Massachusetts law, which seemed to provide that a general nonassignment clause bars the delegation of duties, but not the assignment of rights,
including the right to arbitrate. Indeed, such was the approach of the federal district court
in this case. 317 For better or for worse, the Court of Appeals refused to address the issue,
instead resting its decision on the principle that the effect of the assignment was a
question for the arbitrators.
For a private arbitral institution like the International Chamber of Commerce to
leave the difficult issues to the arbitrator may be acceptable as an efficiency device if
national courts later exercise a fuller control over the clause's validity. 318 However, the
aggregate social and economic consequences of such a prima facie approach are likely to
be less acceptable when a judge imposes state power to enforce an arbitral award without
an independent examination of the authenticity and scope of the alleged arbitration
agreement. The result may well be a loss of confidence by the business community in
both the arbitral system and the judiciary that enforces arbitration agreements and
awards.
6. Amplifying First Options in Subsequent Case Law
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court provide a perspective on
how American jurisdictional methodology plays itself out in practice. The following two
317

886 F. 2d at 407. For a general discussion of the assignment of rights under
UNICROIT principles, see Wolfgang Wiegant & Corinne Zellweger-Gutknecht,
Assignment, in UNICROIT PRINCIPLES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND APPLICATIONS 27
(ICC Bulletin, Court of Arbitration, 2005 Special Supplement).
318

Even for arbitral institutions, however, this approach may not be free from problems.
An arbitration agreement with a forged signature, or a real signature forced by a gun at
the head, ought to be no less a complete nullity because it gives the appearance of being
valid.
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cases, Howsam and Bazzle, address which threshold preconditions for arbitration are to
be determined by judges and which are for arbitrators. 319
a)

Time Limits

Securities arbitration has been a particularly fruitful ground for jurisdictional
conflict with respect to time limits. The investor generally tells of a “nest egg” lost due
to a financial adviser’s misconduct, with golden retirement years turned into a financially
harsh old age due to unsuitable investments. The adviser, of course, replies that the
customer was well aware of the risks and pushed hard for aggressive growth stocks. 320
The reason time bars are so frequently invoked in brokerage disputes is that the
investor is a bit like a casino gambler: happy when winning, but likely to complain in the
event of a loss. 321 If stock rises in value, there would be no loss, and thus no grumbling
that the investment advice was “unsuitable.” Only when things later go sour will the
broker be accused of misbehavior, even though the purchase of securities might be many
319

See generally William W. Park, The Contours of Arbitral Jurisdiction: Who Decides
What?, 3 INT’L ARB. NEWS 2 (ABA, Summer 2003), reprinted in 18 INT’L ARB. REP. 21
(August 2003). A third Supreme Court opinion in Pacificare Health Systems v. Book is
often discussed in connection with Howsam and Bazzle. In a puzzling footnote the Court
stated that the question at issue was “not a question of arbitrability.” 538 U.S. 407 at n.2.
(Emphasis added.) In light of its somewhat different rationale (courts wait to see how the
arbitrators will decide) Pacificare has been discussed earlier, along with Lesotho
Highlands, in relation to the impact of contract interpretation on arbitral jurisdiction.
320

The so-called “Seven Deadly Sins” of securities transactions are hardly as exciting as
the classic offenses: lust, gluttony, sloth, anger, envy, pride and greed – although the last
of these often plays a role in broker misbehavior. The catalogue of common
transgressions includes (i) churning, (ii) unauthorized trading, (iii) unsuitable trading, (iv)
intentional misrepresentation, (v) broker ignorance, (vi) misappropriation and
(vii) outside business activities of the employee relating to investment marketing that is
attributed to the employer. See David E. Robbins, Seven Deadly Sins that Lead to
Arbitration Disaster, 820 PLI/Corp 489, Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series (July-August 1993).
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While the investment in Howsam had occurred sometime between the account
opening in 1986 and its closing in 1994, the arbitration was begun only in 1997.
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years in the past. 322
For decades, the question of what jurisdictional determinations could be made by
an arbitrator was moot, since the basic distrust of arbitrators (the foxes who would guard
the chicken coop) generally meant there was no arbitration of securities transactions.
Except in international cases, 323 courts traditionally refused to enforce arbitration clauses
that implicated either the 1933 Securities Act or the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 324
Interpreting these two pieces of legislation was considered too important for the private
sector. Therefore, since most investment portfolios contain stocks and bonds, accusations
of misfeasance by financial advisers generally ended up in court.
In 1989 the situation changed due to liberalization of limits on subject matter
arbitrability by the U.S. Supreme Court. 325 In part the attitude shift may have been due to
the SEC playing a more active role in supervising the self-regulatory organizations (such
as the National Association of Securities Dealers), under whose auspices securities
arbitration proceeded. And in part the change in attitude might have been related to the
perceived need to relieve congestion in judicial dockets.
In any event, the result was a wholesale adoption of arbitration by the securities
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One recalls the vignette from the 1942 movie Casablanca, starring Humphrey Bogart
and Ingrid Bergman. The French police captain, played by Claude Rains, closed down
Rick’s Café because he was “shocked” to find gambling going on – all the while being
quite happy to take his winnings.
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See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (securities disputes arbitrable
in a German-American contract at a time when prohibited in a domestic contract).
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See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled in Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (fraud claims under Exchange Act §10b). Ironically,
Wilko has lived on in its dictum which posited “manifest disregard of the law” as an
extra-statutory ground for judicial review.
325

See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989),
concerning Securities Act §12(2) claims.
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industry to a point where many securities law questions are no longer addressed by courts
at all. Much of the law has thus been frozen during the past dozen years, with few
judicial precedents to fertilize legal development.
In Howsam v. Dean Witter 326 the drama played itself out through an investment in
limited partnerships whose performance proved unsatisfactory, causing the investor to
allege broker misrepresentation of the investment’s quality. The brokerage firm then
filed suit in federal court requesting an injunction against the arbitration on the ground
that the original investment advice was more than six years old, and thus barred by the
NASD “eligibility rule” requiring that any claim be brought within six years of the
relevant occurrence. 327 The Supreme Court gave the arbitrators a green light to
determine whether their power to hear the case was affected by time limits contained in
the arbitration rules.
Resolving a split among the circuits over who (judge or arbitrator) decides on
“eligibility” requirements, the U.S. Supreme Court in Howsam held that time limits were
for the arbitrator. An opinion by Breyer paid lip service to the principle that judges
would normally decide gateway jurisdictional matters unless the parties clearly provided
otherwise. However, the Court presumed (rightly or wrongly) the parties’ intent that the
NASD Rules be construed by the arbitrators themselves, who were supposed to possess
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537 U.S. 79 (2002). The unanimous decision was written by Justice Breyer. A
concurrence by Justice Thomas rested solely on the basis that New York law (applicable
to the contract in question) had held that time bars under the NASD Rules are for
arbitrators to decide.
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NASD Code of Arbitration Section 10304 (formerly Rule 15), states that no dispute
“shall be eligible for submission to arbitration …where six (6) years have elapsed from
the occurrence or event giving rise to the … dispute.”
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(according to the Court) special familiarity and expertise in interpreting these rules. 328
b)

Class Actions

A plurality of the Court followed a similar line of reasoning in Green Tree
Financial Corp v. Bazzle, 329 which involved an attempt at class action arbitration of
disputes arising from consumer loans used to purchase mobile homes and finance
residential improvements. 330 Once again, the Supreme Court punted the question to the
arbitrator himself. 331
In violation of South Carolina’s Consumer Protection Code, the lender allegedly
neglected to give borrowers notice about the right to name their own lawyers and
insurance agents. Two groups of borrowers filed separate suits in the South Carolina
state courts seeking class certification of their claims against the lender. The first court
certified the class and compelled class arbitration pursuant to the loan agreement’s
328

The court also noted that § 10324 of the NASD Rules (formerly Rule 35) gave
arbitrators power to “interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions under the
[NASD] Code.” For other cases on time limits, see MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
Exalon Industries, Inc., 138 F. 3d 426 (1st Cir. 1998) (time limits for challenging award
do not apply when existence of an arbitration agreement is challenged). But contra see
MBNA America Bank v. Hart, 710 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 2006); MBNA America Bank v.
Swartz, 2006 WL 1071523 (Del. Ch) (time bar for challenging clause).
329

539 U.S. 444 (2003). The interesting plurality decision split 4-1-3-1. Four Justices
concluded that it was for the arbitrator to decide whether the contracts allowed class
action arbitration. One concurred in the judgment although he would have preferred to
affirm the South Carolina decision that ordered arbitration to proceed as a class action.
Three Justices dissented on the basis that any imposition of class-wide arbitration
contravened the parties’ contract, and one dissented on the ground that the FAA should
not apply in state courts.
330

In federal court, class actions would be permitted under FRCP Rule 23. Several
arbitral institutions (including the American Arbitration Association) have established
rules for class action arbitration patterned on these provisions.
331

Commentary on this case includes Hans Smit, Class Actions and Their Waiver in
Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 199 (2004); Bernard Hanotiau, A New Development
in Complex Multiparty-Multicontract Proceedings: Classwide Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT’L
39 (2004)

130

arbitration clause. The second court initially denied the lender’s motion to compel
arbitration, but was reversed and the case proceeded to arbitration before the same
arbitrator.
After the arbitrator awarded the two classes $10.9 million and $9.2 million
(respectively) plus attorney’s fees, the South Carolina Supreme Court consolidated the
lender’s appeals and ruled that the relevant loan contracts permitted class actions in
arbitration. 332 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the state
court holding was consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act. The plurality opinion by
Justice Breyer announced that the permissibility of class action arbitration was a matter
of contract interpretation for the arbitrator, not the courts. For Justice Breyer and his
plurality, the question was “what kind of arbitration proceeding [had] the parties agreed
to?” If the contract is silent, the question was for the arbitrator, they said. 333 The state
court decision was vacated and remanded for further consideration. 334
It is of course possible that litigants might agree to give an arbitrator broad power
332

The South Carolina Supreme Court had determined that the loan contracts were silent
in respect of class action. By contrast, on the U.S. Supreme Court the dissenting opinion
by Justice Rehnquist found that that the contracts forbid class arbitration, while the
opinion by Justice Breyer delivered for the Court essentially ducked the issue and held
that it was for the arbitrator to determine whether the contract allowed class arbitration.
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With respect to the implications of silence, one is reminded of the playful
comparisons of European legal systems. In Germany, all which is not permitted is
forbidden. In France, all which is not forbidden is permitted. To which some add that in
Italy all which is forbidden is also permitted.
334

A dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy)
argued that any imposition of class-wide arbitration contravened the parties’ contract as a
matter of law. Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the Federal Arbitration Act
should not apply in state courts. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but dissented
from its reasoning. Believing that the state court was correct as a matter of law that class
action arbitration was permitted, Stevens would have affirmed the South Carolina
decision. However, to avoid the absence of any controlling majority (only three out of
nine Justices agreed with Rehnquist) Stevens concurred with Breyer in the judgment.
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to determine whether an arbitration clause includes the possibility of class action, as
suggested by the Breyer opinion in Bazzle. However, such a conclusion is by no means
obvious from the language of the relevant contracts, each of which was accepted by an
individual borrower and provided for an arbitrator to be selected for all disputes arising
from “this contract” – a reference to the singular, not plural. In commercial arbitration,
the normal presumption has always been that parties agree to arbitrate with particular
claimants or respondents, not with the whole world. Prior to Bazzle, the FAA did not
authorize forced joinder of different arbitrations arising out of related claims 335 except as
agreed by the parties 336 or when conducted pursuant to a statute that explicitly so
provides. 337
In passing, one might ask to what extent the result in Bazzle was influence by the
somewhat unusual language in the arbitration clause. Arbitration was to resolve not only
contract-related disputes claims or controversies, but also controversies arising from or
relating to “the relationships that result from this contract.”
In one post-Bazzle case (on appeal as of this writing), a federal district court
335

See Government of U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2nd Cir. 1993) (denying
consolidation of arbitrations with Boeing and Textron, Inc. relating to contract with the
British Ministry of Defense to develop an electronic fuel system).
336

As between the same parties, Article 4(6) of the ICC Rules permits the Court to join
claims until the signing of the Terms of Reference. Thereafter, addition of any new claim
must be authorized by the arbitral tribunal. Compare Article 22(h) of the Arbitration
Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration, permitting the arbitral tribunal to
allow third persons to be joined in an arbitration provided the third person has consented
in writing to joinder.
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For example, Massachusetts Gen. Laws, c. 251, § 2A, calls for consolidation as
provided in the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which in Rule 42 permits joinder
of actions “involving a common question of law or fact.” New England Energy, Inc. v.
Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) has held that a federal court sitting in
Massachusetts may order consolidation of related arbitrations pursuant to state statute
Compare California Code of Civil Procedure, § 1281.3.
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vacated an arbitral award that had interpreted a maritime transport contract to include a
class action stipulation. 338 In finding “manifest disregard of the law” the court stressed
both the maritime nature of the contracts (as to which expert testimony established a clear
presumption against class actions) and the principle of New York law that when contracts
are silent on an issue no agreement has been reached. 339
As to the parties’ intent, the court might well have reached the right result. Given
the long tradition of non-consolidation for international maritime arbitration, something
quite special would be needed to justify a determination that the litigants granted the
arbitrators authority to create a class action process. 340
Even if the court might have been correct on contract interpretation, it is by no
means certain that the arbitrators’ mistake (if it was one) could be characterized as
“manifest disregard” of law. The job of interpreting the parties’ intent falls to the
arbitrators. This task, which implicates mixed questions of fact and law, as well as
evaluation of industry custom and practice, has always been entrusted to the
arbitrators. 341
A new twist was added by a Court of Appeals decision arising from customer
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Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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Id. 387.
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In some instances (not applicable in Animalfeeds) a state statute might provide
otherwise. See New England Energy v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1988), applying Massachusetts law. On the law concerning consolidation before Bazzle,
see United Kingdom v. Boeing, 998 F.2d 68 (1993), discussed supra.
341

Perhaps the court believed the arbitrators to have concluded that Bazzle dictated an
interpretation of the contract which favored class arbitration. While this would indeed be
a misreading of Bazzle, it seems more than unlikely that this particular panel (Gerald
Aksen, Kenneth Feinberg and William Jentes) could have made that mistake. The court
itself seems to have misstated Bazzle, suggesting that the interpretation of the agreement
was for the arbitrator only “in the first instance” rather than as a final matter. Id. At 384.
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disputes with a cable television provider. Kristian v. Comcast Corp. 342 held that a ban on
class actions would invalidate the arbitration agreement, 343 but for the possibility of
severing the class action prohibition. In an action for antitrust violations under both state
and federal law, the Court applied a consumer protection rationale to conclude that the
validity of the ban on arbitrability of the class action should be decided by courts rather
than arbitrators. The Court allowed the arbitration to proceed only after striking down
and severing this prohibition.
7. Consumer Transactions
a)

Legal Framework: Justice Astbury’s Ghost

Unlike most of Europe, the United States provides no statutory scheme of general
application to protect the interests of ill-informed consumers and employees who may be
dispatched by an arbitration clause to seek uncertain remedies at inaccessible locations.
For the past eighty years, a venerable but antiquated federal arbitration statute has
stubbornly resisted distinctions between business and consumer arbitration, and has preempted state law that tried to protect the so-called little guy.
This does not mean, however, that courts cannot reach the same result
(protecting consumer against abusive clauses) through ordinary contract principles. On a
case-by-case basis, doctrines such as “unconscionability”, “excessive cost” and
“mutuality of remedy” have been pressed into service to safeguard the interests of weaker
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2006 Westlaw 1028758 (1st Cir. 2006). See also Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
113 P. 3d 1100 (2005), declaring a class action waiver to be unconscionable and Strand v.
U.S. Bank N.A., 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2005), upholding such waivers.
343

The arbitration clause itself provided (in bold face capitals!) that “there shall be no
right or authority for any claims to be arbitrated on a class action or consolidated basis.”
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parties to adhesion contracts. 344 Indeed, in one Alabama case the court found a loan
agreement’s Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause in itself to indicate unconscionability. 345
To a large extent, this American exceptionalism finds its roots in yet another
national idiosyncrasy: the role of the civil jury in deciding contract claims, often
beginning with a bias in favor of the consumer or employee (the proverbial “little guy”)
against the manufacturers and employers. Concerned about the lack of rationality in jury
verdicts, the business community sees arbitration as a more reasonable alternative to
court litigation. This legal oddity has given to arbitration law in the United States an
evolutionary path distinct from that of most of its trading partners.
Resistance to reform has come largely from arbitration’s institutional
establishment, which (perhaps understandably) perceives itself as providing a bulwark of
adjudicatory evenhandedness. The fear is often expressed that any move toward a more
modern arbitration law might open a Pandora’s Box of upheaval, led by an unholy
alliance of consumer advocates and plaintiffs’ lawyers who see arbitration as a scam to
344

See e.g. Kloss v. Jones (discussed infra); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d
889, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2002) (limitation of damages and unilateral nature of the clause
found unconscionable). See also Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 927-36 (N.D. Cal.
2002). For a view questioning mainline consumer protectionist thought, see Stephen J.
Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements – With Particular
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251 (2006). For a
contrasting view, see Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration
as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 17 (2003). See
generally, Edward Brunet, Richard Speidel, Jean Sternlight & Stephen Ware,
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006), Chapter 5 (Consumer
Arbitration).
345

American General Finance v. Branch, 793 So. 2d 738 (2001). The in question
provided, “Borrower and Lender further agree that all issues and disputes as to the
arbitrability of claims must b of Such authority of the arbitrator to determine its [sic] own
authority may also be resolved by the arbitrator”. Id., 741. Other indicia of
unconscionability included the breadth of the arbitration clause (applicable to every
dispute or controversy) and the lender’s exemption from arbitration in certain cases.
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protect crooked finance companies and abusive bosses. 346
The institutional establishment’s opposition to change brings to mind remarks
attributed to Sir John Astbury, the English judge who declared the 1926 British General
Strike to be illegal. As mobs took to the streets and workers rioted throughout Britain,
some political leaders talked of conciliation and change. To which Astbury reportedly
replied, “Reform? Reform? Are things not bad enough already?” 347
b)

Jurisdiction in Credit and Securities Operations

For better or for worse, the absence of any federal consumer protection regime for
arbitration has engendered reactions at the state level. Two cases merit special attention,
each one relating to a financial transaction in which the arbitration clause played a role in
a scheme to take advantage of a relatively unsophisticated party.
One of the most creative efforts to protect weaker parties came out of Montana,
which in Kloss v. Jones 348 attempted to impose public policy limits on the entirety of an
arbitrator’s jurisdiction. In refusing to compel arbitration against a financial adviser
accused of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, the Montana Supreme Court held the
arbitration clause to be an impermissible attempt to waive basic rights guaranteed by the

346

See e.g., John M. Townsed, The Federal Arbitration Act is Too Important to Amend,
4 INT’L ARB. NEWS 19 (ABA, Summer 2004).

347

Attributed to Mr. Justice Astbury (1860-1939), who sat on the Chancery Bench from
1913 to 1929, and was elevated to the Privy Council in 1929.

348

310 Mont. 123, 54 P.3d 1 (2002), on reh’g 57 P.3d 41, cert. denied, 538 U.S. 956
(2003). For a rather harsh critique of Kloss, see Carroll E. Neesemann, Montana Court
Continues its Hostility to Mandatory Arbitration, ABA DISPUTE RESOLUTION J. 22
(February/April 2003), suggesting that the decision “makes the failure to read a provision
(any provision, not just an arbitration clause) in an adhesion contract a complete defense
to enforceability.” Of course, in fact the Montana decision did not refer to “any
provision” but concerned only waiver of constitutional rights not within the weaker
party’s “reasonable expectation.”

136

Montana constitution.
Kloss bears out the adage that “hard facts can make difficult law” – or at least
problematic rules. After a 95-year-old widow had been persuaded by her investment
adviser to create a trust, the adviser proceeded to fund the trust by selling assets from her
personal brokerage account. When the widow’s nephew learned of the sell-off, he helped
her begin litigation against the adviser for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and deceptive
business practices. The adviser invoked the arbitration clauses contained in the accountopening documents, likely fearing a less than sympathetic hearing before a jury.
The Montana Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause involved a waiver
of rights guaranteed by the Montana Constitution: access to courts and trial by jury. The
arbitration clause, contained in a contract of adhesion, had purported to waive these
“sacred” and “inviolable” rights. 349 This waiver was not within the weaker party’s
“reasonable expectation” and thus was held to be unenforceable.
This avenue of attack is significant. The state court addressed waiver of
constitutional rights in general, rather than saying that an arbitration clause was per se
unconscionable, thus running less risk of conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
While the FAA implements a policy favorable to arbitration, it contains a significant
(albeit unintended) escape hatch by providing that arbitration clauses are enforceable
except “on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 350
Since the United States has no general federal law of contracts, 351 one must look to state

349

Id., Special Concurrence by Nelson, at paragraph 55.

350

9 U.S.C. § 2.

351

Sixty-five years ago in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the U.S. Supreme
Court (attempting to prevent forum shopping between state and federal fora) stated,
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law for the basic common law grounds for contract revocability.
Some states have attempted to push revocability beyond classic common law
defenses such as fraud and duress, and occasionally impose special grounds for
revocability of arbitration clauses, usually within the context of consumer or employee
protection legislation. Such legislation has been held invalid, however, to the extent the
state targets arbitration for special burdens that would defeat the policy of the FAA. 352
In other words, a state might say that all contracts must be in capital letters, but could not
say that only arbitration clauses must be in capital letters. 353
Here we return to our nonagenarian widow in Montana. When the court in Kloss
v. Jones struck down the arbitration clause, it did not single out arbitration itself for
attack. Rather the court applied principles of law “generally applicable to all contracts”
in order to protect citizens against waiver of constitutional rights. Arguably, therefore,
the refusal to enforce the arbitration clause did not run afoul of federal arbitration policy.
Kloss serves as a reminder that an arbitrator’s power to address jurisdictional matters will
be limited by public policy, which can always circumscribe the type of disputes that may
be sent to arbitration.
“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the state.” Id. at 78.
352

For example, at one point Montana passed a law stating that an arbitration clause was
revocable unless in capital letters and underlined. See Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681 (1996). Massachusetts also attempted (unsuccessfullly) a similar restriction
on securities arbitration. See Securities Industry Assoc. v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st
Cir. 1989). For other attempts to rationalize the role of state arbitration law, see
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman, 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Allied-Bruce v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265 (1995); Volt v. Stanford, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).

353

The U.S. Congress, however, can and has passed legislation limiting arbitration on
behalf of special interst groups. See Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Act, § 11028, Pub.
L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (enacted as 15 U.S.C. § 1226), sometimes known as the
Bono Bill in recognition of its original sponsor the late Sonny Bono.
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A much less digestible decision recently came out of Kansas. Although the state
Supreme Court had its heart in the right place (if courts have hearts anywhere), the
reasoning remains highly problematic as a guide for the adjudication of future cases.
In MBNA America Bank v. Credit, 354 the Court vacated an arbitration award used
to collect on a credit card debt of one Ms. Loretta K. Credit. The Bank had been unable
to produce an arbitration agreement, and reason existed to suspect that the arbitration
service provider might have been showing a systematic sympathy to financial institutions
inconsistent with the impartiality one expects of arbitral institutions.
To reach its decision, the Court need only have noted that the bank had provided
no evidence of an agreement to arbitrate. Unfortunately, however, the court added
dictum stating, “When the existence of the [arbitration] agreement is challenged, the issue
must be settled by a court before the arbitrator may proceed.” The assertion has no
foundation in logic, policy or law. 355
While it would have been outrageous for the bank to have the award confirmed
without producing the arbitration clause, a court can always address this matter at the
award enforcement stage. Or, the question could be raised earlier, in the context of a
motion to compel arbitration (by the bank) or to stay court proceedings (by the borrower).
However, to require an arbitration to stop merely because arbitral jurisdiction has been
challenged departs from the very fundamentals of sound arbitration law and practice.

354

281 Kan. 655 (2006), 132 P.3d 898 (2006). To avoid reader confusion, it should be
mentioned that “Credit” was the name of the individual borrower. See generally
Christopher Drahozal, Jurisdiction of Arbitrators to Decide Their Own Jurisdiction, 17
WORLD ARBITRATION & MEDIATION REPORT 296 (September 2006).

355

Had the court purported to apply a Kansas statute, the matter might have been less
serious. The Federal Arbitration Act, however, provided the applicable procedural law.
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8. The Next Step
Where these cases leave us for the future is not entirely certain. The decisions in
Howsam and Bazzle (like the decision in Pacificare discussed earlier) are plausible.
However, the presumptions about the parties’ intent may not be self-evident. If a case is
not eligible for arbitration later than six years following the broker’s misbehavior, can
one even speak of an “arbitrator” for an arbitration begun in the seventh year? If a
contract prohibits arbitrators from awarding the two-thirds part of treble damages that
most people consider punitive, can arbitrators give themselves this power merely by
saying that these damages are really compensatory? If an agreement to arbitrate is
intended to provide bilateral dispute resolution, can an arbitrator turn the proceedings into
a multilateral process? Do the cases presume their own conclusions and imply that
arbitrators can create authority simply by defining contract terms that accord with the
desired scope of arbitral power?
The heart of the jurisdictional dilemma is that language, while often ambiguous, is
not infinitely plastic. Some contract terms with a jurisdictional significance may well fall
within the spectrum of matters the parties intended the arbitrator to interpret. Others,
however, do not. Much depends on the precise context of the jurisdictional issues, which
are increasingly (and unfortunately) called “arbitrability questions” in many decisions. 356
356

American courts often use “arbitrability” interchangeably with “jurisdiction.” This is
regrettable, since it blurs useful distinctions between an arbitrator who may not hear a
case because of the parties’ drafting choice, and an arbitrator lacking power because nonwaivable legal norms prohibit him to consider the disputed subject matter. It is true that
when arbitrators lack jurisdiction, a dispute is not arbitrable. However, the term would be
better reserved to instances where the subject matter of a dispute has been declared off
limits by the relevant legal system. In this sense, antitrust and securities disputes were
traditionally non-arbitrable in the United States, and employment and consumer
controversies remain non-arbitrable in many parts of Europe, at least under pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.
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To illustrate, the Second Circuit has held that an ICC arbitrator may address
claims for costs incurred in a court action allegedly brought in breach of an arbitration
clause. 357 This is hardly remarkable. In reaching the conclusion that the parties
bargained to arbitrate “questions of arbitrability,” 358 the Court simply noted that the
parties had signed a broad arbitration clause, which would be given effect under the ICC
Rules. 359
Let us change the facts a bit, however, and return to our earlier scenario about the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal by an improper appointing authority. Imagine that a
contract provides for arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association,
but the claimant files its request for arbitration with the International Chamber of
Commerce, which it perceives as likely to appoint an arbitrator predisposed to claimant’s
case. It is difficult to see how an ICC arbitrator could render a final and binding award,
absent modification of the parties’ agreement. 360
Or, to invoke another example, let us envisage two merchants who agree to
arbitrate disputes arising out of the sale of fruit. The arbitrators might rule on whether
“fruit” was used in the botanical sense (the contents of any developed seed plant ovary)

357

Shaw Group v. Triplefine International Corp, 322 F. 3d 115 (2d Cir. 2003); Stone &
Webster v. Triplefine International Corp., 118 Fed.Appx. 546 (2d Cir. 2004). The
arbitration clause at issue covered disputes “concerning or arising out of [the parties’]
Agreement.”
358

Id. At 125.

359

In light of the Court’s citation to Article 6(2) of the ICC Rules, there may have been
some confusion in the court about the difference between the ICC Court and the
arbitrators themselves. The former has power only to make a preliminary (prima facie)
determinations of jurisdiction, while the in-depth decisions are reserved for the arbitrator.

360

The hypothetical is presented only by way of illustration, the author being well aware
that the ICC’s excellent personnel and efficient internal controls would make such an
attempt at fraud highly unlikely.
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to include pecans as well as apples. 361 However, it is not at all evident that a court, when
asked to enforce an award or compel arbitration, should accept an arbitrator's
determination that “fruit” includes typewriters.
The matter would not be so serious if the arbitrators’ jurisdictional decision was
only preliminary, subject to a clearly understood right of post-award judicial review.
Unfortunately, the recent Supreme Court decisions on arbitration do not make clear (at
least to this author) that a second look by the judiciary is in all events guaranteed.
Much of the work in allocating tasks between courts and arbitrators will turn on
characterization of the analytic task. One formulation might ask, “May persons who call
themselves arbitrators determine their jurisdiction free from judicial review?” An
affirmative answer would be conceptually problematic, implying that a piece of paper
labeled “award” could be enforced without regard to the legitimate mission of the alleged
arbitrator.
An alternate phraseology could pose the jurisdictional question differently: “By
agreeing to arbitrate, did the parties intend to waive their right to have courts determine a
particular jurisdictional precondition to arbitration (such as time bars) or a particular
substantive question (such as liability for costs of litigation begun in breach of the
361

In this connection, one remembers a late 19th century customs case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court held that in common parlance tomatoes were vegetables rather than fruit,
and thus not free of import duty under a free list for “fruits,” but taxed at 10 % ad
valorem under a tariff on “vegetables.” See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893). Justice
Gray noted that “botanically speaking tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are
cucumbers, squashes, beans and peas.” However, in a breathtaking culinary excursion
that makes one hungry just to read it, he continued that “in the common language of the
people, whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables which are
grown in kitchen gardens and which, whether eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes,
carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery and lettuce, usually served at
dinner in, with or after the soup, fish, or meats which constitute the principal part of the
repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert.” Id.
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arbitration agreement)?” Answering the latter question would require a factual inquiry
into the parties’ true intent. In some instances the consent may reveal itself only through
an explicit agreement. In other circumstances, presumptions and inferences might
suffice. On this matter, considerable analytical toil remains.
Conclusion: Costs and Benefits
The principle known as Kompetenz-Kompetenz addresses a very narrow issue,
albeit one of critical importance. The question is not whether the arbitrator possesses
authority to decide the merits of a particular matter, but who (judge or arbitrator) gets to
answer that preliminary question.
Most legal systems seem to accept that arbitrators may rule on their own
jurisdiction and continue the proceedings, provided no court of competent jurisdiction
tells them to stop. Far less consensus exists on the effect that an arbitrator’s jurisdictional
ruling will have in court, when judges can be asked to vacate an award, to enjoin an
arbitral proceeding or to hear a case notwithstanding an allegedly valid arbitration clause.
For example, judges might be asked to vacate an award, or to declare an arbitration
clause invalid before proceedings begin.
The various ways that different countries address the matter contain their own
relative costs and benefits. In all events, two issues lie in most challenges to an
arbitrator’s jurisdiction: (i) the timing of judicial intervention to address questions related
to arbitral jurisdiction; and (ii) the effect of any jurisdictional rulings that arbitrators
might make.
The first inquiry concerns the moment for the judicial consideration of
jurisdictional questions. Some point (or points) must be fixed in the arbitral process for
courts to entertain motions concerning arbitral authority, with a view to preventing or to
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correcting an excess of jurisdiction. The second question relates to whether courts should
ever defer, and if so in what circumstances, to arbitral determinations related to matters
and parties subjected to arbitration. The analysis is one of contract, with a focus on the
basics of party intent.
On the matter of timing, there is much to commend the French rule, which leaves
most judicial intervention until after the award, when the arbitrator’s decision is known.
The “delayed review” principle limits opportunities for dilatory measures that might
derail or sabotage an arbitration. Moreover, postponing jurisdictional motions may
preserve judicial resources. Judges need not get involved if the case is settled or decided
in a way acceptable to both sides. If the case does not settle, judges may receive the
benefit of an arbitrator’s discussion and findings on the jurisdictional questions,
particularly for international cases where reasoned awards remain the norm.
The French rule has its cost, however. A person who never agreed to arbitrate
may need to hedge bets by taking part in a bogus arbitration, at substantial cost of time
and money. Herein lies the proverbial fly in the Gallic ointment: innocent respondents
must wait until the end of proceedings to challenge even the most obvious jurisdictional
defects.
While frivolous attacks on arbitral authority are sometimes used as a delaying
tactic, unwarranted arbitrations also pose their own risk. Believing its chances better in
arbitration than in court, a claimant playing hard ball might bring an arbitral proceeding
with weak jurisdictional foundation, hoping for an easy win that will exert undue
settlement pressure.
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Out of fairness, a rapid and summary mechanism should exist to permit courts to
halt proceedings when the arbitration clause is manifestly void or clearly against public
policy. 362 Without some evidence of a valid arbitration agreement, the respondent’s
burden of costly hearings (a possible default award being the only alternative) usually
outweighs any societal benefit from reducing dilatory tactics in other cases. An
arbitration would go forward only if a court has been prima facie satisfied of the validity
and application of the arbitration clause (no forgery or gun at the head during signing),
subject to more extensive review at the award stage. 363
Such a process could be combined with greater use of court-imposed sanctions
(monetary penalties) to discourage frivolous jurisdictional challenges, an option
increasingly considered by American judges frustrated with groundless motions to vacate
awards. 364 No good reason exists why, as a matter of policy, similar measure should not
be available to moderate improper motions to compel litigation or to stay arbitration.
362

The suggestion here is for something equivalent to the summary process (examen
sommaire / summarische Prüfung) of a Swiss court when asked to appoint an arbitrator.
See LDIP, Article 179(3).

363

For a somewhat contrasting view, see Pierre Mayer, L'Autonomie de l'arbitre dans
l'appréciation de sa propre compétence, 217 RECUEIL DES COURS 320 (Académie de droit
international de La Haye 1989), at 346, suggesting that courts seized of a case prior to
commencement of arbitration should address jurisdiction fully, not limiting the review to
determining if the clause is “manifestly” void. Id., para. 15. (On se demandera s’il est
très logique pour le droit français d’obliger le juge étatique, saisi d’une demande au fond
par une partie au mépris d’une convention d’arbitrage, à se déclarer incompétent sans
pouvoir constater, sauf si elle est ‘manifeste’, la nullité de la convention.) Professor
Mayer takes a different view when the arbitration has already begun, expressing concern
that the greater risk remains dilatory actions (Id., at 347, para. 17).
364

Dominion Video v. Echo Star Satellite, 430 F. 3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2005) (sanctions
imposed on party bringing baseless challenge to award confirmation); Harbert
International v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006) (motion to vacate for
“manifest disregard of the law” led to stern warning that the court was “ready, willing and
able” to impose sanctions on parties who “attempt to salvage arbitration losses through
litigation that has no sound basis in the law applicable to arbitration awards.”); CUNA
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Addressing the second matter (judicial deference to arbitrators’ rulings on their
own authority) calls for considerable nuance and balance. In considering what to do with
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clauses, legal system must navigate between two extremes. One
is a lack of judicial rigor in examining the validity of such agreements. The other is a
blanket over-inclusive rejection of all such clauses, no matter how clearly the evidence
might support their validity in a given factual context.
Alleged grants of jurisdictional power to arbitrators must be considered with
caution. A danger always exists that judges lacking analytic rigor will be tempted to
clear their dockets through sloppy interpretation of the parties’ intent, thereby denying
one side its day in court. Arbitrators should never be given jurisdiction on the basis of a
mere contract recital (such as “the arbitrator has jurisdiction over all questions”) without
verifying the true consent of the party sought to be bound. Even the best of rules may be
misunderstood. Recitation of a “pro-arbitration” mantra often leads to cloudy thinking.
Such potential misapplication must be considered in balancing the costs and the benefits
of any legal rule.
That being said, the concern that contracts will be misinterpreted need not lead to
a public policy that bans all forms of jurisdictional clauses in arbitration. Legitimate
bargains should not be trumped by fears of occasional abuse. From a commercial
perspective, business managers may wish to reduce the prospect of judicial intervention
(particularly for international transactions) by giving an arbitral tribunal the final say on a

Mutual Insurance Society v. Office & Professional Employees Int’l Union, 443 F.3d 556
(7th Cir. 2006) (warning that courts will not permit “spinning out the arbitral process
unconscionably through the filing of meritless suits and appeals.”)
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jurisdictional issue. Respecting such agreements furthers fundamental respect for the
parties’ legitimate expectations.
While not entirely free from doubt, the American cases are probably getting
things more right than wrong. While exceptions exist, judges in the United States seem
to be asking the correct question: what did the litigants actually agree to arbitrate? On
public policy issues, of course, arbitrators can never be empowered to make binding
determinations.
Judicial review will in all events involve examination of the validity of the initial
agreement, allegedly granting the arbitrators power on questions related to their authority.
Such agreements will be most plausible when related to jurisdictional matters such as the
time limits, scope of procedural powers and range of issues submitted to arbitration.
When one side challenges the very existence of an arbitration clause, the
arbitrators’ authority does not always yield to routine presumptions. Many cases present
their own peculiar facts and issues. Was the arbitration clause forged or signed with a
gun at the head? Did the corporate officer who executed the contract have power to
commit the company? With respect to such questions, arbitrators can make binding
rulings only if the supervisory court has been satisfied of the parties’ informed and
explicit consent (normally in the form of a distinct second agreement) to submit the
precise jurisdictional question to arbitrator.
In all these lines of inquiry, legal maxims and phrases on arbitral jurisdiction can
facilitate analysis by communicating general norms quickly. The expressions lose their
value, however, if pressed into service with excessive formalism, or pursuant to the type
of thoughtless mimicry that parrots perform. When lawyers invoke contract recitals
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divorced from context, much as wizards incant magic words, the result is a voodoo
jurisprudence that has no place in a healthy legal framework for arbitration.
As in most areas of the law, the articulation of specific standards that work in
practice will require thoughtful analysis by policy-makers and practitioners alike. The
goal of such efforts remains an arbitral system that gives effect to the parties’ legitimate
expectations about what questions are subject to final and binding private adjudication.
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Appendix: Jurisdiction in Practice: Selected Scenarios
1. A claim against a “non-signatory” company 365 might be brought on the basis of an
arbitration clause signed by a corporate affiliate, either offensively (to reach assets of the
corporate parent) or defensively (to permit a parent corporation to avoid jury trial), on
theories such as agency (express or implied), alter ego, or piercing the corporate veil. 366

365

The term “non-signatories” remains useful shorthand to describe persons whose
relationship to the arbitration is unclear at first blush. The term can be misleading,
however, in its implication that a duty to arbitrate must derive from signed documents.
Better taxonomy might classify such cases as involving “un-mentioned” parties.
Unsigned arbitration agreements can be valid, inter alia under New York Convention
Article II (exchanges of letters ), as well as agreements subject to the procedural law of
countries that dispense with a signature requirement, including England (Arbitration Act
of 1996 § 5) and the United States (FAA § 2, which refers only to a “written provision”).
See generally, James M. Hosking, Non-Signatories and International Arbitration in the
United States: The Quest for Consent, 20 ARB. INT’L 289(2004).
366

For theories used to bind “non-signatories” see Thomson-CSF v. American Arbitration
Association, 64 F. 3d 773 (2d Cir. 1993). See also Intergen v. Grina, 344 F. 3d 134 (1st
Cir. 2003), in which Judge Selya noted the “abecedarian tenet that a party cannot be
forced to arbitrate if it has not agreed to do so.” Unlike many other cases involving
corporate affiliates (where either claimant or respondent will have agreed to arbitrate),
Intergen involved litigation between two parent entities, neither of which had signed an
arbitration clause. Compare Bridas v. Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2006),
finding that government manipulation of an oil company made it the state’s alter ego. By
contrast, in Sarhank v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005) the Court of Appeals
decided that a parent should not answer for the obligations of its subsidiary pursuant to an
arbitration clause signed by the latter. Citing “customary expectations of experienced
business persons” the Court vacated a decision recognizing the Egyptian award and
remanded the case for a finding on whether, as a matter of fact, the parent’s actions or
inactions had given the subsidiary apparent or actual authority to consent to arbitration on
its behalf. For reasons not fully explained, the Court assumed such determination would
be made under “American contract law or the law of agency.” Similarly, an English court
rejected piercing the corporate veil in Republic of Kazakhstan v. Istil Group, 2006 WL
1020597 (2006), [2006] EWHC 448 (Comm.) QBD, applying the 1996 Arbitration Act, §
67, to vacate an award against Kazakhstan for lack of substantive jurisdiction. For a
related problem involving the overlap between the Russian Federation and the Russian
Government, see Compagnie Noga v. Russian Federation, 361 F. 3d 676 (2d Cir. 2004).
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2. Assertions of arbitral jurisdiction might invoke principles of estoppel. 367
3. A duty to arbitrate might be based on trade usage, absent an explicit agreement, 368
4. Corporate affiliates might be joined to an arbitration under what has been called
“group of companies” doctrine. 369
5. An award might be rendered by an arbitral tribunal whose appointment contained
irregularities. 370
6. An employer might assert the right to arbitrate on the basis of an “exchange” of
letters, contested by the employee. 371
367

JML Industries v. Stolt-Nielsen, 387 F. 3d 263 (2d Cir. 2004). Charterers brought
anti-trust action against owners of “parcel tankers” used in chemical transport. Owners
permitted to invoke so-called “ASBATANKVOY” arbitration clause (used in
affreightment of liquefied products) contained in charter contracts signed by owners'
subsidiaries, given intertwining of issues to be resolved in arbitration and issues in
agreements containing arbitration clause; Fluor Daniel Intercontinental v. General
Electric Co., 1999 WL 637236 (SDNY, 20 August 1999), invoking estoppel principles to
hold that signatories of arbitration clauses were estopped from refusing to arbitrate with
GE entities that sought to arbitrate issues intertwined with the contracts containing the
arbitration clause;. In Re Vesta Insurance Group, Supreme Court of Texas No. 04-0141
(17 March 2006) (dispute between insurance company and its agent; arbitration of
tortious interference claims between signatory to arbitration agreement and affiliates of
another signatory).
368

See BGH, Urt. V. 3.12.1992, III ZR 30/91, discussed in 1993 DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 465 (commentary, Klaus Peter Berger) where the
Bundesgerichtshof said that a duty to arbitrate might be implied through custom in the
sheepskin trade.
369

See Isover St. Gobain v. Dow Chemical France et al., ICC Case 4131 (1982), ICC
COLLECTION OF ARBITRAL AWARDS, Volume I: 1974-85 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains,
eds., 1990), upheld by the Paris Cour d’appel, 21 October 1983, 1984 REV. ARB. 98;
English language extracts in 9 ICCA YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 132 (1984).
English law has rejected the “group of companies” doctrine, and requires evidence of
agency before joinder of related companies. See Peterson Farms Inc. v. C&M Farming
Ltd., [2004] EWHC 121, [2004], 1 Lloyd’s Rep 603, 2004 WL 229138 (4 February 2004,
Q.B. Div., Commercial Court).
370

See Enclyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2003 WL 22881820
(SDNY, December 2003). The tribunal’s presiding arbitrator had been appointed by the
Tribunal de commerce in Luxembourg, as provided in the arbitration clause. However,
this Luxembourg appointment was not preceded by an attempt to select a chairman by the
party-nominated arbitrators, which was another requirement of the parties’ agreement.

371

See Dynamo v. Ovechkin, 412 F. Supp 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2006), involving hockey
prodigy Alexander Ovechkin who had played with the Dynamo Club in Moscow before
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7. After an insurance company and its policyholder settle a dispute that had been subject
to arbitration, they disagree on implementation of the settlement agreement. Whether
the arbitrator has power to decide the subsequent quarrel will depend on the terms of
the settlement’s dispute resolution clause. 372
8. If a dispute among law partners is submitted to arbitration, does the arbitrator have
authority to declare forfeiture of the withdrawing partner’s capital interest? 373
9. Does an arbitrator might lack jurisdiction because the matter has already been decided
by another arbitral tribunal? 374 When an arbitration clause gives rise to multiple
arbitrations, will principles of res judicata and issue preclusion bar later arbitrators
from deciding particular questions? 375
signing with the Washington Capitals to play in the National Hockey League. In the
United States, the federal district court refused to recognize an award by the Arbitration
Committee of the Russian Ice Hockey Federation that prohibited Ovechkin him for
playing for the American team. No arbitration agreement resulted from the Russian
Club’s offer that failed to elicit any “matching letter” from the player.
372

For example, arbitrators with power to decide controversies arising from one specific
transaction would not necessarily have authority to decide disputes arising from a prior or
subsequent commercial relationship between the same parties.

373

See decision by Judge Mosk in O’Flaherty v. Belgum, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 286 (2004), holding that an arbitrator exceeded his authority (as granted in the
partnership agreement) by declaring forfeitue of a withdrawing partner’s capital account.

374

Determinations about res judicata and issue preclusion (what the French might call
force de chose jugée and opposabilité and the Germans Rechtskraft) do not yield to facile
analysis. In the real world, difficult factual nuances often arise with respect to (i) identity
of parties and (ii) identity of action, both prerequisites to preclusion. On the one hand, a
losing party should not be permitted to begin another arbitration in the hope of getting a
better result. On the other hand, due process requires that one company should not be
denied an opportunity to vindicate a claim simply because similar issues were litigated by
another entity. Particularly difficult issues arise when the same arbitration clause gives
rise to multiple proceedings, or when in the middle of an arbitration one party sells a
business unit that might later find itself seeking to assert related claims.

375

For an example of multiple arbitrations arising from a single clause, see Admart AG v.
Stephen & Mary Birch Foundation, 457 F. 3d 302 (3d Cir. 2006). A court in the United
States was asked to enforce an award rendered ten years earlier in a matter where a
second arbitral tribunal was deciding questions related to the same parties and the same
dispute, left open by the prior award. In the initial arbitration, the buyer of an open air art
exhibition was denied the right to rescind the purchase. The second tribunal was asked to
ascertain alleged damage to the purchased art works, which damage would have reduced
the price ultimately borne by the buyer. Determining damage, however, implicated an
examination of the art work which the first award had purported to preclude, at least as a
precondition to payment of the price.
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10. A breach of contract action asserts recovery of punitive damages. The arbitrator’s
power to include a non-compensatory element in the award could depend on the
terms of the parties’ agreement, 376 the applicable law 377 or a combination of both as
seen through the lens of the applicable institutional arbitration rules. 378 The same
might be said of claims for compound interest or for an award denominated in a
currency other than the one of the controverted transaction. 379
11. If a court in Country X has already begun to hear a matter when an arbitration begins
in Country Y, does the arbitral tribunal have the authority proceed? Or do notions of
lis pendens require the work to be suspended. 380
12. Is an arbitrator deprived of authority because the stronger party, in order to maximize
its litigation options,381 has imposed an arbitration clause that binds one side only to
arbitrate? 382 What role does “mutuality of remedy” play in arbitral jurisdiction? 383

376

See Pacificare Health Systems v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2002).

377

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995), interpreting the New
York state rule in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354 (1976).

378

The AAA International Arbitration Rules exclude punitive damages unless the
applicable statutes “requires” that the compensatory damages be increased in a specified
manner. Arguably, adoption of the AAA International Rules might be deemed a waiver of
the right to request punitive damages in jurisdictions that permit parties to enter into such
exclusions. See e.g., Drywall Systems v. ZVI Construction , 435 Mass 664 (2002)
(relating to the consumer protection provisions of M.G.L. Ch. 93A § 11), in which the
court stated that “[p]arties who prefer to exclude multiple damage claims … from
arbitration may do so by the terms of their agreement to arbitrate, or they may elect to
waive them entirely.” Id. At 671, n. 5. In the instant case (a domestic construction
dispute) no such waiver was found.
379

Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impreglio SpA [2005] UKHL 43 (30
June 2005).

380

See Fomento de Construcciones y Contrats S.A. v. Colon Container Terminal S.A.,
Swiss Tribunal fédéral, 14 mai 2001 ( Ie Cour Civile), BGE 127 III 279/ATF 127 III 279;
discussed supra.
381

From the perspective of litigation strategy, an institution would normally want to
reserve an option either to elect arbitration or to go to court. A unilateral right permits
significant flexibility with respect to hard-to-forecast elements such as whether extensive
document discovery (available in court to a greater extent than in arbitration) will be
beneficial in a particular dispute.

382

See Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F. 3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002) (arbitration clause
“unconscionable” for “unilaterally” forcing employee to arbitrate). By contrast, when
employees and consumers (rather than employers and manufacturers) benefit from a right
to opt-out of arbitration (through signing a form within thirty days of being hired),
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13. If arbitrators are asked to consolidate arbitration of claims arising from separate
contracts or transactions, the power to do so may depend on what the parties’
agreement or the applicable arbitration rules say on the matter. 384 A similar question
may arise prior to the commencement of the proceedings, with courts asked to make a
declaratory pronouncement about whether the arbitrators will have authority to
consider the matter at all. 385 Sometimes arbitration rules will address the matter, at
least in part, 386 but in most cases remain silent on the matter. 387
14. May an arbitrator award attorneys’ fees? Does the answer depend on the applicable

arbitration obligations have been upheld. See Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F. 3d 1198 (9th
Cir. 2002); Circuit City v. Najd, 294 F. 3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002).
383

Some courts invoke the principle of “mutuality” (of remedy or of obligation) to
invalidate arbitration agreements. The theory is that if both parties are not bund, then
neither is bound. See Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (employer
retained right to go to court). Other courts have enforced optional clauses. See Pittalis v.
Sherafettin [1986] 1 QB 868, [1986] (landlord/tenant rent review); Law Debenture Trust
Corp. v. Elektrim, [2005] 1 All E.R. 476; 2005 WL 1630790; Sablosky v. Gordon, 73
N.Y.2d 133, 138-39 (N.Y. 1989). American financial institutions have used unilateral
clauses to enhance litigation flexibility and reduce the prospect of what they perceive as
biased jury proceedings. See generally Willliam W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and
Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 213, 251–253 (1998); William W. Park,
Jurisdictional Issues in Financial Arbitration, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR OTTO SANDROCK ZUM
70. GEBURTSTAG 745 (Klaus Peter Berger, ed. 2000).
384

See Shaw's Supermarkets v. United Food, 321 F. 3d 251 (1st Cir. 2003), a union
grievance arbitration (concerning whether union members should take leaves of absence
when on a negotiation committee) in which arbitrators were given the right to consolidate
three collective bargaining arbitrations brought by the same union.

385

See Employers Insurance Company of Wausau v. Century Indemnity Company, 2006
WL 851643 (7th Cir. 2006). Allstate Insurance and Employers Insurance had entered into
reinsurance contracts with Century Indemnity, which requested a consolidated arbitration
of its claims against Employers and Allstate, as well as several other companies.
Although holding that the question of consolidation was for the arbitrators, the Court of
Appeals also determined that each side would appoint only one arbitrator, thus giving a
substantial practical nudge to consolidation. Had the Court ordered constitution of two or
more tribunals, it would not have been self-evident which would have ceded its work to
the other.
386

See LCIA Rules 22.1(h).

387

There may, of course, be institutional practices (ICC practice) or rules with respect to
judicial consolidation. See New England Energy v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1988) (allowing consolidation under Massachusetts law). Compare United
Kingdom v. Boeing, 998 F. 2d 68 (2nd Cir. 1993) (consolidation denied).
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law, the norms of the arbitral situs, arbitration rules, or some combination thereof? 388
15. Related to consolidation, arbitrators in the United States sometimes face the question
of whether they are authorized to direct “class action” proceedings for similar claims
arising that would normally yield individual recoveries too small to make arbitration
economically viable. 389
16. Arbitration under investment treaties might raise the following jurisdictional
issues. 390
• A foreign investor might bring an arbitration claiming indirect expropriation by a
country whose courts allegedly denied the investor a fair trial. In order for the
arbitrators to hear the case, the alleged judicial misbehavior will need to fit within the
definition of governmental “measures” covered by the relevant investment treaty. 391

388

See e.g., CIT Project Finance v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 799 NYS2d 159, 2004 WL
2941331 (2004), discussed supra, holding arbitrators without power to grant attorneys’
fees notwithstanding application of Article 31 of the AAA International Rules, which
provides for “the reasonable costs for legal representation of a successful party”. See
also PaineWebber v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996); Shaw Group v. Triplefine Int’l
Corp., 322 F.3d 115 (2nd Cir. 2003); Stone & Webster v. Triplefine International Corp.,
118 Fed.Appx. 546 (2d Cir. 2004). For another aspect of the problem of attorneys’ fees in
arbitration, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee
Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729 (2006)

389

See Green Tree Financial v. Bazzle 539 U.S. 444 (2003) discussed supra. A recent
Court of Appeals decision held that a ban on class actions would invalidate the arbitration
agreement but for the possibility of severing the class action prohibition. See Kristian v.
Comcast Corp, 2006 Westlaw 1028758 (1st Cir. 2006), an action for antitrust violations
under both state and federal law arising from customers’ dispute with a cable television
provider. Under what might best be called a public policy (consumer protection)
analysis, the decision concluded that the validity of the ban on arbitrability of the class
actions should be decided by courts rather than arbitrators. The Court struck down and
severed the ban, and only then permitted arbitration to proceed. See also Discover Bank
v. Superior Court, 113 P. 3d 1100 (2005), declaring a class action waiver to be
unconscionable and Strand v. U.S. Bank N.A., 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2005), upholding
such waivers.
390

See generally, Pierre Lalive, Some Objections to Jurisdiction in Investor-State
Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY
QUESTIONS 376 (2002 ICCA Congress, London). Professor Lalive lists a half dozen
categories for jurisdictional challenge in investor-state arbitration: nationality, the nature
of an “investment”, assignment, absence of prior “friendly negotiations”, non-exhaustion
of local remedies, and a fork in the road between a local and international forum.
391

Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Interim Award on
Jurisdiction, 5 January 2001.
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• A host state might bring a counterclaim against the foreign investor or a company
related to the investor. Would the arbitral tribunal constituted to hear the claim have
authority to hear the counterclaim as well? 392
• There might be an issue related to the nationality of the claimant. Does the
arbitral tribunal have jurisdiction to hear the claim when an investor possesses dual
nationality, including citizenship in the host state? 393 What is the arbitrator’s power
when the surviving entity in an investor’s reorganization is incorporated in the host
state? 394
• A host state might assert that the treaty’s definition of “investment” excludes
certain categories of property (contract rights to build a factory), or requires that the
original investor continue to hold shares of a company whose property was
expropriated (rather than sell in order to mitigate damages). Or there may be a
question of whether the arbitrator’s jurisdiction covers disputes in which the state acts
as a contracting party. 395
•

A host state might assert that the treaty’s jurisdiction does not cover tax claims. 396

392

Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction (UNCITRAL
Rules, Netherlands-Czech BIT, 7 May 2004), rejecting jurisdiction over counterclaim
without deciding on the relationship between claimant Saluka and another company of
the Japanese merchant banking group (Nomura) with which it was affiliated.
393

Decision on Jurisdiction in the case of Champion Trading Company, Ameritrade
International Inc., James T. Wahba, John B. Wahba, Timothy T. Wahba v. Arab Republic
of Egypt, Case No. ICSID ARB/02/9 (21 October 2003). On nationality in investment
arbitration, see generally, Robert Wisner and Nick Gallus, Nationality Requirements in
Investor-State Arbitration, 5(6) J. WORLD INVESTMENT AND TRADE 927 (2004); Anthony
Sinclair, Nationality of Individual Investors in ICSID Arbitration, [2004] INT. A.L.R. 191.
See also decision in Wena Hotels v. Egypt, Award (2000) reproduced 41 I.L.M. 896
(2002); Annulment Decision reproduced 41 I.L.M. 93 (2002). In Sedelmayer v. Russia, a
tribunal constituted under the German-Russian BIT addressed the question of whether the
corporate veil should be pierced when investor and owner had different nationalities.
394

The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/98/3, Final Award 26 June 2003.

395

Sophie Lemaire, Treaty Claims et Contract Claims: La Compétene du CIRDI à
l’épreuve de la dualité de l’état, 2006 REV. ARB. 353 (2006).
396

See e.g., Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Production Co. [ 2006] EWHC 345
(English High Court), 2006 Westlaw 690585; UNCITRAL arbitration (LCIA
Administered Case No. UN 3467), 1 July 2004 (Value Added Tax payments subject of
investment dispute; taxpayer prevailed in arbitration). For a case in which the taxpayer
did not prevail see EnCana v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arbitration (Final Award, 3 February
2006; dissenting opinion by Horacio Grigera Naón).
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17. An arbitral tribunal is asked to decide a dispute between a consumer and a
manufacturer in different countries. Two different arbitration statutes may be
applicable. One expressly prohibits arbitration of consumer disputes. The other
impliedly allows arbitration of cross-border contracts regardless of any consumer
element. The arbitrators’ power to hear the case will depend on which regime
applies. 397
18. Do arbitrators have authority to decide a dispute on the basis of on the basis of an
arbitration clause contained in Terms and Conditions of Sale appearing through a
hyperlink on a manufacturers’ website shopping page? 398
19. Will a buyer of goods be bound to arbitrate on basis of an arbitration clause in a
contract between a manufacturer and a distributor. 399
20. The parties to a contract provide for arbitration in a particular city, but under nonexistent rules and without any identifiable appointing authority. To what extent may
an arbitral institution in the chosen local confer upon itself power to constitute a
tribunal. 400
21. Does an arbitrator lack jurisdiction because the arbitration clause lacks

397

French Cour de cassation, May 21, 1997, Meglio v. Société V2000. Cass, 1e civ., May
21, 1997, 1997 REV. ARB. 537 (note Gaillard); see also Cass, 1e civ., May 21, 1997, 1998
REV. CRIT. DR. INT’L PRIVÉ 87 (note Heuzé). The Cour de cassation upheld the validity of
an arbitration clause in an agreement for the purchase of a limited series Jaguar, finding
that the contract implicated international commerce by virtue of a transfer of goods and
funds between France and the United Kingdom.
398

See Dell Computer Corp v. Union des Consommateurs & Olivier Dumoulin, Appeal
to Supreme Court of Canada, S.C.C. File 31067, Leave to Appeal, 19 January 2006
(Docket: 31067), 2006 CarswellQue 84, appeal from 2005 CarswellQue 3270, Cour
d'appel du Québec, 2005.
399

For an answer in the affirmative, see International Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen
Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000), concerning sale of an
industrial saw. When the buyer sought to enforce guarantees and warranties contained in
the contract between the manufacturer of the saw and one of its distributors, the doctrine
of equitable estoppel precluded the buyer’s assertion that it was not bound by the
arbitration clause in contract manufacturer –distributor agreement.

400

See Marks 3-Zet-Ernst Marks GmbH v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2006), in
which an arbitraton clause between a German company and a Delaware corporation
provided only for “arbitration in the Hague under the International Arbitration rules.”
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague found no agreement to apply the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules so as to permit the arbitration to go forward under its
auspices. A request to compel arbitration made to a court in the United States was
subsequently dismissed.
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consideration? 401
22. Arbitrators award monetary sanctions for one side’s failure to comply with discovery
orders. The award is challenged on the basis that the tribunal lacked authority to
impose such a penalty. 402

401

See Douglass v. Pflueger Hawaii, Inc., 135 P. 3d 129 (Hawaii 2006), holding that an
arbitration clause failed for lack of “bilateral consideration” when included in an
employee handbook which the employer could change at will.

402

Superadio Ltd. Partnership v. Winstar Radio Productions, 446 Mass. 330, (2006),
permitting arbitrators’ imposition of sanctions for violation of discovery orders. In a case
arising from an agency for sale of advertising on radio (each side accusing the other of
failing to turn over advertising revenues), the court upheld the tribunal’s interpretation on
the AAA rules, which in Rule 23(c) authorize arbitrators “to resolve any disputes
concerning the exchange of information” As a matter of contract interpretation, the
arbitral power to award sanctions may or may not be misplaced. However, the court’s
analytic methodology seems sound, in its attempt to discern what authority the parties
granted the arbitrator. For a contrasting perspective, see Philip J. O’Neill, The
Arbitrator’s Power to Award Monetary Sanctions for Discovery Abuse, 60 DISPUTE RES.
J. 60 (Nov. 2005/Jan. 2006); Update: Massachusetts Allows Arbitrators to Award $$
Sanctions to Remedy Discovery Abuse, 61 DISPUTE RES.. J. 8 (May-August 2006). Mr.
O’Neill suggests it might be best for American judges and arbitrators simply to look to
institutional (AAA) interpretation of rules, rather than exercising independent judgment.
Decided under Massachusetts Arbitration Act rather than the FAA, Superadio also
refused to vacate the award on the ground that one side’s attorney was not admitted to
practice in Massachusetts.
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